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ABSTRACT
The purpose of  this thesis is to identify key conditions for successful industrial 
implementation of  collective extended producer responsibility (EPR) programmes in 
the Norwegian plastic packaging system, according to an industrial ecology perspective. 
‘Key condition’ is deﬁned as those factors, both drivers and barriers, which are critical 
for the outcome of  industrial implementation of  EPR. As we have seen there are several 
key conditions to be identiﬁed. We have studied this by ﬁrst developing a theoretical 
framework based on the industrial ecology perspective and combined with a modiﬁed 
understanding on categories for EPR policy instruments we have developed an analytical 
framework which combines a material ﬂow approach and an actor approach. Based 
on this we have carried out a case study of  the Norwegian EPR system for plastic 
packaging, organised by the producer responsibility organisation Plastretur. We have 
shown the complexity of  this system by doing analysis on various levels, both with 
respect to material ﬂows and to actors. Our conclusions are primarily valid for this 
system only, but we have shown how our results correspond to existing literature, both 
theoretically and in practice. 
The overall conclusion from this case study is that the Plastretur EPR scheme has 
proven to be successful with respect to recycling ratios and costs, while it has been 
less successful concerning dematerialisation and design for recycling. This conclusion 
is contrary to what is considered to be the strength of  EPR policies, but it provides 
empirical evidence for the arguments put forth by for instance Veerman (2004) on the 
Dutch system, claiming that EPR has mainly effects downstream. We argue that one of  
the reasons to this controversial result is that previous studies have not to a sufﬁcient 
extent taken into account the need for identifying the causality between EPR policy 
instruments and the observed effects. We have provided this through a detailed case 
study on various analytical levels.
v
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1. INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines extended producer responsibility (EPR) and how this policy 
principle has been implemented in the Norwegian plastic packaging industry since 1995. 
Today, more than 10 years later, the 30 % material recycling target has still not been 
reached. How can we explain this, and what can we learn from these experiences?
1.1 Background
On 14th of  September 1995, closing a long negotiating process, four agreements between 
the Norwegian Ministry of  Environment (NMoE) and industrial sectors of  packaging 
in Norway were signed (NMoE 1995a,b,c,d). The overall environmental intention 
of  these agreements, or covenants as they are denoted, was to counteract increasing 
amounts of  generated waste and increasing amount of  waste ending up at landﬁlls. The 
covenants, being preferred to a more traditional environmental tax paid by industry to 
government, challenged industry to itself  decide how to reduce the amounts of  waste 
in the most cost-efﬁcient way in order to reach certain targets deﬁned in the covenants. 
These targets were related to the rate of  collection, the rate of  material recycling and the 
rate of  energy recovery, in addition to a non-quantiﬁed waste reduction objective. 
This Norwegian example is representative for the development of  environmental public 
policy related to products. As has been realised to an ever-greater extent during the last 
decades, the environmental impact of  a product comes from its entire life cycle, and not 
only during production. Strategies and actions carried out by the upstream companies, 
‘the producers’, are thus decisive for the environmental impact later in the life cycle. This 
new understanding has paved the way for public policies where upstream companies to 
a larger extent have become obligated and responsible for the environmental impacts 
from their products beyond the production phase and particularly for the end-of-life 
(EoL) phase of  the products. This relatively new policy principle is today known as 
EPR. EPR has been applied in several OECD countries such as Japan, Australia, EU-
countries and US (OECD 1998a), and is today a frequently used approach for reducing 
environmental effects from products.
EPR is deﬁned as a policy principle (Davis 1998, Lindhqvist 2000, Tojo 2004): “Extended 
producer responsibility (EPR) is a policy principle to promote total life cycle environmental 
improvements of  product systems by extending the responsibilities of  the manufacturer 
of  the product to various parts of  the entire life cycle of  the product, and especially 
to the take-back, recycling and ﬁnal disposal of  the product”. The underlying premise 
in this deﬁnition is that the policy principle does not in itself  have the power to induce 
changes on market actors, and that the extension of  the producers’ responsibilities is 
thus implemented through tangible EPR policy instruments. Indeed, implementation 
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of  EPR in national contexts varies along a number of  dimensions, for instance type of  
environmental problem to be solved, type of  product, type of  responsibility, type of  
sectors involved, and consequently type of  policy instruments (OECD 2001). These 
dimensions will be discussed in Chapter 3.
The research on EPR has mainly been on the policy design level (OECD 2001), on 
design, implementation and evaluation of  EPR schemes (free-riders, monopoly of  
Producer Responsible Organisations (PRO), ownership etc) (OECD 1998a), on 
institutional issues and challenges (Tojo et al. 2001) and on goal attainment (Tojo 2001, 
OECD 2004). These analyses are, generally speaking, on an aggregated level leaving 
the intermediate processes and mechanisms as part of  the industrial implementation 
of  EPR fairly unknown to the policy makers. For simply knowing whether the target 
is reached or not, measuring the outcome, e.g. the actual recycling rate compared to 
the target set, is sufﬁcient. This approach however, does not provide any knowledge 
on why the outcome is the way it is. In order to improve policy design, to evaluate the 
potential for improvements within the existing policy regime, or to understand how 
various actors that are exposed to the policy instrument actually behave, both in relation 
to the policy instrument and in relation to each other, in-depth case studies on the 
industrial implementation of  EPR are needed.
OECD notes that “the primary purpose of  EPR is to provide incentives to producers 
to redesign products to make them more environmentally sound” (OECD 1998a, p 11). 
To what extent are EPR policy instruments actually designed to fulﬁl this objective? 
Thomas Lindhqvist states that “EPR is a vehicle for innovation in the design of  products 
and product systems” (Lindhqvist 2000, p. 155). Theoretically and conceptually it might 
be valid, but is it also true in reality? To what extent do EPR policy instruments actually 
inﬂuence decision-making processes within upstream companies? This thesis aims at 
diminishing this knowledge gap.
Changes on a product and company level provide, however, only the potential for getting 
the products recycled in a proper way. The organisation of  the recycling system to 
take care of  waste ﬂows has been analysed by many (OECD 1998a, OECD 2001), but 
the role of  the PROs as well as the means and instruments at hand for them to execute 
their targets, have only been studied to a limited extent. Where are the potential for 
improvements for reaching the targets? How do the PROs interact with market actors 
in order to reach the objectives?
Although various EPR schemes exist, depending on country, material- and product 
group (OECD 2001), the basic intention for all EPR take-back programmes remains 
the same – to move towards closed loops by transforming linear ﬂows into circular 
ﬂows by placing enhanced responsibility on the producers. EPR is hence an interesting 
case from an industrial ecology perspective. As a matter of  coincidence, by the time 
2
Chapter 1
Germany introduced their Packaging Law, which is regarded as the ﬁrst operational EPR 
programme, Frosch and Gallapagous (1989) employed the term ‘industrial ecosystem’ 
in their seminal article “Strategies for manufacturing” in the monthly Scientiﬁc American. 
This article was the birth of  the term ‘industrial ecology’ (IE). 
There are clearly connecting points between industrial ecology and EPR. First, several 
have argued, theoretically, that EPR is an important strategy within industrial ecology 
(Ehrenfeld 1995, Lifset & Graedel 2002). Second, the industrial ecology concept with a 
focus on systems perspective, on closing loops, on technological change and innovation, 
and on preventive strategies for reducing the environmental changes due to human 
activities, is to a large extent compatible to the EPR focus on recycling and the role 
of  upstream producers. Third, industrial ecology is regarded as a promising way of  
thinking for making environmental improvements in the future, while EPR is held 
to be a policy instrument for the next generation (Powers and Chertow 1997). Even 
though industrial ecology and EPR have emerged in the same period of  time, they have 
developed more or less independently. EPR in Norway has been implemented without 
any observed connection or relevance to industrial ecology ﬁeld of  academics (Rensvik 
1998). Fifth, both industrial ecology and EPR rely, to a greater or lesser degree, on 
market mechanisms. 
Starting from the industrial ecology perspective, the case of  EPR is in fact an example 
of  how industrial ecology ideas might be put into practice through concrete public 
policies. It is though interesting to study how well such a public policy works in practice. 
From this stand point, we regard EPR as a policy principle for implementing some of  
the ideas that are contained in the industrial ecology way of  thinking. Moreover, and 
most importantly, industrial ecology will serve as the conceptual and analytical basis for 
this study.
Industrial ecology has not to date signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced policy making, although 
some examples can be found on substance policy (Lifset 2005). However, the obvious 
common features of  industrial ecology and extended producer responsibility make it 
interesting to study their connections and coherences. Industrial ecology seems to be 
a wider concept than EPR because it includes more perspectives, larger systems and a 
more total picture of  the environmental challenge, such as improved metabolism and 
more sustainable energy patterns. Given the premise that an industrial ecology practice 
will provide more sustainable patterns, it is interesting to study the power and inﬂuence 
of  EPR to implement industrial ecology principles. It is also interesting to study whether 
EPR programmes inﬂuence and implement other industrial ecology practices than those 
which are inherent in the EPR principles. Has EPR the power to induce changes within 
organisations and industries towards an overall industrial ecology way of  thinking.
During the last decade a large number of  papers have been published on industrial ecology 
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and EPR. Theoretical papers, conceptual papers and more empirical and practical papers 
are found on both issues. Industrial ecology and EPR are to some extent discussed in 
the same paper, but these simply state (theoretically) that EPR is a signiﬁcant policy 
within the industrial ecology concept (Ehrenfeld 1995, Lifset and Graedel 2002). There 
are, as far as the author can see, no papers discussing the empirical relationship between 
industrial ecology and EPR which can test and discuss these statements.
Rather than spreading the empirical investigation over a number of  EPR schemes, 
which would have made it more complicated to control for all the variables, this study 
closely investigates one case. We have selected the case of  plastic packaging in Norway. 
There are several reasons for this. First, a voluntary agreement between industry and 
national authorities is the regulatory basis for the industrial implementation of  EPR in 
the plastic packaging sector in Norway. This voluntary agreement is from an industrial 
ecology point of  view interesting to consider as it provides an alternative to traditional 
command-and-control policies. Second, take-back schemes are considered as the purest 
form of  EPR (Gertsakis et al. 2003). Third, the link between industrial ecology and 
EPR is particularly evident in the take-back schemes since these deals with loop closing 
and transition into circular ﬂows which is a key characteristic of  industrial ecology. 
Forth, although studies show that voluntary agreements are not effective within energy- 
and production process-related settings (OECD 2003), there are few studies on the 
effects of  voluntary agreements on products for instance related to loop-closing and 
dematerialisation.
It is argued from political and administrative actors that Norwegian EPR systems are 
successful (Berntsen 2005, Brende 2003). Through the covenant the targets are set and 
it is up to the industry to ﬁnd the means and solutions to reach these targets. But the 
targets for plastic packaging have not been reached. This thesis looks into the internal 
mechanisms within this system to explain why. Hence, the Norwegian case represents an 
illustrative example as well because Norway is a relatively transparent country, making it 
easier to explain the performance of  this system and the challenges related to achieving 
the targets.
1.2 Aim of the study and research question
Despite the increasing interest in EPR as a policy for improving material ﬂows, few 
in-depth studies on the industrial implementation of  EPR have been carried out. 
Understanding the processes, dynamics and mechanisms within the EPR system is 
important to understand its outcome. The purpose of  this research is therefore to better 
understand – based on an industrial ecology perspective – the industrial implementation 
of  collective EPR programmes based on voluntary agreements. The methodological 
objective is to develop an analytical framework for studying industrial implementation 
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of  EPR based on an industrial ecology perspective. The empirical objective is to 
synthesise the achievements and lessons learned from implementation of  EPR in order 
to provide knowledge to decision-makers, on how to improve the political and industrial 
implementation of  EPR.
The main research question is this: 
What are the key conditions for successful industrial implementation of  collective EPR 
programmes in the Norwegian plastic packaging system, according to an industrial ecology 
perspective?
In addition to deﬁning EPR, we need to look into the terms ‘industrial implementation’, 
‘an industrial ecology perspective’, ‘key conditions’ and ‘successful’. These terms will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2-4, but will brieﬂy be commented upon here. 
‘Industrial implementation’ describes the processes within the industrial sector and 
companies that occur as a consequence of  EPR policy instruments. More on this will 
be provided in Chapter 3.
By ‘key conditions’ we mean the factors, both drivers and barriers, which appear to be 
critical for the outcome of  the industrial implementation of  EPR. There are obviously a 
number of  potential ‘key conditions’, and in this thesis we will employ industrial ecology 
and Giddens’ structuration theory (Giddens 1979, 1984) as basis theories for what these 
‘key conditions’ can be and where to look for them. 
The term ‘successful’ is used to express that the objective is to generate knowledge on 
how EPR systems might be improved in order to achieve targets at the lowest possible 
cost. That said, we are not aiming to analyse at which point the EPR system is successful, 
but rather pointing to drivers and barriers for the direction and speed of  the observed 
changes. Hence, this thesis studies the industrial implementation of  a certain policy to 
learn more about its successes and failures.
The ﬁnal term raised here is ‘an industrial ecology perspective’. The industrial ecology 
perspective is chosen because it deals with many of  the issues that EPR is concerned with, 
that this way of  thinking is potentially fruitful for moving towards a more sustainable 
society, and that it provides an analytical basis for studying EPR systems.
In order to make it easier for the reader to follow the arguments, we disclose the conclusion 
already here. The key factors found in this study to be signiﬁcant for successful industrial 
implementation of  EPR are:
1. Proper sorting by waste generator
2. PRO must ﬁnd a balancing role in inﬂuencing the market
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3. Explicit incentives directed towards the producers for obtaining 
changes upstream
4. Producers see the link between their own waste generation and 
the EPR recycling system
5. A mix of  EPR-based policy instruments that create pressure 
along the entire value chain must be employed. 
The remaining of  the thesis will provide explanation to justify this conclusion.
1.3 EPR-system for plastic packaging in Norway – an overview
Although companies for some time had prepared themselves for the implementation 
of  EPR, it can, for simplicity reasons, be said that the EPR implementation at sector 
level started with the signing of  the covenant in September 1995. According to the 
agreement, the role of  the government was reduced to set the boundary conditions 
and targets only, while the role of  the industrial sector was to comply with them. This 
chapter will brieﬂy present the system that the industrial sector itself  established as a 
consequence of  the covenant.
Simply stated, Plastretur is established by those who have signed the covenant with 
Norwegian Ministry of  Environment (NMoE) to collectively comply with the targets of  
30 % material recycling and 50 % energy recovery of  the plastic packaging consumption 
per year, see Figure 1.1 below. In addition there are particular targets for expanded 
polystyrene (EPS); 50 % material recycling and 10 % energy recovery. Plastretur is 
owned by the producers, packers & ﬁllers, retailers and importers in the plastic packaging 
chain (‘producers’), and ﬁnances its activities through the licence fee paid by these 
producers.
The horizontal ‘central line’ in Figure 1.1 above, from ‘upstream sector’ to ‘secondary use 
companies’, illustrates the material ﬂows of  plastic packaging in a life cycle perspective. 
Plastic packaging ﬂows from producers to consumers and waste generators, and further 
as plastic packaging waste to the waste management sector. We collectively denote all 
these on the central line as ‘direct actors’ because these actors are those who actually 
process the plastic packaging forward in the life cycle.
Given the overall objective of  reaching the targets in the covenant and the income from 
the licence fees, the key role of  Plastretur is to spend the income as efﬁciently as possible 
so that the targets are met. The operational objective of  Plastretur is then to design 
and implement systems, strategies and means (e.g. contracts, subsidies and information) 
towards the direct actors and primarily the waste management sector. However, 
strategies and means inﬂuencing the upstream sectors to design for environment, the 
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consumers and waste generators to sort and source separate correctly and the secondary 
use companies to employ recycled material, might also be signiﬁcant for achieving an 
effective system. The full and dotted lines from the box ‘Plastretur’ to the direct actors 
illustrate this. 
Figure 1.1: A schematic presentation of  the Plastretur system.
Plastretur, NMoE and other actors that inﬂuence the ﬂows of  plastic packaging without 
being in physical contact with or claiming ownership to the plastic packaging, are here 
called ‘indirect actors’. The balancing interaction between the direct and indirect actors 
makes this a market-driven EPR-system. Plastretur is a catalyst for directing the cash, 
and thereby the material and product ﬂows, in a wanted direction, and with the direct 
actors competing on a regular basis to make money. It is a collective system since the 
targets to be met are for plastic packaging as a group and not for single plastic packaging 
products.
The term ‘Plastretur EPR system’ is here used for grasping all material ﬂows, activities, 
structures and actors that are, in one way or another, inﬂuencing the fulﬁlment of  the 
covenant. The purpose of  the system is to fulﬁl the targets, consistent with the EPR 
principles discussed in Chapter 3. The EPR system for plastic packaging does, thus, not 
only include the Plastretur organisation and its activities, although this is perhaps the 
most signiﬁcant part of  the entire system.
The Plastretur EPR system for plastic packaging is based on some key principles. First, 
the objectives shall be achieved by stimulating existing, direct (market) actors and hence, 
the existing waste management industry to collect, sort and recycle the material, and to 
employ various strategies and means in order to comply with the covenant. Plastretur 
shall not develop a parallel collection and recycling system like in Germany (OECD 
1998b). Second, Plastretur should focus, due to economical reasons as stated in the 
covenant, to get the ‘cheapest’ tons ﬁrst. This proved to be within agriculture and 
commerce and industry.
Upstream sector 
(”Producers”)
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Ministry of 
Environment
PLASTRETURLICENCEFEES
STRATEGIES &
MEANS
PLASTIC
PACKAGING
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waste generators
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Third, from the very beginning in 1996, the strategy has been to ‘plan from behind’. 
This was important since Plastretur is guaranteeing collectors that there will always be 
recyclers available to receive the collected plastics. Experiences from previous plastic 
recycle efforts in Norway and Germany showed that collecting plastics without having a 
viable recycling industry was not successful both from an economical and environmental 
point of  view (Muenk 1998, OECD 1998b). Forth, Plastretur sign contracts with 
collectors, typical traditional waste management companies, by guaranteeing a minimum 
price for the collected and baled plastic packaging and delivered to the recyclers that 
Plastretur have contracted. The principle is that Plastretur shall cover the deﬁcit the waste 
management companies have when collecting, sorting and material recycling instead 
of  energy recovery, combustion or land ﬁlling. However, the collectors are obliged to 
receive plastic packaging from any waste generator free of  cost for the waste generator. 
However, they can get paid for the transport from waste generator to their recycling 
sites. The recycler gets paid for the actual amount sold.
Table 1.1 Generation of  plastic packaging waste in Norway in 2004.Sources: (a) Plastretur (2005), 
(b) Eik (2005), number from 2003, and (c) Syversen 2005
Organisation Type of product Consumption a year [tons] % of total
Plastretur Normal plastic packaging 119100 a 90.5
Plastretur EPS 4800 a 3.6
Plastretur Hazardous waste 5000 a 3.8
Resirk One-way beverage PET-bottles 1700 b 1.3
Others Some very toxic and explosive 
hazardous products
1000 c 0.8
Plastretur is running a collective system where there is no direct connection between the 
fee payer and the product(s) that is recycled. However, Plastretur is not responsible for 
plastic packaging that is subject to governmental taxes, that is one-way beverage bottles, 
which is the responsible of  Resirk. The total amount of  plastic packaging under the 
responsibility of  Resirk is 1,700 tons (Eik 2005). Hence, the Plastretur system, with its 
119,100 tons of  general plastic packaging in 2004, 4,800 tons of  EPS and 5,000 tons 
of  plastic packaging deﬁned as hazardous waste deals with 97.9 % of  the total plastic 
packaging consumption in Norway. 
We will in Chapter 7 return to a more detailed description of  the EPR system. 
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1.4 Scope and limitations
The case study is limited to the plastic packaging sector in Norway, and the ﬁrst type 
of  product shown in Table 1.1 above. The study does neither include poly-ethylene 
terephthalate (PET) beverage bottles as this fraction is covered by another regulation 
(see Eik 2005), plastic packaging of  EPS nor plastic packaging with hazardous content. 
Moreover, the study looks at one of  several variants of  EPR schemes, namely that of  
product take-back regulated by a negotiated agreement. That said, the thesis does not 
cover any entirely voluntary schemes initiated by industry without any kind of  intentional 
governmental interference. 
The study does not explicitly look at individual EPR systems, but is limited to collective 
EPR systems. Moreover, we do not intend to assess the level of  the targets in the 
covenants, whether these are ‘correct’ or not, but rather use these targets as a starting 
point for the analysis. It is the processes during the industrial implementation that reveal 
the key conditions.
We are not performing an environmental assessment of  the recycling targets set 
or recycling ratios obtained. Rather, the intention is to understand the industrial 
implementation of  EPR, leaving the assessment of  the targets to others. Moreover, 
although a material ﬂow approach will be used for studying the EPR system, we do not 
intend to develop an improved methodology for material ﬂow analysis (MFA). 
1.5 Research method
This is a case study that combines various methods for empirical investigation and 
analysis. The study consists of  one main case study covering the entire plastic packaging 
sector (the ‘Plastretur EPR system’) and of  several smaller cases on a company level 
along the entire life cycle. We employ a material ﬂow approach for studying the EPR 
system on the sector level and typical case study tools such as in-depth interviews, 
active participation, document research as well as quantitative analysis of  economic 
and environmental parameters on company level. The idea is to look deeply into this 
single case by studying all major actors along the entire life cycle, on different levels. 
Since a number of  actors are involved, and not only one company (as is normal in 
case studies), this represents a complex case. However, the results are primarily relevant 
to the boundary conditions that are valid for this case. The results will be subject to 
analytical generalisation by comparing with existing literature from other EPR systems 
(Yin 1994).
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1.6 Research context
This research started in 1998 and has been ﬁnanced by the Norwegian Research 
Council. The working environment has been at the Industrial Ecology Programme at 
the Norwegian University of  Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim. During the 
research period the author has been involved in a number of  research projects such as 
‘Productivity 2005 - Industrial Ecology’, and co-editor of  a new graduate level textbook 
within industrial ecology. For the period 2003 – 2005 the author was a guest researcher 
at Fridtjof  Nansens Institute in Oslo, and since 2002 he has also worked as a consultant 
for various Norwegian and European EPR systems.
1.7 Outline of the thesis
The structure of  the thesis is as follows:
Chapter 1. Introduction This is the present chapter that provides a background leading up 
to the aims for the study as well as the research question.
Chapter 2. Industrial Ecology – a theoretical perspective. This chapter starts with a presentation 
of  the concept of  industrial ecology based on literature in the ﬁeld. A theoretical 
framework for industrial ecology is presented, based on three dimensions i) resource 
perspective, ii) networks of  actors’ perspective and iii) systems perspective. This will be 
the structural framework for carrying out the studies on this thesis.
Chapter 3. Extended producer responsibility – a policy principle. Here we focus on EPR as a new 
policy principle and how it ﬁts with the more traditional policy instruments. Further, the 
distinction between political and industrial implementation of  EPR is elaborated.
Chapter 4. Analytical framework and research methodology. The aim of  this chapter is to provide 
the analytical framework that will be applied for studying the research questions. We start 
by introducing a general analytical approach based on the industrial ecology perspective, 
and develop thereafter the particular analytical framework to be employed for this study. 
Then we present the research design, including the various methods for collecting and 
treating the empirical evidence needed for studying the research questions. A multiple 
range of  methods have been used: MFA, case study based on interviews, surveys, data 
collection, observed participation, active participation, literature survey, secondary 
literature studies (annual reports, board documents, etc) This is a case study of  one 
system and contains in-depth studies of  an upstream company (Tine Norske Meierier 
(Tine)) and of  Plastretur as the PROs.
Chapter 5. Policy implementation of  EPR in Norway. This chapter presents data from the 
policy implementation of  EPR in plastic packaging in Norway.
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Chapter 6. Dematerialisation and loop closing in selected EPR systems The intention here is 
to gain a picture of  the dematerialisation and loop closing within plastic packaging in 
Norway. This chapter takes an overall view of  the systems studied by looking at the 
major inﬂows and outﬂows to and from national EPR systems. 
Chapter 7. Industrial implementation of  EPR on plastic packaging in Norway – sector level. This 
chapter focuses on the actual EPR-system. Important empirical information is gained 
by looking at the ﬂows of  materials, cash and information throughout the system, and 
by presenting the various actors and their overall roles in the system, and, in particular, 
studying Plastretur and its role and the challenges it faces.
Chapter 8. Industrial implementation of  EPR on plastic packaging in Norway – company level. In 
this chapter, a web survey on ‘technological change and innovation’ is ﬁrst presented. 
Then we elaborate on particular companies throughout the life cycle of  plastic packaging 
by looking into the processes and decisions that are relevant for EPR. The aim is to ﬁnd 
evidence for the effects of  EPR on a corporate level. The main focus will be on Tine 
Norske Meierier (Tine), the largest Norwegian dairy company.
Chapter 9. Key conditions for successful implementation of  EPR. In this chapter we employ the 
empirical information from Part II to discuss the research questions stated in chapter 
1. Moreover, we will discuss the implications for EPR system for plastic packaging to 
discussing the generalisation of  these results, both related to theory, methodology and 
empirically interested people.
Chapter 10. Conclusions, scientiﬁc contributions and recommendations for further studies. Here we 
draw the conclusions and recommendations for further studies.
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2. INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY – A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
The objective of  this chapter is to develop the theoretical framework needed for analysing 
the industrial implementation of  extended producer responsibility in an industrial 
ecology perspective. We will start with a discussion of  the most relevant indusial ecology 
literature for this thesis. Next, due to limitations in existing theoretical frameworks, 
a three-dimensional structure of  the ﬁeld is developed and discussed in 2.2 – 2.4. 
This structure is constituted by i) the resource perspective, ii) the networks of  actors’ 
perspective and iii) the systems perspective.
2.1 A discussion of most relevant industrial ecology literature
Industrial ecology has emerged as a unifying term during the last 16 years. The ﬁeld 
has grown considerably within academia throughout the world1. Ehrenfeld (2004) 
argues that industrial ecology is being institutionalised. The growing body of  academic 
literature on industrial ecology brings about a variety of  approaches, deﬁnitions and 
operationalisations2. For instance, Journal of  Industrial Ecology (1997) provides some 
key words considered to be signiﬁcant within the ﬁeld: ‘industrial metabolism’, 
‘dematerialisation and decarbonisation’, ‘life cycle planning, design and assessment’, 
‘design for environment’, ‘extended producer responsibility’, ‘eco-industrial parks’, 
‘product-oriented environmental policy’ and ‘eco-efﬁciency’. This diversity demonstrates 
the breadth of  the ﬁeld and its interdisciplinary character, but also the potential vagueness 
of  what the ﬁeld is actually about (Lindhqvist 2002, Johansson 2003).
Industrial ecology is suggested as a new way of  thinking for reducing the environmental 
impact from human activities (Ehrenfeld 1995). It is spoken of  as a concept, a paradigm, 
a strategy, a tool and a method, depending on the actor or the professional ﬁeld one is 
based in, and the motives the actors have3. But in the heart of  industrial ecology thinking 
is the ecological metaphor where ecological systems are viewed as models for designing 
and improving industrial systems (Graedel 1994, Socolow 1994, Ehrenfeld 1995, 2000a, 
Levine 2003,). The underlying hypothesis is that if the human society adopts principles 
in natural systems, then our society will become more sustainable4.
Frosch and Gallapagous (1989) were the ﬁrst to use the term ‘industrial ecosystem’, 
and also employed the metaphor as a commercial argument. If  industrial activities 
were interconnected as industrial ecosystems in the same way as found in Nature, 
this would be beneﬁcial both for the company and for society. Hence, extending the 
system boundaries, making production waste useful as inﬂows for other processes, is a 
key characteristic of  the ﬁeld. This extended system perspective is evident in the ﬁrst 
textbook in the ﬁeld, where industrial ecology is deﬁned as
13
“…the means by which humanity can deliberately and rationally approach and maintain 
a desirable carrying capacity, given continued economic, cultural and technological 
evolution. The concept requires that an industrial system be viewed not in isolation from 
its surrounding systems, but in concert with them. It is a systems view in which one seeks to 
optimize the total materials cycle from virgin material, to ﬁnished material, to component, 
to product, to obsolete product, and to ultimate disposal. Factors to be optimized include 
resources, energy, and capital.” (Graedel and Allenby, 1995, p. 9)5. 
The deﬁnition emphasises the system perspective, material ﬂows, life cycle perspective 
and optimisation. Engineers have always been concerned with optimising industrial 
processes, and industrial ecologists bring in costs and material ﬂows that previously 
have been overlooked due to a narrow system analytical perspective. The deﬁnition 
also points to the fact that understanding material and energy stocks and ﬂows within 
society (industrial metabolism) and between society and nature is a basic premise for 
dealing with environmental problems.  We consider environmental problems as changes 
in environmental conditions that eventually might cause human problems, or reduced 
ability to, according to Ehrenfeld (2000a, p232) “ﬂourish forever”.
It has been argued that industrial metabolism is a cornerstone within industrial ecology 
(Ayres 1989, Erkman 1997) 6. The selection of  topics and texts in A Handbook of  Industrial 
Ecology (Ayres and Ayres 2002) conﬁrms this strong focus, both methodologically and 
empirically. Thinking in terms of  industrial metabolism does not, however, explicitly take 
the interrelation between the environment and society into account as it only looks at 
what happens within the society.
Similar to all academic ﬁelds, industrial ecology is also recognised by the analytical 
approaches and methods employed for studying the topics of  interest. The methods and 
tools employed to study the stocks and ﬂows of  material and energy into, within and 
out of  industrial systems (technosphere), provide a more practical aspect of  industrial 
ecology. Wrisberg et al. (2002), Finnveden and Moberg (2005) and Brattebø et al. (2006) 
provide overviews of  available methods. Life cycle assessments (LCA) and material 
ﬂow analysis (MFA) are two methods frequently referred to as being at the core of  the 
industrial ecology concept. This is underlined by the fact that more than half  of  all 
articles published in Journal of  Industrial Ecology are on LCA and/or MFA.
The industrial ecology systems analytical methods are characterised by being system-
oriented, building on the law of  mass conservation, and having a product and life cycle 
focus. The intention is to provide as precise and reliable information as possible on 
the actual ﬂows and environmental and human impacts for decision-making, expressed 
either in monetary or physical metrics. The latest methodological developments are 
on combining methods, for instance MFA-LCA (van der Voet et al. 2004) and LCA-
IOA (Hybrid-LCA) (Strømman 2005), and the tendency is to a greater extent develop 
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mathematical expressions based on matrixes.
Lifset and Graedel (2002) provide a broader understanding than what is covered 
through the industrial metabolism. They present six core elements characterising 
industrial ecology: i) the biological analogy, ii) the use of  systems perspectives, iii) the 
role of  technological change, iv) the role of  companies, v) dematerialization and eco-
efﬁciency and vi) forward-looking research and practice (p 4). They go beyond industrial 
metabolism by recognising the role of  companies as key actors essential to bring about 
technological changes. 
Moreover, they put emphasis on the prescriptive and prospective character inherent in 
the concept, indicating like several other authors (Ehrenfeld 2000a, Boons and Rooms 
2000), that the metaphor points out ideas, potential solutions or directions towards a 
sustainable condition, bringing it further than the pure descriptive nature of  industrial 
metabolism. They consider the ecological part of  the industrial ecology term to be 
understood in at least two different senses; “industrial ecology looks to non-human 
“natural” ecosystems as models for industrial activity” and “industrial ecology places 
human activity […] in the context of  the larger ecosystems that support it” (p. 4). They 
put less emphasis on explaining why these six elements are chosen to characterise the 
ﬁeld and how these are interrelated. 
Several scholars have paid attention to the shortcomings of  industrial metabolism’s ability 
to grasp the interrelation between nature and the environment. For instance, Kay (2002) 
deﬁnes industrial ecology as “the ﬁeld of  integrating/adapting production consumption 
systems into the limited ability of  natural ecosystems to provide energy and absorb 
waste”. Based on this, Kay proposes four industrial ecology design principles, by stating 
that the design of  production-consumption systems should be such that:
1. the interface between societal systems and natural ecosystems reﬂects 
the limited ability of  natural ecosystems to provide energy and absorb 
waste before their survival potential is signiﬁcantly altered, and that 
the survival potential of  natural ecosystems must be maintained. This 
is referred to as the problem of  interfacing.
2. the behaviour and structure of  large-scale social systems should be 
as similar as possible to those exhibited by natural ecosystems. This 
is referred to […] as the principle of  bionics (in the IE literature it is 
often referred to as mimicry).
3. whenever feasible, the function of  a component of  a societal system 
should be carried out by a subsystem of  the natural biosphere. This is 
referred to as using appropriate biotechnology.
4. non-renewable resources are used only as capital expenditures to 
bring renewable  resources on line.
15
Industrial ecology - a theoretical perspective
A somewhat similar radical understanding of  industrial ecology is put forth by Ehrenfeld 
(1995). He operationalises industrial ecology, building on the work by Tibbs (1992), by 
classifying the main elements of  industrial ecology into two main groups: i) “Critical 
technologies and infrastructure” and ii) “The design of  new roles and new rules”. This is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1 where we have illustrated the need for balanced approaches by placing the 
two groups of  elements on each side of  a pair of  scales. 
The ﬁrst group contains elements that industrial systems should head for in order to 
become more similar to natural ecosystems. The second group contains regulatory and 
institutional elements in order to identify new roles and new rules for the actors. A 
balance between these two groups is needed as designing social institutions and framing 
conditions which contribute to improve environmental situation is just as important 
as designing technical products and production systems. This again emphasizes the 
importance of  an interdisciplinary approach to industrial ecology (Røine 2000). However, 
the academic focus has so far been mostly on the left side of  the ﬁgure (Korhonen et 
al. 2004).
Figure 2.1 Balance between technological and institutional improvement
This categorisation invites to the discussion whether industrial ecology is normative 
or descriptive. Ehrenfeld (2000a) argues that it is both, and gets support on this view 
from Andrews 2000, Boons and Rooms 2000, Opoku 2004, Brattebø et al. 2006, to 
mention a few. The ﬁeld is occupied with developing methods for analysing stocks 
and ﬂows of  materials and energy in products, process and infrastructure in order to 
reduce the environmental burden from these in a life cycle perspective. Ehrenfeld (2000) 
Balance in design and implementation
Critical
technologies
and
infrastructure
New roles 
and new rules
Improving the metabolic pathways of industrial 
processes and material use
Dematerialise industrial output
Creating loop-closing industrial ecosystems
Systematising patterns of energy use
Towards sustainability
Balancing industrial input and output to natural 
ecosystem capacity
Aligning policy to conform with long-term 
industrial system evolution
Creating new action-coordinating structures, 
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16
Chapter 2
categorises this as the descriptive-analytical aspect of  industrial ecology since it aims at 
bringing knowledge about past, present and future stocks and ﬂows.
The normative part of  industrial ecology is the ecological metaphor that offers models 
and strategies for carrying out needed changes, besides indicating direction of  the changes. 
Industrial ecology is driven by the concern for the environmental impacts from human 
activities (Lifset and Graedel 2002). Ayres (1999) points to this direction when arguing 
that a future stable state may exist in which material resources are consumed and recycled 
efﬁciently and completely as in stable natural ecosystems, with exergy obtained from the 
only renewable source, namely the sun. A closed ‘industrial ecosystem’ will eliminate 
material wastes or convert them into raw materials and deliver immaterial services to 
ﬁnal consumers. 
van der Voet et al. (2001) understand the metaphor as basically a source for ideas, but 
not for normative ‘shoulds’ when arguing that “the metaphor can, in a technical sense, 
teach us useful lessons on how to arrange the processes most efﬁciently, how to prevent 
losses from cycle, what the usefulness is of  certain policy measures in terms of  the 
problems they intend to solve, how to spot problem shifting to other areas, to other 
environmental problems or to other time periods” (p. 2), but warns industrial ecologist 
to “arrange society or at least the processes related to production, consumption and 
waste management, based on inherent notions of  a right or wrong way to do, as there 
is no morality in Nature” (p 2). Moreover, Isenmann (2003), Ehrenfeld (2003), Allenby 
(1999), Boons and Roome (2000), Johansson (2002) and Spiegelman (2003) all contribute 
further to this discussion on metaphors and the normative-descriptive character of  
industrial ecology7.
The main focus within the ﬁeld of  industrial ecology has been on describing and 
mapping the actual, historical material ﬂows and environmental impacts by using the 
methods explained above. Given that industrial ecology also is a normative guide for 
understanding technical systems as part of  a larger industrialised society, it is an implicit 
consequence that transitions from current to a more sustainable state are needed. An 
important question in industrial ecology literature is: How do we get there? Dealing 
with social systems also involves the powers and factors of  interacting humans, which 
involves an entirely new ﬁeld of  knowledge, namely the social sciences. Erkman (1997, 
p. 1) interprets the idea of  industrial ecology as 
“ﬁrst to understand how industrial system works, how it is regulated, and its interaction 
with the biosphere; then, on the basis of  what we know about ecosystems, to determine how 
it could be restructured to make it compatible with the way natural ecosystems function”
Like Erkman, White (1994) indicates the need for understanding how these ﬂows can 
be changed and redirected when he deﬁnes industrial ecology as
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 “the study of  the ﬂows of  materials and energy in industrial and consumer activities, of  
the effects of  these ﬂows to the environment, and of  the inﬂuences of  economic, political, 
regulatory, and social factors on the ﬂow, use, and transformation of  resources”.
First, White does not limit his deﬁnition to the core activities of  industrial companies, 
but includes consumer activities as well as part of  the industrial ecology system. Second, 
in order to comply with the prescriptive objective of  transforming material ﬂows towards 
an improved industrial metabolism, White explicitly goes beyond ‘industrial metabolism’ 
by including the need for understanding the factors that actually inﬂuence stocks and 
ﬂow. How can we for instance understand the internal business mechanisms that induce 
environmental improvements, and the role of  public policy in stimulating business to 
improve products and processes? White’s focus on factors is implicitly supported by 
Ehrenfeld when he, conceptually, argues for the need for “new roles and new rules” 
(Ehrenfeld 1995). Thus, we might ﬁnd both conceptual and empirical papers on this as 
well as articles on company level and sector/national level. 
If  you look at relevant journals, for instance Journal of  Industrial Ecology and Journal of  
Cleaner Production, you see that there are very few articles that deal with inﬂuencing 
factors, both conceptually and empirically. On the conceptual side, some papers 
discuss, ex ante, innovation and design for environment on corporate level and EPR 
on the national/societal level. Empirical studies concerning inﬂuencing factors are rare, 
although Røine and Lee (2006) provide an empirical ex-post study that look at how EPR 
induce technological change and innovation on both corporate and national level, and 
King and Lenox (2001) provide an empirical study on the causality between ﬁnancial 
and environmental performance.
Moreover, van der Voet et al. (1994, 1996) provide studies that employ Substance Flow 
Analysis (SFA) for mapping the stocks and ﬂow of  various substances (cadmium and 
nitrogen) and then discuss the implications for policy design and changes. These are, 
however, studies on aggregated national levels, and do not incorporate company studies 
and the (potential) policy effects on these actors. Most important is to get empirical 
knowledge on how various factors inﬂuence actual material ﬂows as “macro level 
analysis of  materials and energy ﬂows tell us little about how to improve the efﬁciency 
of  the industrial ecosystem” (Andrews 2000, p38).
Going through journals on for instance environmental policy, innovation and management 
reveal the fact that articles cover relevant factors but seldom connect these factors 
directly to industrial ecology topics such as material ﬂows, life cycle improvements, 
dematerialisation and loop closing. Apparently, there is a missing link, illustrated also 
by the fact that A Handbook of  industrial ecology (Ayres and Ayres 2002) includes some 
non-metabolic aspects of  industrial ecology, without actually providing a systematic 
presentation of  the actors and factors that inﬂuence material ﬂows (Bohne et al. 2004). 
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Moreover, studies on both internal and external drivers for companies to implement 
industrial ecology are rare. The discrepancy between the ambitions of  the ﬁeld is most 
evident when we look at how changes and implementation in practice actually occur. 
Peck (2003) points out that empirical knowledge on the effects of  policy instruments, 
both on company and national level, is imperative to avoid being naive regarding the 
complexity of  social change processes.
Some have argued for extending the focus from factors to actors since actors constantly 
make conscious and unconscious decisions that are decisive for the actual material ﬂows 
(Andrews 2000, Brattebø et al. 1999, Røine and Opoku 2000, Eik 2005). The actors, be 
it individuals, ﬁrms and/or governmental agencies, all have, ﬁrst and foremost, their 
own self-interests that they seek to maximise. Thus, “[I]ndividuals are fundamentally 
interesting units of  analysis as well as being building blocks for aggregate agents like 
ﬁrms and nations” (Andrews 2000, p 36). Despite this, only a few industrial ecologists 
have asked “what species are present and what are their roles and distinguishing feature” 
(ff). Moreover, recalling Ehrenfeld (1995), there is a need for empirical knowledge to be 
able to actually design new roles and rules. On the contrary, Jackson and Clift (1998) 
argues that “[w]ithout such theory [of  agency], we will be at a loss to determine which 
actors should take which steps and whether the incentives are in place to encourage 
them to act appropriately” (p. 3). 
In summing up, the literature on industrial ecology is to a large extent dominated by 
methodological and empirical studies on industrial metabolism, as well as on conceptual 
papers regarding the ecological metaphor and efforts to deﬁne the ﬁeld. Less attention 
has been given to factors that inﬂuence this metabolism, although some studies have 
been done on corporate level particularly related to design for environment and on 
national level on the inﬂuence of  policy instruments (van der Voet et al. 1994). However, 
these have to be complemented by empirical studies, particularly on corporate level, in 
order to understand the mechanisms that induce technological changes and innovation. 
So far, industrial ecology does not appear as a separate, established science, but rather 
as a young and ‘immature’ concept that has not entirely developed into a discipline. 
No strong common agreement of  terminology and deﬁnitions exist, no authoritative 
epistemology and theory of  science (Lifset and Graedel 2002). It appears rather as a 
collection of  concepts, perspectives, strategies and tools. 
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2.2 Structuring industrial ecology – a three-dimensional 
approach
Like other scientiﬁc ﬁelds, industrial ecology is through theories, models, methods and 
analysis producing knowledge to better understand the real world (Boons and Rooms 
2000). The actors and structures in the real world represent forces and factors inﬂuencing 
the paths of  the materials and energy through design and implementation of  policies 
(authorities) and strategies (ﬁrms and consumers). Industrial ecology provides ideas 
and inspiration to improve industrial practice related to sustainability. Figure 2.2 below 
illustrates these two realms8.
There are, however, still deﬁciencies in the existing theoretical frameworks that can be 
applied for developing the analytical framework for studying the ‘real world’ in this thesis 
(ref. Figure 2.2). The main problem is the limited focus on how to carry out changes, 
what actors might be signiﬁcant in this (Andrews 2000) and the apparent distance 
between the ambitions of  the ﬁeld and the actual results (O’Rourke et al. 1997). To cope 
with this, we propose a 3-dimensional structure of  the ﬁeld: i) resource perspective, ii) 
networks of  actors’ perspective and iii) systems perspective. 
Figure 2.2 Two realms of  industrial ecology
First, understanding the stocks and ﬂows of  material and energy is a core element of  
industrial ecology. This might not be limited to ﬂows within society, but should preferably 
also include the ﬂows of  material and energy from nature to society and back again. 
Moreover, the role of  the industrial ecology metaphor is not yet precisely understood 
and investigated. Based on Lifset and Graedel (2002), Kay (2002) and Ehrenfeld (1995, 
2004), among others, we develop the resource perspective as fundamental within industrial 
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ecology. This perspective distinguishes between the interface aspect and the mimicry 
aspect.
Second, studies on material ﬂows and environmental impacts usually leave the actors as 
‘black boxes’. The processes within the black box remain unknown. As pointed out by 
Andrews (2000) and Jackson and Clift (1998) it is the individuals (as private individuals 
or as representing ﬁrms, governmental institutions etc.) that actually make decisions. 
Similar to ecological systems, there are networks of  actors within industrial systems that 
are interconnected in webs of  interests and dependencies (Ehrenfeld 2004). In order to 
understand the underlying mechanisms that cause the actual material ﬂows, we propose 
the networks of  actors’ perspective to be a signiﬁcant dimension of  industrial ecology. In 
order to understand the mechanisms of  change, we need to look into the single actors 
and their networks. We also need to look into both internal and external factors (drivers 
and barriers) for the companies, which inﬂuence the ‘space of  action’ for the actors.
Third, the systems perspective is argued to be a core characteristic of  industrial ecology and 
appears as both a physical and an analytical extension of  systems boundaries (Brattebø 
1995, van der Voet 1996, Erkman 1997). Firstly, the systems perspective is materialised 
through physical interconnecting solutions for material and energy ﬂows that go beyond 
the traditional processing plant towards industrial eco-parks such as Kalundborg (Frosch 
and Gallapagous 1989, Ehrenfeld and Gertler 1997, Ehrenfeld and Chertow 2001). This 
physical dimension of  the systems perspective is covered by the resource perspective. 
Secondly, the systems perspective has an analytical dimension by extending the systems 
boundaries in time and space as well as in relation to the number of  actors and factors 
included in the analyses. We will now look into these three perspectives.
2.3 The resource perspective
As seen in Figure 2.1, Ehrenfeld’s four elements within the category ‘Critical technologies 
and infrastructure’ raise some questions: How do these elements actually relate to 
each other and can each of  them, for instance dematerialisation, be deduced from the 
metaphor? In order to grasp the content of  the resource perspective, we distinguish 
between the interface aspect and the mimicry aspect. 
2.3.1 The interface aspect
There are continuous interactions between the environment and industrial economic 
systems9 due to the fact that human activities are inevitably based on use and consumption 
of  natural resources10. Industrial economic systems are subsystems to ecological 
systems.
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Natural resources are extracted from the environment, brought into the industrial 
economic systems, processed into useful qualities and concentrations, ending up as 
products or energy carriers. As illustrated in Figure 2.3, the inﬂows are currently larger 
than the outﬂows, giving accumulation of  materials in society. Moreover, the stocks and 
throughput in the industrial economic systems have increased considerably over the 
centuries and particularly the last decades. According to the law of  mass conservation11, 
however, the historical input must sooner or later leave the global economic systems 
and enter the environment again, and larger outﬂows are thus expected in the future, 
see Figure 2.4. The ﬂow of  materials from the environment to the industrial economic 
systems and back to nature again can be regarded as the ‘big loop’. 
Figure 2.3 Relation between environment and the industrial economic systems. 
Figure 2.4 shows three situations (‘past’, ‘now’ and ‘future’) all with larger inﬂows than 
outﬂows, which provide addition to stocks (accumulation). If  inﬂows equal outﬂows 
there is a steady state situation. Estimating future outﬂows provides knowledge for 
designing public policies to cope with these12.
Figure 2.4 Size of  inﬂows, stocks and outﬂows from industrial economic systems in a historic 
perspective
The environmental consequences of  human activities depend to a large extent on type 
and quantity of  resources used, and in what quantity and quality the materials re-enter 
the environment. We distinguish between three different types of  resources:
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1. The renewable resources that are input to society. Examples of  renewable 
resources are the sun, wind, forests and ﬁsh. Renewable resources 
are those that can repeat themselves, reproduce or propagate. Proper 
management of  these resources means that the consumption must 
not exceed the interests of  nature capital in the actual region.
2. The non-renewable resources that are input to society. Examples of  these 
are fossil fuels and inorganic material13. Good management of  these 
resources means that the consumption must be evaluated in relation 
to the total amount available and the degree of  substitution of  
renewable resources covering the same function. 
3. The emergent properties in Nature that are inﬂuenced by extraction to and 
emissions from society. Local and global eco-systems are examples of  
these resources. Good management of  these means that extractions 
(e.g. deforestation in the Amazons) and emissions should be on a 
level that eco-systems can handle within their buffering capacities so 
that their emergent properties are not permanently disturbed. The 
buffering capacity is that systems can sustain external inﬂuences up 
to a certain point, and if  this point is exceeded, the system will change 
dramatically or even collapse14.
Based on this categorisation of  resources and keeping in mind that there are physical 
limits to the possible growth in industrial economies (Boulding 1966, Georgescu-
Rougen 1971, Daly 1991), the environmental consequences of  the interactions can be 
reduced by looking at i) the resource input to society and ii) the harm of  the outﬂows 
from society.
Reduced resource input may have three primary effects; i) less disturbance to the eco-
systems, ii) less material throughput requires less energy and iii) reduced inputs result 
in reduced outputs. As for the outﬂows, these might cause harm primarily because of  
two reasons. First, industrial economic systems manufacture artiﬁcial compounds that 
are not present in Nature (e.g. certain petrochemicals, chlor ﬂuorine carbones (CFCs)), 
and with no decomposition properties these will accumulate and eventually disturb 
eco-systems and their emergent properties. Second, society emits compounds that are 
present in Nature (for instance CO
2
) but in such a large quantity that these will disturb 
the natural processes15. 
As noted by Lifset and Graedel (2002), the ‘ecology’-part of  industrial ecology may 
have two meanings. Their point on industrial economic systems being subsystems to 
the ecological systems is covered above and we denote it the interface aspect. Two groups 
constitute the interface aspect: i) reducing resource input and ii) changing towards less 
harmful ﬂows. Reducing resource input in material terms is about dematerialisation, 
while in energy terms this is about energy conservation and conversion efﬁciency. 
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Changing towards less harmful ﬂows is correspondingly about transmaterialisation and 
decarbonisation. Table 2.1 below summarises this. We will here only discuss the issues 
relevant for this thesis, and hence, we will not discuss the energy issues.
Table 2.1 The interface aspect
Material Energy
Reducing resource input Dematerialisation Energy conservation and 
conversion efﬁciency
Changing towards less harmful ﬂows Transmaterialisation Decarbonisation
2.3.1.1 Reduce resource inputs
Dematerialisation is a key element in the industrial ecology concept and has been a 
continuous topic in the literature16. Dematerialisation is primarily measured on the input 
side to an industrial system, and is a quantitative measure of  the material ﬂows, not 
taking into account the environmental impacts of  these ﬂows17. Dematerialisation is 
deﬁned as “the absolute and relative reduction in the quantity of  materials used and/or 
the quantity of  waste generated in the production of  an economic unit” (Cleveland and 
Ruth 1998, p. 16).
Dematerialisation can be explained on different levels and scales. For illustrative 
purposes we employ national level and company level in order to distinguish between 
the level of  common goods (national) and private goods (company). This distinction 
is important for understanding the different roles of  the actors and consequently the 
different strategies they accomplish. Further, we distinguish between absolute scale and 
speciﬁc scale. On the absolute scale we measure the total material input to for instance a 
company, a country or the Earth, during a certain period of  time, for instance a year. On 
the contrary, in the speciﬁc scale the material ﬂow is not only related to the time period 
but also to the economic performance or the product speciﬁcation. Table 2.2 sums up 
different indicators that can be employed for measuring dematerialisation along the 
lines of  scale and level. 
On national level total material requirement (TMR) is the overall quantitative indicator. 
TMR is the total domestic extraction and import into the system (e.g. a nation) as well 
as the hidden ﬂows, and is measured on a weight-basis [kg/yr]. It should be noted that 
indicators on absolute scale is the basis for developing indicators on speciﬁc scale. MFA 
is the collective term for the tools available for measuring the material ﬂows at absolute 
scale (Brunner and Rechberger 2003). 
On the speciﬁc scale, the numbers from the absolute scale are employed for relating 
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this to, for instance, economic performance or number of  products. A number of  
indicators can be developed based on this, depending on what kind of  information that 
is requested. 
A common quantitative indicator on national level is decoupling, which expresses the 
relation between the environmental and the economic performance, e.g. material input 
and the gross domestic product (GDP). Measuring this during several years will provide 
a picture of  the material requirements for the actual level of  economic activity. If  a de-
coupling can be observed, this is an indication of  relative improvement in environmental 
performance. If  GDP is measured per capita, the indicator can be compared with other 
nations.
Table 2.2 Dematerialisation along various levels and scales
Absolute scale Speciﬁc scale
National level Total material 
requirement [kg/yr]
De-coupling [€/kg], material poductivity 
[GDP/TMR] or material intensity [kg/€]
Company level Total resource use 
[kg/yr]
Material Input pr Service [kg/€] or Eco-
efﬁciency [€/kg]
Eco-efﬁciency is a frequently employed term, both as a strategy and as an indicator, for 
expressing the relation between the value creation and the corresponding environmental 
inﬂuence18. It expresses the same on the company and product level as de-coupling 
does on the national level. As an indicator, eco-efﬁciency can only be measured on the 
speciﬁc scale. This is frequently raised as a criticism of  eco-efﬁciency (Ehrenfeld 1997a, 
2000). The purpose of  eco-efﬁciency is very simple – to maximise value creation and 
minimise environmental burdens. 
Business strategies for obtaining dematerialisation include reducing the weight 
of  products, which provides reduced extraction of  materials and reduced energy 
consumption during transportation from ﬁnal producer to wholesalers. 
Further, increased use of  recycled material will reduce the gross extraction of  virgin 
material. Whether the net extraction of  virgin material will also be reduced depends 
on the material consumption for carrying out the recycling processes. Redesign of  the 
products and restructuring of  the market for these products, for instance leasing instead 
of  selling, are suggested as promising strategies for dematerialisation (Stahel 1994). 
There is, however, a lack of  empirical evidence that such dematerialisation actually takes 
place.
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2.3.1.2 Change towards less harmful outﬂows
The industrial society manufactures compounds that are not present in nature. The 
ecosystems do not have natural processes to take care of  the emissions of  these 
compounds which may cause harm to both environmental and human health. CFCs 
and dioxins are examples of  such compounds. In this context, transmaterialisation 
is an important concept as “industries continually replace old materials with newer, 
technologically more advanced material” (Labys 2002, p. 204). This is the familiar path 
of  industrial innovation, but from the environmental point of  view, the demand to be 
fulﬁlled is not only related to functionality in use phase, but also the environmental 
impact throughout the life cycle. A general trend for instance, is the relative increase in 
plastics consumption as compared to other materials such as steel. 
There are thousands of  types of  materials employed in the society with different 
characteristics. The ﬁeld of  industrial ecology contributes to ﬁnd balanced choices between 
a dematerialisation strategy and a transmaterialisation strategy. Dematerialization implies 
that a reduction of  the environmental pressure should be accomplished by a reduction 
of  the ﬂow of  materials on weight basis. An improvement might also be accomplished 
by a transmaterialisation, a substitution of  materials with less environmental burden for 
harmful and/or scarce materials, for instance aluminium substituting for copper. 
2.3.2 The mimicry aspect of industrial ecology 
Lifset and Graedel’s (2002) second point, that ecological systems are models for industrial 
economic systems, is about the industrial ecology analogy and metaphor. We will call 
it the mimicry aspect. The mimicry aspect helps to identify similarities and differences 
between industrial and natural systems, which might stimulate new ideas for how to 
improve industrial economic systems. 
The similarities, for instance the fact that there are stocks and ﬂows of  energy and 
material in both ecological systems and industrial systems, constitute the ecological analogy. 
The differences clear the way for developing the ecological metaphor (Ehrenfeld 2003). The 
current differences between practice in industrial systems and what is found in natural 
systems, for example loop closing, use of  renewable energy, design of  robust systems 
with resilience, become inspirations for actors to head towards.
The mimicry aspect does not take into account the size of  the actual material ﬂows, the 
environmental consequences of  these, the physical limits of  the Earth to support human 
activities nor the sink-capacities of  the eco-systems, and is thus decoupled from the 
actual interactions in real world. The mimicry aspect is a realm of  potential solutions that 
must be scrutinized in a real world context. Several scholars argue that this aspect is very 
powerful for achieving sustainability (Ehrenfeld 2004). The interface aspect, however, 
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takes these actual connections and mutuality between the society and the environment 
into account and represents to a large extent what Ehrenfeld (2000a) calls “descriptive 
and analytic”, while the mimicry aspect is “paradigmatic, normative and metaphorical” 
(p. 229)19. There are several elements within the present industrial ecology concept that 
cannot be explained through this metaphoric and analogical perspective. 
For example, dematerialisation is indeed part of  the industrial ecology perspective, but 
it cannot be derived from natural ecological systems. Dematerialisation does not exist in 
natural systems. On the contrary, industrial systems’ dematerialisation can exist also in 
absolute terms. Less material can be extracted from the environment to the technosphere, 
making this a dematerialised system. The reason is that industrial economic systems are 
subsystems to the ecological systems.
A number of  properties and characteristics of  ecological systems might stimulate 
actors within industrial economic systems to be creative and come up with ideas and 
solutions for how to improve the environmental performance. For instance, as noted 
by Ehrenfeld: ‘I believe that the power of  the concept of  industrial ecology lies in its 
normative context and in its potential to shape paradigmatic thinking. It is normative 
in the sense that the above-mentioned three features of  the ecological metaphor 
– community, connectedness, and cooperation – are characteristics we should strive 
for in designing our worlds. We ought to become more like an ecological community.’ 
(Ehrenfeld 2000, p. 238)
Exploring the metaphorical power within the mimicry aspect is important to bring 
the ﬁeld forward. For instance, employing renewable energy resources is part of  this 
mimicry aspect as natural systems are entirely driven by this type of  energy source. We 
will here however, limit ourselves to present the characteristic of  ecological systems 
that are frequently mentioned in the ﬁeld and that are relevant in this thesis; degradable 
waste and closed cycles.
2.3.2.1 Degradable waste and closed cycles
There are two types of  loops which are important to look at: i) process loops and ii) 
product loops. A product loop can be closed in basically two ways, by using recycled 
material or components in the same product system (closed loop recycling) or by using 
recycled material or components in another product system (open loop recycling). A 
process loop can be closed if  waste ﬂows from production are integrated into the same 
production or if  the waste ﬂow is utilised as input to another production process, as in 
Kalundborg (Ehrenfeld and Gertler 1997). The basic idea of  a loop is that the material 
is not emitted to the environment and hence being unavailable for future use.
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A completely closed production system, with respect to both matter and energy, is 
impossible, due to physical and chemical laws. This opens for a new type of  closed 
process loop strategy, namely so-called industrial eco-parks, clusters and industrial 
symbiosis networks and clusters. The key point here is that matter and energy that 
inevitably becomes waste in one production plant might be useful for other companies/
production plants; either geographically close by or far away.
The main difference between closing the process loops in one production plant and 
closing process loops in an eco-park, is that the latter consists of  more units, usually 
several legally independent ﬁrms, and that it is geographically more extended. The 
industrial symbiosis in Kalundborg Municipality in Denmark is a frequently quoted 
example of  an eco-park where waste ﬂows of  matter and energy are exchanged between 
ﬁrms instead of  emitting these resources directly into the air, water or soil. This feature, 
the interconnectedness of  ﬂows, is a fundamental characteristic of  ecological systems, 
and should therefore be encouraged in other industrial systems as well. There is 
obviously a close connection between different companies in value chains, but what is 
more uncommon is the interconnection between ﬁrms that are not in the same value 
chain, but that nevertheless can potentially interchange process waste. 
Figure 2.5 Recovery options for closing the product loop
A product’s life cycle consists of  several processes and moving towards product loop 
closing means that one sequence is added at the end-of-life (EoL) phase, so that the 
material is processed instead of  emitted into the environment. This process, like every 
other process, demands energy, and there is always a trade-off  between the gains of  
carrying out the recycling process and the loss due to actual input of  energy. Talking 
about actually closing the product loop means focus on the end-of-life phase.
There are several strategies that can be employed for obtaining this. Figure 2.5 identiﬁes 
four options: reuse of  products and repair; reuse of  components; material recycling and 
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energy recovery. In the given consecutive way, this is referred to as the waste hierarchy. 
In reality, there is a mix of  these options. All these strategies show that it is possible to 
utilise the materials and resources once extracted from the Earth and imported to the 
industrial economic systems.
Waste prevention is also an option to reduce the environmental impact from the EoL 
phase. Although the actual closing of  the product loop happens in post-use phase, 
actions can be taken earlier in the product’s life cycle to prepare for recycling and 
recovery. Through design for recovery, including for instance choice of  material, 
packaging solutions, dismantling and transportation method, upstream companies 
can make it easier for those companies actually carrying out the recovery in post-use 
phase. Differently from closing process loops, however, the companies may not have 
the incentives for doing this (Frosch 1994). Extended producer responsibility is a policy 
that provides better incentives for these recovery options for closing the product loop. 
If  recycled plastic packaging waste in Norway is employed in other types of  products, 
there is an open loop and the material is transferred to another product system. If  
employed within the same product system there is a closed loop. The differences between 
process loops, product loops and product systems loops are shown in Figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6 The interconnections within and between different product systems
Loop closing is about utilising the resources as much as possible once they are imported 
to the economy. Keeping the materials available within the system as long as possible is 
both energy- and material-demanding, and hence there is again, also a trade-off  between 
the gain of  keeping the material within the system and the cost of  using energy and 
resources to do this. 
Reuse, recycling, and energy recovery avoid materials and products to end directly at 
disposal sites and minimise loss of  materials to environment. As for recycling, this 
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has both a quantitative and qualitative aspect. The quantitative efﬁciency expresses the 
relation between material input to and output from the waste management system. 
The qualitative aspect has two characteristics; the actual quality of  the recycled material 
(for instance compared to virgin material) and the material quality requirements in the 
product it is used.
2.4 The networks of actors’ perspective
The promising ideas of  industrial ecology must be translated into daily practice in 
society, in politics, in industrial strategies and practice and in consumer behaviour, if  
noticeable changes and improvements are to actually come about. In this process, the 
industrial sector has a signiﬁcant role to play, as the term itself  indicates. The reason 
is mainly twofold: companies contribute considerably to the environmental impact 
and at the same time they have the knowledge, capacity and power to come up with 
new, more efﬁcient and improved technical solutions for environmental improvement. 
However, a ﬁrm’s ability to make improvements depends also on other actors and 
boundary conditions. Thus, the key question still remains: Does industrial ecology bring 
any substantial new solutions for reducing the ‘concerns about human impact on the 
biophysical environment’ (Lifset and Graedel 2002, p 10)?
The normative and goal-oriented aspects of  industrial ecology as presented above, 
imply that studying and understanding social and industrial transformation and change 
on macro level, as well as how the single actors are involved in the ﬂows on micro 
level must be an explicit part of  the ﬁeld (Andrews 2000, Jackson and Clift 1998). The 
metaphor provides inspiration on what to implement, but less on how to implement it 
and who should be responsible for and involved in the implementation. Once accepting 
that industrial ecology has a normative aspect, the ﬁeld, thus, turns to be not merely a 
descriptive-analytical exercise (Ehrenfeld 2000a). This includes knowledge on innovation, 
on product, process, product system and national levels, on consumption patterns and 
consumer behaviours, on dynamics of  public policies and industrial behaviour, on how 
various actors actually act within various political regimes, and on how to design robust 
political frameworks that promote industrial ecology practice within the networks of  
actors. The individual actors (or companies as group of  individuals) make decisions 
that might (or might not) alter the structures. By taking actors as starting point and 
elaborating on their actions and the structures (factors) they consequently constitute, 
we denote this part of  the industrial ecology concept as the networks of  actors’ perspective. 
This derives from the interconnectedness found in Nature between different actors 
(Ehrenfeld 2000a). 
We will employ Giddens structuration theory (Giddens 1979, 1984) as the theoretical 
basis for understanding how actors inﬂuence and are inﬂuenced by external and internal 
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structures such as for instance public policies and organisational culture. Giddens 
combines a subjective and objective approach saying that structure is the basis for 
individual actions and that individual agents conﬁrm existing structures or produce new 
ones through action20. Structure and action are thus, two integrated notions contributing 
to dynamics and changes. Giddens does not look at structures as given, external, 
over-individual and physical facts that determine human action. Giddens shows that 
apparently ﬁxed structures are continuously produced and reproduced through human 
actions, and at the same time these structures are the starting point for further action. 
Thus, structures are both the medium for and the result of  action21.
The structuration theory recognizes that human actions are enabled and constrained by 
structures and that these structures are the cumulative history of  previous actions. The 
structure is either reproduced (stays unchanged) or produced (altered) through action. 
“Structuration theory focuses on the dynamics by which structures are reproduced or 
altered” (Barley and Tolbert 1997, p. 112). According to Giddens, the structuration 
consists of  three structural dimensions; signiﬁcation, domination and legitimation. 
These three dimensions are always present, but the content of  them will change as a 
result of  action. To these areas belong so-called modalities, which one can describe as 
the means of  interactions. This can be seen from Figure 2.7 below.
Figure 2.7 Giddens’ structuration theory
‘Signiﬁcation’ relates to knowledge and shared cognitive understanding of  an individual, 
company or society. It is concerned about what we understand as important and includes 
our basic values and beliefs. The modality is interpretative schemes, and the process of  
human interaction is communication. ‘Domination’ represents facilities like authoritative 
and allocative resources. Authorative resources are extended over people, while allocative 
resources are extended over objects or material phenomena. The actors are able to 
deploy power due to these resources. Finally, ‘legitimation’ concerns the norms and rules 
that individuals draw on in justifying their own actions and that of  others. Summing up, 
structural properties of  a social system consist of  rules and resources that actors draw 
on in their everyday interaction.
Giddens strongly emphasises the reﬂexive and knowledgeable actors and that their 
interactions are results of  their reﬂexive processes. Reﬂexivity is based on the properties 
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of  the human being(s) in question and its inner will, values and basic assumptions, 
captured in ‘signiﬁcation’. As noted by Ehrenfeld (2000b) ‘Giddens theorises that 
such visions and values create the tools and power relationships that in turn reinforce 
and further embed those visions and values in the cultural underpinnings of  routine 
actions’(p. 200) For instance, the concept of  industrial ecology might inﬂuence the 
actors’ organisation culture at various levels as illustrated in Figure 2.8 below, and the 
underlying understanding on abstract level is decisive for what happens on the practical 
level22
Giddens is criticized for putting too much emphasis on the knowledgeable actor, and 
less on the signiﬁcance of  external, slow and causal functioning structures (Guneriussen 
1999). The criticism is based on the fact that the actor does not have full information 
on the consequences of  their actions. This is particularly relevant in an environmental 
perspective where the consequences of  a human activity often are unintended. Moreover, 
although knowledgeable, the actors’ space of  action is also limited by the structures.
Figure 2.8 Different analytical levels in a random organisational culture as seen from an industrial 
ecology perspective
Why is Giddens’ structuration theory selected as the one applied in studying industrial 
ecology systems? First, Giddens incorporates the dynamics on how systems change 
in the structuration theory. Second, combining actors and structures emphasises the 
dualism of  structure, which seems particularly relevant for EPR since this is typical 
(political) structure acting towards companies (actors), who must relate and reﬂect on 
how this structure should be taken into account in their own business strategies. Finally, 
the structuration theory is combining a positivistic and a hermeneutic approach, or a 
natural science and a social science approach, which is valuable as seen from the concept 
of  industrial ecology.
This networks of  actors’ perspective enhance the third element of  White’s deﬁnition 
(White 1994) by strongly emphasising the role and self-interest of  single actors and 
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organisations and the mutual interaction and interdependence between various actors. 
The networks of  actors’ perspective also indicates that the solutions to obtain good 
results lie in the cooperation with others. That said, we take as a premise that individuals 
and companies are acting to optimise their self-interests, and that altruism is non-
existent. However, they are indeed bound to take into account the present structures 
and boundary conditions. We therefore develop this perspective further by looking into 
the actual actors present in industrial systems, and their intentions, visions, potential for 
improvements and roles.
2.4.1 The actors
We distinguish between four different types of  actors: authorities, industry, consumers 
and civil society, as shown in Figure 2.9 below23. The authorities and civil society are 
primarily suppliers of  premises, while the interactions between and within ‘consumers’ 
and ‘industry’ primarily constitute the market. According to Giddens’ structuration 
theory, the decisions and actions taken by the actors are to a large extent determined by 
the dynamics between the actors and their own preferences and resources.
Figure 2.9 Interaction between various groups of  actors
We will characterise these actors through the role or type of  (self-) interest they actually 
have, and through the measures, instruments and power they possess in order to fulﬁl 
their role and ensure their interests.
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2.4.1.1 The authorities
The role of  the authorities is to ensure that the resources and values in society are 
sustained and developed to the best for its citizens (Vedung 1998). The measures are 
a large body of  strategies and instruments ranging from local to regional, national and 
international arena and from regulatory to economic and informative instruments in 
order to stimulate technological innovation, behaviour changes and actual reduction 
in emissions. Moreover, the policy style may alter between countries. For instance, 
Japanese and European policy makers are more likely to sign ‘negotiated agreements’ 
with industry associations and or individual ﬁrms, under which the industry agrees to 
meet certain negotiated environmental goals with the expectation that if  the goals are 
met then legislative requirements will not be imposed. “Public policy instruments are 
the set of  techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power in attempting 
to ensure support and effect social change” (Vedung 1998, p. 3)
Policies are most commonly designed so that actors only have one commitment in 
one phase of  the life cycle, see upper left box in Figure 2.10. This is the case with for 
instance emission permits from production plants. Some EPR policies however, include 
more than one commitment in several phases of  the life cycle. For instance voluntary 
agreements on packaging in Norway have quantitative targets on both material recycling 
and energy recovery in the end-of-life phase, as well as a non-quantiﬁed commitment in 
the production phase related to waste reduction. 
Moreover, the EU Directives (EU 2003a, b) for electrical and electronic (EE) products 
illustrate a third group of  policies where an actor has several commitments (ban of  
certain substances and recycling commitments) in several phases (production phase 
and EoL-phase) constituted by several policies (‘Restrictions of  the Use of  Certain 
Hazardous Substances’ (RoHS) and ‘Waste electrical and electronic equipment’ 
(WEEE)). Finally, the actors inevitably face commitments from a portfolio of  policies 
in the life cycle phase they are operating within, for instance both environmental and 
non-environmental regulations.
Figure 2.10 Relation between policies and phases
One policy Portfolio of 
policies
One
phase
Multiple
phases
One commitment 
in one phase
Commitment in 
several phases
Several commit-
ments in one phase
Several commitments 
in several phases
34
Chapter 2
The authorities in Figure 2.9 are separated into two sub-groups; politicians and 
administration. Ideally, the politicians are passing laws, setting taxes and regulations, 
while the administration is preparing for these actions as well as doing follow-up work. 
Moreover, further disaggregation might be done between various departments of  
authorities, for instance Ministry of  Environment, Ministry of  Finance and Ministry 
of  Commerce and Trade. These ministries all have various interests and objectives to 
take into account, which is implemented through their measures and policies. In total, a 
ﬁrm or a consumer is inﬂuenced by all these policies constituting a portfolio of  policies 
(Christiansen 2002, Vedung 1998). Within industrial ecology this can be considered 
as integrated product policy. Authorities might design policies that aim at stimulating 
consumers (the markets) and the industry (the supply). Thus, on this level as well there 
are networks of  actors.
Within industrial ecology literature, several argue that extended producer responsibility 
is a key policy, particularly because it creates loop closing mechanisms. Economic 
instruments might be equally well suited for inducing industrial ecology practice, for 
instance recycling and loop closing. Hence, there is no particular industrial ecology 
policy, but rather policies that to a greater or smaller extent contribute to implement 
industrial ecology thinking as presented in the resource perspective. Evaluating the 
effectiveness of  an EPR policy however, requires a broader understanding of  the causal 
mechanisms that actually provide the observable outcome. Inevitably, other policies 
than EPR constitute the total package of  policy instruments inﬂuence and the outcome 
as well, in addition to non-policy factors such as market competition and consumer 
behaviour. 
Given the ambitious normative objectives inherent in the industrial ecology concept 
and that public policies constitute a signiﬁcant factor for meeting these objectives, it is 
important to be aware of  the fact that solutions to environmental problems cannot be 
more radical than the boundary conditions allow. Radical innovation requires radical 
policy frameworks. National and international regulatory bodies are occupied with 
establishing environmental regimes that, on an absolute level, produce desired results, for 
instance certain recycling ratios. Obviously, these regulatory bodies are just frameworks 
and the actual changes have to appear as a result of  changes and improvements within 
companies, consumers and so on.
2.4.1.2 The industry
Industrial actors have great power to inﬂuence both the environmental properties of  
a product and consumer patterns in society24. ‘The industry’ captures all commercial 
ﬁrms that produce goods, materials, products and services for industrial and private 
consumers. We distinguish between primary, secondary and tertiary sectors between 
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which there are interactions, and changes in supply and demand within each sector will 
affect the other sectors as well.
The primary objective of  ﬁrms is to survive in a long-term perspective by making 
proﬁt for their owners. There are a number of  strategies to achieve this, depending on 
the sector, product and other framing conditions in question. The requirements for 
proﬁts and competitive power are decisive for company choices, making it difﬁcult to 
implement technological solutions that directly conﬂict with ﬁnancial considerations. 
Socio-economic and environmentally advantageous solutions frequently are not realized 
because they are not sufﬁciently interesting when it comes to commercial interests. 
However, investments with environmental improvements may also be ﬁnancially 
proﬁtable in the short term (the win-win situation) (Porter and van der Linde 1995, 
Brattebø 1995, Hagen et al. 1998). Moreover, companies may prioritise long-term 
competitive power with environmental aspects as one competitive factor.
In the prolongation of  this argument, we might distinguish between those companies 
whose product or function in itself  contributes to environmental improvements 
(e.g. windmill energy producers) and those companies being within environmentally 
unfriendly sectors (e.g. oil industry) but that improve their processes to reduce 
emissions and environmental impacts thereof. Being green might be proﬁtable for 
companies in both categories (King and Lenox 2001). “Empirical research shows that 
superior environmental performance and superior ﬁnancial performance are positively 
intertwined” (Lyon and Maxwell 2004) Voluntary environmental protection appears to 
make good business sense.
Independent of  which category the company is within, technological change, innovation 
and business development are central premises for improving their competitiveness 
and consequently environmental performance. The point of  entry for most businesses 
is not primarily environmental concerns, but rather opportunities for making proﬁts. 
Knowledgeable business actors know however, that low resource productivity increases 
their costs, while poor environmental performance may affect their reputation. For 
instance, the waste hierarchy as a national strategy are less important than ﬁnancial 
arguments when companies are to make decisions whether to recycle or deposit. In order 
to capture these elements in the decision making process, the regulatory frameworks, 
the innovation environment and the tax system, to mention just some, have to stimulate 
decisions in line with industrial ecology thinking. Hence, authorities (through legislation 
and regulation), consumers (through being the market) and civil society (through 
persuading the market) are all inﬂuencing the industry. This emphases the signiﬁcance 
of  ‘the networks of  actors’. 
Technological change is the outcome of  an innovation process providing different 
ways of  fulﬁlling existing or new functions or needs in society. It has been suggested 
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that the overall innovation process is constituted by four interwoven and dynamically 
interplaying sections (Grübler 1998; Christiansen 2002). This applies to both product 
innovation and process innovation. During invention and innovation the key task is to 
go from an idea (invention) to the realisation of  a product or process (innovation). In 
these two sections, the innovators face mainly technological and ﬁnancial challenges, 
and for instance Design for environment (DfE) might be employed as a methodological 
approach to the innovation phase. 
Figure 2.11 Innovation process and stimulating factors in various innovation phases
However, in order to actually reduce emissions on aggregate (national) level, these 
improvements must penetrate the market. Thus, equally important as product 
improvement and design for environment, is the extent of  diffusion of  new technology. 
Therefore, niche market commercialisation and diffusion are important to spread new 
technologies to the market, making these two sections mainly a business and marketing 
challenge. As argued by Smith (2004), what matters most for successful innovation is 
not so much the link with basic science, big public laboratories and universities, but 
close interaction with users (demand), suppliers and competitors.
Hence, it is not the development of  technology that is the problem concerning 
environmental issues, but the implementation and diffusion of  it. As shown in Figure 
2.11, policy instruments must be directed towards all the four phases of  the innovation 
process, usually through consumers to stimulate market pull and consequently diffusion, 
and directly towards companies to stimulate invention and innovation. The technological 
knowledge on how to design and construct a windmill is only one side of  the coin. 
Knowing how to implement this, what is commercially, politically and socially possible, 
is equally important. That said, as noted by Fagerhaug et al. (2004), ‘to understand 
innovation dynamics it is not sufﬁcient to focus on interaction with external partners, 
the resources available, innovation output etc. It is also necessary to take into account 
what goes on within ﬁrms, such as strategic choices, the extent to which it manages 
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to beneﬁt from new ideas (‘openness’), what it does to encourage the development of  
new ideas etc.’ Getting into the internal company-speciﬁc processes is, thus, equally 
important for understanding the effects of  various factors, for instance public policies.
However, although diffusion appears in the market, the potential of  environmental 
improvements depends on the type of  innovation. Figure 2.12, a modiﬁcation of  
Stevels (1999), shows that the incremental changes and redesign of  products do not 
have the greatest potential to contribute to signiﬁcant environmental improvement, 
while functional innovation and system innovation do have the potential to do so. It 
should be noted that the ﬁgure is just illustrative and the scales are not reﬂecting a real 
situation.
Figure 2.12 Technological innovation on different levels
Incremental changes in product and process design may provide immediate improvements 
(as indicated by not having any initial negative environmental improvement in Figure 
2.12), but may not be sufﬁcient to obtain signiﬁcant environmental improvements in 
the long run. This calls for more fundamental changes through system innovation. 
Given that Figure 2.12 depicts a long-term perspective, for example 40 years, we see 
that total environmental improvements are deﬁnitely greater with system innovation, 
even with severe negative environmental impact during the ﬁrst years. The challenge 
is to encourage long-term thinking and action so that the pro-active investments are 
taken in year 0, and by this means remove the infrastructural lock-ins that impede major 
environmental improvements25.
Technological change and innovation are commercially motivated by the expectations 
of  lower production costs (lower purchase cost and lower taxes and fees) or higher 
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income (increased sales), in short and long term perspectives (Hagen et al., 1998). 
These improvements may also have positive environmental consequences, but this 
is usually secondary as to why improvements are made. The interests of  the market 
are also the interests of  business, and industry’s motivation is to position itself  in the 
(future) market. This has led to a transition from an authority-driven to a market-driven 
environmental policy (Socolow, 1994). If  the ﬁrm has an ‘over-compliance behaviour’, 
this might be a kind of  environmental risk management; in relation to consumers 
and the reputation (shadow of  the market), to authorities (shadow of  the law) and to 
competitors (competition on environmental quality). 
However, the paradox is that even though the last ten years have shown an increased 
environmental focus, increased systems approaches and increased interest on the part 
of  industry, the most important indicators of  the state of  the environment show that 
the situation is deteriorating (EEA 2005). This points to how inadequate it is to focus 
only on a micro level, and that the ﬁeld of  industrial ecology captures more than an 
industrial strategy to attain increased competitive power.
2.4.1.3 Consumers and civil society
Furthermore, the traditional supply and demand fraction characterises the relation 
between the industry and consumers. The ellipse ‘consumer’ contains both private 
consumers (end-users) and ‘industry’ and ‘authorities’ who are substantial consumers of  
both ﬁnal products and commodities. These represent the demand side of  the market. 
The pattern of  consumption is yet an understudied area within industrial ecology, 
although progress has been made (Journal of  Industrial Ecology 2005). The primary 
issue here is that consumers have a certain amount of  money to spend, and consumption 
is most usually based on functional or psychological needs. Consumers are inﬂuenced 
by authorities through taxes, regulations, bans and information, by industry through 
product attractiveness and commercials and by civil society in terms in information.
The ﬁnal ellipse is the ‘civil society’ which includes all the actors representing particular 
interests and perspectives and that inﬂuence the choices made by consumers, industry 
and authorities. In Figure 2.9 above, we have identiﬁed some of  these actors, e.g. work 
organisations, academia, NGOs, media, international and national institutions such us 
UN, OECD and WTO, and all of  these represent a potentially inﬂuencing power to the 
three other groups of  actors.
2.4.2 Relating actors to the resource perspective
Authorities, industry, consumers and civil society are all interacting in various networks 
of  actors, making decisions on strategies and policies that might alter the structures 
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and boundary conditions that everybody relates to. Our particular concern is how these 
actors and their strategies and policies actually inﬂuence the metabolism, and in particular 
towards loop closing. Or in other terms, how do networks of  actors’ perspective and the 
resource perspective relate? Obviously, the crucial analysing units within the resource 
perspective is the physical ﬂows of  materials, products and energy, while the actors, 
their strategies and how they interact are the main focus within the networks of  actor’s 
perspective. In order to carry out fruitful analysis on industrial ecology systems, we 
distinguish between direct actors and indirect actors. The direct actors are those who 
actually bring the materials, products and energy forward in the life cycle. 
On the other hand, the indirect actors are not in physical contact nor own the materials, 
they do not have direct power over these, but through their resources (authorative 
or allocative), strategies and means, they inﬂuence the stocks and ﬂows of  materials 
and products. Simply stated, we may say that indirect actors lay the premises and the 
framework for the direct actors to act efﬁciently. By making this distinction, we are 
able to distinguish the signiﬁcant actors from the less signiﬁcant. When integrating we 
ﬁnd the technological change and innovation within an environmental aspect. Figure 
2.13 below illustrates this. It shows key actors, material ﬂows, cash ﬂows and types of  
innovation for EPR on packaging in Norway. 
Figure 2.13 Key actors, material ﬂows, cash ﬂows and types of  innovation in a collective EPR 
scheme.
‘Technological change and innovation’ (TCI) in a life cycle perspective occurs mainly 
in two phases, upstream and downstream. By upstream is meant all activities from 
extraction of  natural resources to the point of  sale to industrial or household consumers, 
while downstream is from the point where a product becomes waste to the point the 
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material or component is recycled, recovered or disposed. In life cycle terminology this 
corresponds to ‘production phase’ and ‘end-of-life phase’, respectively. Technological 
change and innovation upstream is denoted product innovation. It reﬂects a preventive 
strategy by designing and producing the product with less material so that the amount 
of  waste downstream is reduced (dematerialisation, see e.g. van der Voet et al (2004) 
for more) or by employing materials and components that are easier to treat in end-
of-life phase. Hence, although the environmental problem in focus is downstream, the 
solutions to them may be upstream.
The second type of  innovation appears among downstream companies operating in the 
end-of-life phase and involves strategies for improving collection, sorting, dismantling 
and recycling, denoted process innovation in Figure 2.13. Process innovation often 
requires industrial product innovation, resulting in improved collection/sorting/
recycling processes and reduced costs of  these operations, all contributing to higher 
efﬁciency and eventually improved quantity and quality of  the recycled materials.
In collective EPR systems, the upstream companies pay a fee to a PRO that spends 
this money mainly downstream to increase collection and recycling. The formation of  
PROs and EPR supporting policy instruments can be considered as an institutional 
innovation. Institutional innovation is considered as a potential driver for technological 
change and innovation through subsidies and learning, as well as generally creating 
arenas for cooperation and focus on these issues.
2.5 The systems perspective
The third dimension of  the industrial ecology concept, the systems perspective, deals 
with approaching complex problems analytically by extending the systems boundaries 
and including more factors in the analysis. The main argument for employing a system 
perspective in environmental analysis and decision-making is to avoid partial analysis 
and problem shifting (van der Voet 1996, Wrisberg et al. 2000). By extending the system 
borders unintended side-effects may be avoided (Lifset and Graedel 2002). Second, the 
environmental challenges have in a historic perspective expanded in time, place and 
complexity. They are now regarded as more global than before (e.g. greenhouse gas 
emissions that inﬂuence the global ecosystem), the environmental impacts of  human 
actions are now, since the effects is more on global than local ecosystems, far less visible 
because the delay times are much longer, and the complexity of  the environmental 
problems has increased, making causal chains less easy to discover. (Karlsson 1997).
On the other hand, Ehrenfeld (2000a) argues that extending the system borders do 
not necessarily solve any problems, if  the problem is the system itself: “Many of  my 
colleagues see industrial ecology as an analytical system, but with broader boundaries 
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than those deﬁned in other technical areas in science and engineering. These academics 
seek a way to become more holistic and more precise in describing the complexity of  
the world.” (Ehrenfeld 2000a, p. 238) Ehrenfeld argues that more emphasis might be 
put on the metaphoric aspect of  industrial ecology, conf. mimicry aspect of  the resource 
perspective, in order to restructure our institutions, establishing coordinating actors 
(Ehrenfeld 1995, Boons and Baas 1997) and increase the connectedness, cooperation 
and community characteristics of  the industrial society. There will, in our opinion, 
nevertheless be a demand for systematically analysing the ideas and potential solutions 
inspired by the metaphor to be implemented in the real world. The systems perspective 
is because of  this a crucial part of  industrial ecology.
There are some well-known practical examples of  a systems perspective. The eco-park 
in Kalundborg, Denmark, evolved without any guidance from neither industrial ecology 
concept (Erkman 1997) nor a master plan (Ehrenfeld and Gertler 1997 Ehrenfeld and 
Chertow 2002), but rather as consecutive solutions to emerging local environmental 
problems. Through extending the system boundaries by redirecting production waste 
into useful inﬂows for other processes, different companies and households in a limited 
geographical region became integrated in terms of  material and energy ﬂows. This type 
of  optimisation is based on precisely the same principles as for ‘traditional’ processing 
plants. The only difference is that in Kalundborg there are different companies and 
production of  a wider range of  products (Røine and Brattebø 2002).
One side of  the systems perspective contains practical examples that to a large extent are 
covered by the two other perspectives already. On the other side of  the coin we ﬁnd the 
analytical aspect of  the system perspective. Lifset and Graedel (2002, p. 3) mention four 
forms in which the “systems orientation is manifested”: i) use of  life cycle perspective, 
ii) use of  materials and energy ﬂow analysis, iii) use of  systems modelling and iv) 
sympathy for multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research and analysis. These are 
in fact all analytical aspects and approaches to employ for solving complex problems. 
For instance, the ‘use of  life cycle perspective’ involves the use of  LCA as a method 
for ‘examine the environmental impacts of  products, process or services’, which is an 
analytical part of  industrial ecology (Brattebø et al 2006). The life cycle perspective of  
policies like integrated product policy (IPP) and EPR is in this theoretical framework 
already covered by the networks of  actor’s perspective. 
Moreover, studying the resource perspective and the network of  actors’ perspective 
requires a systems approach. It is analytically important to be able to distinguish between 
which material ﬂows and actors to look at, respectively, and which one to exclude from 
the study. The systems perspective contributes to make this clear as well as admitting 
that those ﬂows and actors being outside of  the system also have inﬂuence. The crucial 
question is then what comprises the analytical systems perspective and how we analytically 
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and methodologically deﬁne a problem and ﬁnd a solution to it26?
2.5.1 The analytical systems perspective
It is for analytical purposes that we deﬁne systems.27 Only open systems exist, and 
these contain webs of  components forming a complex totality interacting with its 
surroundings. The components within the system are integrated by ﬂows of  energy, 
materials, information, money etc. between them. Every component can be regarded as 
a system itself, a subsystem, which can be broken further down into smaller components 
(sub-subsystems) (Checkland 1999, Asbjørnsen 1998). The system is then a limited part 
of  the entire world with ﬂows into, within and out of  the system.
Analytically, it is far easier to deal with smaller than larger systems. The high degree of  
interconnectedness and complexity of  society and nature requires that simpliﬁcations, 
for analytical reasons, must be done. This is, however, only analytical shortcomings to 
understand the real world, and extending the system perspective means “to move closer 
to reality”. The level of  analysis (global, national, local, processing plant, companies and 
so forth) and the intention of  the analysis decide how the system – and based on this, 
subsystems and sub-subsystems – are deﬁned (Checkland 1999, p. A24). How the system 
is deﬁned is decisive for the results, and as O’Rourke et al. (1996) put it: ‘by drawing the 
industrial box small enough, anything it seems can be an optimized ecosystem’. 
A processing plant, exempliﬁed as level 1 in Figure 2.14, consists of  several modules 
(unit operations) that are designed and integrated through exchanges of  materials and 
energy so that the entire plant, and not the single modules, is optimised28. However, if  
the system borders are extended, shown as the second level in Figure 2.14, by including 
material extraction and secondary production as well, the process designer might 
optimize the “new and extended system”. 
Turning to the third level in Figure 2.14, the product level, we include the whole life cycle 
of  the product. A product designer may strive to close material and energy loops for 
the product throughout its entire lifecycle. This new and extended system perspective 
indicates the fact that environmental impacts occur throughout the product life cycle 
and not only in the production phase. 
On the last level in Figure 2.14, several product systems are integrated through exchanges 
of  material and energy from both processes and products. Exchanges of  process wastes 
between various product systems are the situation in Kalundborg29. As for material and 
energy from products, the integration is shown from recycling phase to production 
phase in either the same product system (closed loop recycling, e.g. gold) or in other 
product systems (open loop recycling, e.g. recovered plastic packaging used in chairs 
(Håg 2000)).
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Figure 2.14 Different levels of  systems analysis
At all levels of  Figure 2.14 there are factors that inﬂuence the industrial metabolism in a 
system and society. This is exempliﬁed on level 4. Knowledge on these non-technological 
or non-metabolic factors, for instance the inﬂuence of  policy strategies and measures 
(studied by political scientists), the inﬂuence of  changing individual behaviour (studied 
by psychologists), knowledge on how do societies change (studied by sociologist), and 
the inﬂuence of  micro and macro economic mechanism and rationale by the actors 
(studied by economists), is important to have in order to achieved a steered evolution 
of  the society towards environmental improvements. It is, thus, to a larger extent 
accepted that solutions to complex environmental challenges must be sought outside 
the technological realm through interdisciplinary and system-oriented approaches. 
Design of  social institutions and policy frameworks is just as important as designing 
new products and processes (Ehrenfeld 1995).
2.5.2 Methodological aspects of the systems perspective
As mentioned in Chapter 2.1, systems analytical methods like LCA and MFA have been 
at the core of  the activities within the industrial ecology ﬁeld. As suggested by for 
instance Brattebø et al. 2006, we might distinguish between methods based on monetary 
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metrics and methods based on physical metrics. In addition, there are combinations of  
these. Table 2.3 below shows an overview of  the most common of  these: 
Table 2.3 Important industrial ecology analytical methods and indicators. Source: Brattebø et al. 
2006
Physical metrics Monetary metrics Combined methods and 
indicators
Life cycle assessment (LCA) Input-output analysis 
(IOA)
 LCA-MFA
Material ﬂow accounting (bulk-MFA) 
and Substance ﬂow analysis (SFA)
System of  national 
accounts (SNA)
Environmental IOA 
and Hybrid LCA
Energy analysis and Exergy analysis Cost-beneﬁt analysis 
(CBA)
Eco-efﬁciency
Environmental risk assessment 
(ERA)
 Life cycle costing 
(LCC)
De-coupling
These methods and indicators provide information on the two ﬁrst points of  White’s 
deﬁnition. In this context, we might also distinguish between those methods that map 
the actual ﬂows of  material, products, substances within the economy and those that in 
addition assess the environmental (and eventually human) effects of  these ﬂows.
Figure 2.15 Methods seen as a framework for modelling and its accompanying activities, problem 
formulation and interpretation.
A general methodological approach to these methods is suggested by Heijungs and 
Røine (2006), as illustrated in Figure 2.15. Problem formulation is to state the intention 
with the analysis. The modelling part is about deﬁning the system in terms of  elements 
to be included and setting the boundaries along the time, space and scope dimensions. 
Then, expressing the relations between the elements in the system as well as expressing 
the entire system is necessary to get the mathematical representations of  the system. 
The output from this modelling exercise is input for developing interesting indicators 
for analysing the problem to be studied.
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(Endnotes)
1 The ‘International Society of  Industrial Ecology’ (ISIE) with its own journal, Journal of  Industrial Ecology, was 
established in 2001. There are several books on the topic like Graedel and Allenby 1995, Ayres and Ayres 2002, 
Erkman and Bourg 2002 and Brattebø et al. 2006. Comprehensive education programmes on graduate level as well 
as research programmes illustrates a ﬁeld in ‘institutional’ growth.
2 Besides the Journal of  Industrial Ecology, academic journals like Journal of  Cleaner Production, Resource, Recycling 
and Planning, Ecological Economics, Progress in Industrial Ecology, Journal of  Environmental Policy and Planning and Business 
and the Environment , to mention a few, all offer articles and dedicated issues on this ﬁeld.
3 A person in the process industry might consider industrial ecology as a shift from traditional process 
oriented HES activities to a system and lifecycle-oriented product focus (Marstrander 1994). This may reduce the 
consumption of  materials and energy, which in turn will reduce ﬁnancial costs for companies while also beneﬁting 
the environment. A person in an NGO may, on the other hand, consider industrial ecology more as a macro 
oriented concept reducing the overall consumption in order to promote sustainability.
4 It is here important to note that this does not imply that all principles found in Nature, should be adopted. 
The selection must be subject to case-speciﬁc considerations.
5 This deﬁnition is slightly modiﬁed from Allenby (1992) “[I]ndustrial Ecology may be deﬁned as the means 
by which a state of  sustainable development is approached and maintained. It consists of  a systems view of  
human economic activity and its interrelationship with fundamental biological, chemical and physical systems 
with the goal of  establishing and maintaining the human species at levels that can be sustained indeﬁnitely - given 
continued economic, cultural and technological evolution”.
6 Industrial metabolism is described as ”the economy’s metabolism, in terms of  materials mobilisation, use 
and excretion to create ”technomass”, is compared with the use of  materials in the biosphere to create biomass. 
The economy thus is viewed only in terms of  its materials stocks and ﬂows”. (van der Voet og Kleijn 2000).
7 Metaphors can contribute to better understanding of  nature. Metaphors “extents far beyond its use as an 
artistic tool for poetic language, into the realm of  creative thinking, where it functions as an inducer of  new ideas” 
(Johansson (2003), p. 70, in Ayres and Ayres 2002. In this sense the metaphors go beyond describing an idea 
towards becoming fundamental parts of  the understanding itself. It seems, however, that metaphors are usually 
used for describing and understanding something that already is a natural (or social) phenomena, but that we – yet 
– cannot understand through regular (mathematical) language. In the case of  industrial ecology the situation is, 
however, somewhat different, the metaphor is used for providing ideas on how things should be or should have 
been in order to approach sustainability.
8 Academia is indeed also part of  the real world since it supplies this with knowledge, information and 
strategies, but for analytical purposes and for the sake of  distinguishing between the ‘academic’ part of  industrial 
ecology and the real world part of  industrial ecology, these appear as two entities here. 
9 Various nomenclature is used on this, for instance society, technosphere (Karlsson (1997) and production-
consumption systems (Kay 2002, Brattebø et al 2006)
10 As noted by Lifset and Graedel (2002, p.10), the ﬁeld is clearly “driven by concerns about human impact 
on biophysical environment”. This concern is based on the assumption that today’s actual interactions between 
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industrial systems and natural systems are not sustainable.
11 Fundamental to all material ﬂows and metabolism is the law of  mass conservation (Lavoisier 1789): ”Mass 
can never be lost in a physical or chemical process – apart from energy-mass exchanges.” (Kleijn 2000). Lavoisier 
wrote that ”we may lay it down as an incontestable axiom, that, in all operations of  art and nature, nothing 
is created; an equal quantity of  matter exists both before and after and experiment, the quality and quantity 
of  the elements remains precisely the same; and nothing takes place beyond changes and modiﬁcations in the 
combination of  these elements” (Hudson 1992).
12 Centuries ago the population and its resource use was very small compared to the capacity of  ecosystems to 
handle the impacts from human activities. Technological development has made more resources available, but one 
consequence is that some resources have become scarce and the emissions from society are sometimes higher than 
the nature can tolerate. Several researchers go even further, claiming that for sustainable development, attaining 
correct prices is not sufﬁcient. It is just as important that prices are correct in relation to the Earth's limited resource 
base, in other words that the level of  the activities is correct. Georgescu-Rougen (1971), Daly (1991), O'Neill 
(1996) and Ehrenfeld (1995, 1997) support this view. They claim that the economic system is a subsystem of  the 
natural ecosystem, and that the volume (throughput) of  the economic system must not grow to such a size that 
it threatens the stability of  the ecological system. This means that even if  prices are correct we do not necessarily 
achieve sustainability. 
13 Despite the fact that we regard for instance metals as non-renewable, we must note that, according to the 
1st law of  thermodynamics, materials cannot disappear. They can only be transformed into another form (quality) 
or be “placed” so that they become inaccessible for human purposes.
14 This is the same situation as when snow falls to the roof  of  a house. More and more snow can be added 
to the roof, but only until a certain point where the framework of  building does not stand any more and the 
construction collapses. The buffer capacity in chemical solutions has the same property.
15 For instance, carbon in form of  methane or oil (petroleum) is extracted from environment, processed in 
society and emitted as CO
2
, hence increasing the amount of  CO
2
 in the atmosphere (and correspondingly reducing 
the amount of  petroleum in the ground. Thus, the society has processed inﬂows of  petroleum to output of  CO
2
, 
releasing energy for human purposes.
16 See for instance ”Dematerialisation” by Ayres (1994) in Greening the industry,  “Dematerialisation and 
rematerialisation as two reoccurring phenomena of  industrial ecology” by Bruyn (2002) in A handbook of  
Industrial ecology and Cleveland and Ruth (1998)
17 Dematerialisation can both be denoted a strategy and an indicator for the development towards reducing 
the amount of  materials brought into the society (or a deﬁned system).
18 There are several deﬁnitions of  eco-efﬁciency. The WBCSD deﬁnes eco-efﬁciency as ”the delivery of  
competitively priced goods and services that satisfy human needs and bring quality of  life, while progressively 
reducing ecological impact and resource intensity throughout the life cycle, to a level at least in line with the earth’s 
estimated carrying capacity” (DeSimone and Popoff  2000). The OECD deﬁnes eco-efﬁciency as “the efﬁciency 
with which environmental resources are used to meet human needs” (OECD 1998c).
19 It is important to note that the mimicry approach and the interface approach might provide different 
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answers. Although the metaphor prescribes closing the loop, the analytical interface approach might conclude 
differently because the resource use, for actually carrying out the loop closing in a given system, is higher than what 
is gained. This depends on type of  product (the complexity involved), type of  materials; type of  infrastructure 
(energy sources, transportation) and of  course the economic realities in this.
20 To understand how societies evolve and change it is fruitful to make a methodological distinction between 
a positivistic and a hermeneutic approach. The basic premise of  a positivistic approach is that ‘true’ knowledge 
is possible to discover. Only one truth exists, it is out there, and the task of  science is to ﬁnd it. Sociologists that 
regard structures and functions of  a system as the subject, express a view where social phenomena follow an 
objective lawfulness, analogue to what is found in Nature. Causalities are to be identiﬁed. This is a normal view 
of  natural science and the quantitative part of  social science. On the other hand, social reality can be explained 
and understood as a hermeneutical system where the meaning of  the social reality, the “truth”, is decided by 
how it is interpreted by individuals. Knowledge must be understood in its context, and in all interpretation and 
understanding there are parts dependent on the totality and vice versa. Moreover, all understanding is subjective 
and builds on a certain pre-knowledge (e.g. the theory that is the frame of  reference for studying a phenomena), 
expectations and pre-assumptions. Scientists like Weber, Heidegger, Gadamer and Goffman argue that social 
phenomena follow hermeneutic paths where the individual’s intentions, needs, choices and actions are those which 
construct social reality.
21 Within the industrial ecology concept, which emphasises the role of  interdisciplinary activity, this approach 
is valuable, trying to combine the positivistic practice of  natural science and the more hermeneutic practice of  
social science. Natural scientists seek to understand the complexity, mechanisms and dynamics of  nature, while 
social scientists understand and interpret societies and the systems within. How can changes and dynamics within 
a system or a society be analysed and understood? What are the forces contributing to change and what are the 
interactions between them? These are questions that for instance sociologists try to theorise about.
22 There are numerous examples that Giddens’ structuration theory is applicable at both company and society 
level. As for the former, Giddens’ structuration theory is beginning to have a growing inﬂuence in management 
science. Principles of  structuration have been applied at the organizational level (Ranson et al. 1980, Pettigrew 
1987) and as an explanation for industry level activity (Huff  et al. 1994). Applications of  structuration theory have 
also yield insight into organizational culture (Riley 1983) and technology transfer (Orlikowski 1992, Desantis and 
Poole 1994).
23 Civil society is certainly capturing ‘consumers’ as well, but we choose here to treat this group separately 
as this is a key group within the ﬁeld of  industrial ecology. For a broad introduction to the consumer aspect of  
the ﬁeld, see Journal of  Industrial ecology 9(1-2).
24 Industrial ecology is, however, not exclusively for industry and about what industry can do, but rather just 
as much about what the authorities, academia, media, politicians, consumers, NGOs and industry can do together 
to meet environmental challenges. As Capra (1996) contends, understanding the interplay and the interaction between 
these actors is the decisive factor if  we are to succeed with the aim. Hence, as suggested by Erkman (1997) and 
Brattebø et al. (1999), every actor must ﬁrst understand the materials and energy ﬂows and the environmental 
inﬂuence of  these ﬂows in a given life cycle system. Second, the actors must understand how they may contribute 
to reduce the environmental load within and from the deﬁned system.
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25 Although the ﬁgure shows a reasonable relation between different improvement strategies, it is worth 
noting that all systems innovations do not necessarily result in total environmental improvements. Building a new 
airport with improved passenger and freight handling is indeed a system innovation, but it does not necessarily 
improve environmental conditions from a broader systems perspective. Thus, technological innovation must both 
have a direction and a rate that is consistent with the aim of  sustainability.
26 Systems thinking is not a new endeavour, but is a signiﬁcant part of  academic approaches on how to study 
complex systems. In cybernetics, biology, organizational theory, political science and economics, just to mention 
some, systems thinking has been developed and employed for decades (Sastry 1995, Richardson 1991). For every 
of  these disciplines, understanding the relation and connectedness of  the different components in the systems, 
how they relate and interact, feed-back mechanisms and delays and self-regulation have been signiﬁcant in order 
to understand the behaviour of  the system.
27 We may say that it is not a question of  whether there is a systems perspective or not, but whether there 
is a narrow or broad system perspective. The system perspective is argued to be an alternative approach to the 
reductionistic and mechanistic approaches (Blanchard and Fabrycky 1998).
28 In quantitative studies, the relations between the components are expressed mathematically (e.g. chemical 
engineering (Skogestad 2000), system dynamics (Forrester 1961, Sterman 2000). By using software programs 
we are able to simulate the system behaviour, given the structure of  the system and certain initial conditions. In 
business dynamics, for instance, causal loop diagrams are employed to show the causal relation between parameters 
that inﬂuence each, and then to show the entire system behaviour if  one parameter is changed. The challenge is, 
as always, to decide what is within and what is outside the system, since the factors closed to the system border, 
surely are inﬂuenced by factors just outside the system border.
29 In this context, the cascading principle is a theoretical very important principle. Energy cascading is quite 
usual in processing plants, but in Kalundborg the cascading is carried out by different companies. The basic idea in 
cascading is to utilise the exergy in the ﬂows as many times as possible on their way to zero exergy. The cascading 
principle is also applicable for products and materials (Sirkin and Houten 1993).
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3. EPR – A PUBLIC POLICY PRINCIPLE
As is evident from the previous chapter, the metabolism in industrial systems is inﬂuenced 
by a number of  actors and factors, in which the governmental bodies play a signiﬁcant 
role. Governmental environmental ambitions have increased during the last 20 years, 
and industrial actors are now facing far stricter regulations and compliance issues than 
even just two decades ago1. However, reaching these ambitious objectives has, in more 
recent years, to a larger extent relied on market-oriented policies and measures and the 
power of  market mechanisms (Wallace 1995).
EPR is part of  this trend. For the last 15 years it has been a frequently used policy 
principle throughout OECD-countries for dealing with product-oriented environmental 
problems in a life cycle perspective. On the international level, the European Union has 
implemented several EPR-based directives. The Packaging Directive (EU 1994) requires 
that member states should recycle between 50 % and 65 % of  all generated waste from 
packaging materials, and that each material should at a minimum be recycled 15 % and 
recovered 40 %. Electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) face two directives; the 
Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive (EU 2003a) that includes 
a collection target of  4 kg per capita per year from private households by 31 December 
2006, and the Restriction of  the Use of  Certain Hazardous Substances (RoHS) Directive 
(EU 2003b) that prohibits new EEE put on the market from 1 July 2006 from containing 
any of  the following six hazardous substances: lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent chromium, 
poly-brominated biphenyls (PBB) or poly-brominated diphenyl ethers (PBDE). The EoL Vehicle 
Directive EU (2000) is a fourth example of  an EPR-based EU Directive2.
On a national level, Germany was the ﬁrst country to pass take-back legislation for 
producers within the packaging sector, introducing the Packaging Ordinance in 1991. In 
the Netherlands covenants3 between government and industry were signed in 1991. As 
for EEE, Norway was the ﬁrst country to pass an EPR-based legislation in 1998 (NMoE 
1998a,b). All EU member states have implemented the Packaging Directive (EU 1994), 
while WEEE and RoHS Directives (EU 2003 a,b) are currently being approved in all 
national legislation. For non-EU countries such as Japan, Canada, Australia and US, 
EPR has been implemented variously, but the highest attention has been on the same 
sectors as in the EU; packaging, EEE, batteries and vehicles (OECD 2001).
These examples give a glimpse of  EPR policy instruments and regulations implemented 
worldwide. There are large variations in how the policies are designed and implemented. 
Below we will explore the key aspects of  EPR, by ﬁrst looking into EPR as a policy 
principle, then go on to describe EPR policy instruments and ﬁnally look at the industrial 
implementation of  these policy instruments.
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3.1 EPR as a policy principle
A number of  environmental policy principles are formulated in various international 
conventions and declarations. As suggested by Christophersen (1997), environmental 
principles may be divided into two main categories; i) those regulating the relationship 
between mankind and nature and ii) those regulating the relations between humans. For 
instance, the carrying capacity principle and the precautionary principle can be positioned 
within the ﬁrst group, while the Pollution-Pays-Principle (PPP) (OECD 1975) is within 
the second category. 
Some scholars and governments consider the PPP to be the governing principle for 
EPR policies. PPP is based on the assumption that those physically emitting are those 
‘paying’. Producers within an EPR-regime pay for the environmental impacts caused by 
their products and are, thus, considered to be the polluter. Others, for instance Davis 
(1998), Lindhqvist (2000) and Tojo (2004), dispute this position by arguing that PPP was 
developed to be a guiding principle for process-related emissions (Davis 1998, p 29). EPR is 
product-oriented (Lindhqvist 1992, Lifset 1993), and PPP is thus not applicable. 
Within EPR the responsibility is placed on one group of  actors (the producers), although 
these actors are not the actual physical emitters. They are however, assumed to be those 
who have best resources and capacity to reduce the overall environmental impact from 
products throughout their life cycle. Based on this argumentation, Davis (1998) proposes 
that EPR is not based on the polluter-pays-principle, but is rather a policy principle 
itself. In this thesis, EPR will be understood as a policy principle4. However, the term 
‘EPR’ comprises a policy principle that has only conceptual content and is thus not a 
regulatory instrument in itself. The principle must be applied through various tangible 
EPR policy instruments in order to be of  any practical importance. But what is the 
actual conceptual content of  EPR?
3.1.1 The conceptual content of EPR
EPR is often, and mistakenly, considered to be synonymous to ‘take-back schemes’ 
where producers are responsible for achieving a certain recycling target. EPR is more 
than this. A frequently quoted deﬁnition of  EPR is given by Thomas Lindhqvist. He 
deﬁnes EPR as 
“a policy principle to promote total life cycle environmental improvements of  product 
systems by extending the responsibilities of  the manufacturer of  the product to various 
parts of  the entire life cycle of  the product, and especially to the take-back, recycling and 
ﬁnal disposal of  the product” (Lindhqvist, 2000, p. 154). 
Dissecting this deﬁnition, two main parts emerge, respectively, as ends (‘to promote total 
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life cycle environmental improvements of  product systems’) and means (‘extending the 
responsibilities of  the manufacturer of  the product to various parts of  the entire life 
cycle of  the product, and especially to the take-back, recycling and ﬁnal disposal of  the 
product’).
Following the categorisation by Christophersen (1997) above, the EPR principle 
has one foot in each group. The objective is to obtain total life cycle environmental 
improvements. As explained in Chapter 2, life cycle thinking comprises of  a number of  
phases and activities, and obtaining ‘total life cycle improvements’ requires consequently 
coordination of  various policy instruments in order to avoid sub-optimisation. We here 
suggest integrated product policy (IPP) as an appropriate policy strategy for securing 
this.
Figure 3.1 EPR Policy hierarchy with governmental intervention
In short, IPP is a coordinated mix of  policy instruments all pointing in the same direction 
to minimise environmental impact throughout the life cycle5. In our context, industrial 
ecology is pointing out the direction. Moreover, a consequence of  employing IPP as 
the policy strategy for developing coordinated EPR policy instruments, is that this also 
‘invites’ policy makers to integrate EPR-based policy instruments and non-EPR policy 
instruments6 in order to obtain ‘total life cycle improvements’. Figure 3.1 shows the 
EPR policy hierarchy including EPR policy principle as the overarching principle on 
which product-oriented, tangible EPR policy instruments are designed. In this design 
process IPP must be employed as a system-oriented strategy for avoiding sub-optimal 
solutions.
Turning to the second part of  Lindhqvist’s deﬁnition, we see that the crucial feature 
of  EPR as a policy principle is the identiﬁcation of  the ‘producers’ as those being 
responsible for the environmental performance of  their products throughout the life 
cycle. The reason for this is that producers are in the best position to improve the whole 
life cycle environmental performance through their product design choices (Davis 
 EPR POLICY PRINCIPLE
POLICY STRATEGY
EPR POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS
EPR: Promoting total life cycle environmental improvements of product systems by extending the 
responsibilities of the manufacturer of the product to various parts of the entire life cycle of the 
product, and especially to the take-back, recycling and final disposal of the product”
IPP: create a coordinated mix of policy instruments all 
pointing in the same direction to minimise 
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1998, p. 33), that preventive strategies are considered more effective than ‘end-of-pipe’ 
solutions, and that by extending responsibility, the producers also get feed-back on the 
design of  new products (Lindhqvist 1998). This position is supported by Lifset (1999, 
p 1), noting that 
“EPR is a critical complement to source reduction because it provides individuated 
(targeted) incentives to producers to engage in design for environment (DfE) related to end 
of  life (EoL) management – to use less material and design for recyclability” 
The question is then how the producers can get incentives to produce products with 
minimised environmental impact throughout the life cycle.The incentives are provided 
through EPR policy instruments. Lindhqvist (1992), Tojo (2004) and Tojo et al. 
(2005) have employed the usual distinction between regulatory instruments, economic 
instruments and informative instruments (Vedung 1998) for categorising current EPR 
policy instruments. This classiﬁcation, however, provides only minor information on the 
incentives for the producers. To be able to analyse the strength of  the policy instruments, 
it is necessary to determine what the incentives are and how they are incorporated in the 
producers’ decision-making processes. In order to better understand how EPR policy 
instruments actually stimulate producers to act according to the EPR policy principle, 
we propose an alternative categorisation of  EPR policy instruments.
3.1.2 Three categories of EPR policy instruments
Considered from a governmental policy point of  view, we distinguish between three 
categories of  EPR policy instruments: 
1. policy instruments that are designed with targeting commitments 
for the producers within their core domain business areas (the 
upstream production phase) 
2. policy instruments that are designed with targeting commitments 
for the producers outside their core domain business areas (the 
consumption phase and the end-of-life phase)
3. policy instruments targeting consumers and end-of-life phases 
aiming at inﬂuencing producers’ behaviour through market 
mechanisms. 
Authorities might direct EPR policy instruments straight towards the producers or via 
consumers so that their demand for more environmentally friendly products stimulate 
producers to design differently. Figure 3.2 illustrates these three categories.
Upstream companies, like all companies, are facing various types of  regulation, and, 
along the lines of  Giddens’ structuration theory, the eventual mix of  these policies 
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are structural input to actors and their decisions making processes. Traditionally, they 
have had to comply with regulatory restrictions, targets and licences put on their core 
activities, particularly related to production process emissions to air, water and soil as 
well as solid waste management. This category is found in the lower left part of  Figure 
3.3 (‘production process emissions) and in the upper part of  Figure 3.3 (z) and can be 
considered as PPP-based policy instruments due to its point-emission character7. 
Figure 3.2 Three directions for EPR policy instruments
The new trend however, is that regulatory mechanisms have been extended to include 
additional commitments within their core business area related to production output and 
product characteristics (y in Figure 3.3, e.g. banning certain substances in products), 
to input of  raw materials (x in Figure 3.3, e.g. requiring recycled material) and utilities 
necessary for running the processes (u in Figure 3.3, e.g. new renewable energy 
sources). 
Figure 3.3 Distinction between traditional and new focus in environmental policy
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There are at least three reasons as to why policy instruments directed towards these 
points within the core business area can be considered EPR-based. First, these policy 
instruments (e.g. RoHS) comprise products and not production processes. Second, the 
main environmental impacts from these products appear when these become waste, 
hence in another phase of  the life cycle than the producers’ core business areas. Finally, 
this group of  policy instruments is preventive as they, in the case of  RoHS, remove the 
hazardous substances from the product instead of  treating them in the EoL-phase.
Contrary to this stand point, OECD (2001, p 51) states that
“the core intent of  EPR is to extend the responsibility for products at the post consumer 
stage away from the taxpayer and municipalities and towards the producer of  the 
products”. 
OECD, thus, considers the uniqueness of  EPR to be that the producers have 
commitments (responsibilities) outside their core business area. The responsibility, OECD 
argues, is not extended if  the measures taken are just targeting another point within their 
core business area. In this thesis, however, we consider these policy instruments as 
being classiﬁed under the EPR umbrella, partly due to the product-orientation and their 
preventive characters, and partly due to the need, in an industrial ecology perspective, 
for an integrated product policy.
The second category comprises EPR policy instruments that explicitly give producers 
obligations for activities and results outside the production phase. Indeed, the most 
apparent understanding of  the term ‘extended’ is the extension of  commitments from 
production phase only, towards commitments in the other phases of  the life cycle as 
well. As shown in Figure 3.2 producers have ‘responsibilities and commitments outside 
the production phase’, in principle throughout the whole life-cycle of  the given product, 
that must be taken into account when they make decisions.
An underlying assumption within the EPR principle is that when producers have 
responsibility for other parts of  the life cycle, this might give them incentives to improve 
the design of  the product and carry out technological change and innovations. As noted 
by Lindhqvist (1998, p.6); “…it is the feedback to the design of  new products which is 
the key element”, and by including the waste management costs in the product price, 
producers might consider this as an incentive to reduce these costs (OECD 1998a). 
Consequently, the strength of  these incentives for making product changes depends on 
how the actual EPR policy instrument is formulated. This, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, is 
another preventive aspect of  EPR.
The two categories above contain EPR policy instruments that give producers regulatory 
commitments. The third category of  EPR policy instruments aims at stimulating 
consumers to demand more environmentally friendly products, and hence, stimulating 
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producers to design differently. This is within the EPR policy principle because the aim 
is to induce changes in companies’ behaviour. For instance, if  the market (due to EPR 
policy instrument) demands less packaging to be used, then, in a perfect market, the 
producers would act accordingly8. Going beyond compliance is to take responsibility, 
not primarily for the sake of  the environment, but for the sake of  its own business. 
Similarly, if  an EPR policy instruments require the producers to reduce the amount 
of  packaging, the producers must obey this in order to comply. This shows that the 
different drivers might cause the same output. However, the market often provides a 
stronger and quicker signal than public policies do, but from an IPP perspective, the 
combination of  these is preferable. That said, this third category is to a very limited 
extent employed deliberately by EPR policy makers.
In summing up, EPR is proposed to be a policy principle that can support the IPP 
strategy and complement PPP as the governing principle. In order to achieve the objective 
of  reducing the total environmental impact, policy instruments must be designed and 
oriented directly towards producers or indirectly via the market so that “anywhere in the 
chain has appropriate incentives to be concerned about life cycle environmental impacts 
of  the whole product system” (Davis 1998, p 32). Achieving this should follow an 
integrated product policy strategy, stimulating both the supply side and demand side for 
environmental friendly products. Below we will look closer into issues related to policy 
implementation and industrial implementation of  EPR.
3.2 Policy implementation of EPR
Policy implementation of  EPR includes all political and administrative processes for 
passing a law or regulation in national assemblies and bringing it into force, either on 
a national or international level. As Figure 3.4 shows, this is followed by the industrial 
implementation which concerns the actions taken by industrial actors to comply with 
the policy instruments in the national legislative frameworks.
Figure 3.4 Policy implementation and industrial implementation of  EPR
A number of  issues are to be decided during the policy implementation phase; type 
of  environmental problems, selection of  type of  EPR policy instruments, type of  
responsibilities and degree of  responsibility, type of  practical solutions to EPR-systems, 
and, ﬁnally, sanctioning mechanisms. All these issues will be discussed below.
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3.2.1 Environmental problems to be solved
Policies must be selected and designed according to the environmental problem to be 
solved. As mentioned in Chapter 2, environmental problems in highly complex industrial 
systems are a challenge to grasp. OECD (2001) suggests a number of  objectives for EPR 
policies, which all indicate potential environmental problems, for instance reducing use 
of  raw materials, reducing energy use and increasing reuse and recycling of  products.
The general trend in both EU and Norway is that waste is generated more than ever 
(NMoE 2001, 2003a, 2005; EEA 2005). Some EPR policy instruments are designed 
to reduce the environmental effects of  waste9 in the end-of-life phase, by internalising 
environmental externalities and the costs of  waste handling into the product prices. In 
the majority of  current EPR policies the overall objective is to reduce the environmental 
effects from end-of-life phase through increasing the recycling levels. The generation of  
waste is, however, a consequence of  past production and consumption activities before 
products are turned into waste. EPR policy instruments therefore are also aiming at 
waste reduction (Røine et al. 2001).
The environmental problems connected to plastic packaging waste are, if  not treated 
properly, higher volumes of  waste to landﬁlls followed by increased emissions as well as 
increased input of  virgin material to industrial production systems. Lifset and Lombardi 
(1997) argue the latter to be the most signiﬁcant one.
3.2.2 Designing EPR policy instruments
International bodies (e.g. the European Union) and national authorities may apply various 
types of  EPR policy instruments, depending on the type of  environmental problem and 
type of  product. In Chapter 3.1.2 we suggested a categorisation for this. Independent 
of  category, EPR policy instruments are part of  the ‘National legal frameworks’ (see 
Figure 3.4). Covenants, regulations, permits, trading schemes or combinations of  these 
are some of  the national policy instruments employed. Figure 3.5 gives an overview of  
various EPR policy instruments for plastic packaging sectors in selected EU countries.
Figure 3.5 illustrates further that EPR policy instruments might either be implemented 
through regulatory measures or through non-regulatory measures such as covenants. 
The difference is that in non-regulatory regimes the authorities do not have apparent 
sanctioning mechanisms at hand if  there is non-compliance, except from threatening 
with a legally binding regulation. Most current EPR policies for plastic packaging are, 
however, connected to the regulatory body in the country. These policies might either 
be governmentally driven, like the packaging waste recovery notes (PRN) – system in 
the UK or industry driven like in Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium and Italy. 
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Figure 3.5 Overview of  policies and policy implementation at EU and national level for plastic 
packaging [Source: EPRO 2005]
The types of  EPR policy instruments mentioned above are general categories that, 
during the policy implementation, are ‘ﬁlled with content’. Table 3.1 below provides 
some examples of  EPR policy instruments organised along Vedung’s (1998) categories 
and the categories suggested in Chapter 3.1.2.
Table 3.1 Examples of  EPR policy instruments grouped along Vedung’s categories (1998) and 
categories suggested in Chapter 3.1.2.
Regulatory instruments Economic 
instruments
Informative 
instruments
Core business domain Recycling content requirements, 
Substance bans
Material tax
Outside core business 
domain (Consumption)
Covenant (packaging optimisation/ 
waste reduction)
Outside core business 
domain (End-of-life)
Covenant: (Take-back system)
Regulation (Deposit-refund system)
Advanced 
disposal fee
Through the market
The EPR policy instruments presented above might be designed and given substance in 
various ways. For instance, important questions to clarify are: Who are the producers? 
What type of  responsibility are they facing? And to what extent are the producers 
responsible?
National legal 
frameworks
Non-regulation
(covenant) Regulation
Industry-driven
Government-driven Industry-driven
Norway (plastic packaging)
Netherlands
Collective
systems
Individual
systems
UK (PRN)
Germany, Sweden, 
France, Belgium, Italy
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The term ‘producers’ is a collective term for all upstream companies that are involved in 
the EPR schemes, and is not limited to the manufacturer of  the product. As far as plastic 
packaging in Norway is concerned, the entire value chain including plastic producers, 
plastic packaging producers, packers & ﬁllers as well as wholesalers and retailers have all 
signed the covenant with the Norwegian Ministry of  Environment. 
Lindhqvist (1992) proposed a frequently quoted typology for types of  responsibility 
within EPR. He distinguished between legal responsibility, physical responsibility, 
economic responsibility, informative responsibility and ownership. These types of  
responsibility are to a large extent concentrated on commitments in the EoL phase and 
not closely related to the production phase.
If  the producers are given a ﬁnancial responsibility, it is still a debate how far this 
responsibility actually should go – full cost coverage or shared costs. In Germany there 
is full cost coverage as the Duales system represents a parallel system to the municipal 
waste management system (Muenk 1998). In most other EPR schemes there is a sharing 
of  costs, for instance between waste generators, municipalities, consumers and PROs. 
Within plastic packaging in Norway there is a principle of  ‘net deﬁcit cost coverage’, 
which means that Plastretur provides a subsidy that, theoretically, shall compensate for 
the deﬁcit when choosing a material recycling route instead of  a cheaper alternative (e.g. 
energy recovery and landﬁll). Everyone gets the same subsidy and the competition is 
then based on the internal efﬁciencies of  each company.
The policy instruments normally clarify how the producers might carry out their 
responsibilities. We usually distinguish between collective systems, semi-collective systems 
and individual systems. A collective system is often organised with PROs which on 
behalf  of  the producers, execute the commitments in the policy instrument. Collective 
systems might be found based on both negotiated agreements and regulations, as shown 
in Figure 3.5. The producers pay a licence fee to ﬁnance the collective system, and the 
fee does not necessarily reﬂect the costs of  recycling for their particular product. On the 
contrary, in individual systems the producer must prove that his product is taken care of  
in an environmental friendly manner. There is a closer relation between the license fee 
paid and the costs of  recycling the speciﬁc product (Tojo 2004). Finally, we ﬁnd semi-
collective systems where private (waste management) companies, take responsibility on 
behalf  of  their clients to fulﬁl their commitments. Within this category we also ﬁnd the 
insurance companies that offer EPR-solutions for long-lived products (EE-products).
In order for policy instruments to be effective there must be credible sanctioning 
opportunities. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, the national implementation of  EU directives can 
either take a non-regulatory or a regulatory route. In Norway, for instance, the covenant 
on plastic packaging does not explicitly state sanction, but there is an underlying premise 
for the covenant that if  the producers do not reach the targets, then a regulation will 
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be implemented (Hambro 2003). The question is how strong this threat (‘shadow of  
the law’) is considered by the actors. Most countries have a regulatory basis for their 
EPR schemes on plastic packaging. In the UK, for instance, the PRN-system, being the 
most market-oriented system of  all European EPR systems on packaging, has ﬁnancial 
penalties for non-compliance. This is the guarantee needed for the market to work well. 
(Simmons 2004). It seems, however, to be essential to either have a strong program for 
monitoring and ensuring compliance with negotiated agreements and/or an ongoing 
regulatory threat that will be triggered if  industry fails to meet its obligations (Veerman 
1998).
3.3 Industrial implementation of EPR policies
All policy instruments aim at inﬂuencing commercial market actors or consumers so that 
social beneﬁcial objectives are obtained (Vedung 1998) By industrial implementation 
of  EPR we mean processes that are initiated and carried out within industry as a 
consequence of  the EPR policy instrument. Understanding the outcome of  the industrial 
implementation of  EPR, for instance the recycling ratio, requires closer studies of  the 
processes within the industrial system that have produced the outcome (Weiss 1998). 
A majority of  the papers that look into EPR schemes argue that dematerialisation has 
happened due to these schemes, without showing the causalities between this policy 
and the effects (e.g. Lindhqvist 2000, Hanssen et al. 2003). Hence, going deeper into the 
processes is necessary. This point is further supported by the fact that the importance 
of  achieving changes upstream in material choice and design are frequently accentuated 
(Lifset and Lombardi 1997).
The formal transition point between policy implementation and industrial implementation 
is when the regulation is passed or the covenant is signed. Then most of  the remaining 
political uncertainty is removed by agreeing upon the political boundary conditions within 
which industrial actors will operate. That said, industrial actors prepare themselves for 
the regulation and changing boundary conditions that are most likely will appear, and 
industrial changes due to the regulation might, thus, be observable ahead of  the formal 
transition point. 
As stated in Chapter 1, we will concentrate on collective systems. Figure 3.6 shows the 
interaction between various actors and the corresponding ﬂows of  material, money 
and information  In the policy implementation process, the authorities (Ministry of  
Environment) design an EPR regulation or negotiate with the producers (upstream 
companies) on an EPR covenant. Other non-EPR policies such as energy policies, 
transport policies and industrial policies will also inﬂuence both upstream and 
downstream companies. 
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In collective systems, PROs are usually established to act on behalf  of  the producers to 
comply with the targets. A PRO’s main tasks are to collect licence fees from producers 
and redistribute these ﬁnancial resource as subsidies to downstream companies in order 
to lubricate the recovery system. Moreover, the PRO interacts with the market through 
information campaigns and contractual frameworks as to safeguard that the market is 
running as smoothly as possible. Understanding the role of  the PROs, their strategies 
and means for reaching targets as well as their interactions with market actors in the 
networks of  actors, is imperative to be able to improve current systems.
Figure 3.6 Structured overview of  collective EPR systems
In collective systems, the producers might take various roles and responsibilities. Some 
producers do not, however, exercise producer responsibility at all, via not paying the 
licence fee. They are so-called ‘free-riders’. This is altering the competition within the 
market as these companies take beneﬁt from a system they do not ﬁnancially contribute 
to. Those paying are then, relatively speaking, worse off. 
The simplest and most usual way of  a producer taking responsibility is to pay the licence 
fee corresponding to the amount of  products put on the market. If  this is the only 
consequence of  the EPR policy instrument, the producer is showing weak responsibility. 
To these companies, the licence fee is like any other tax paid to the government. The 
producers might, however, perform a stronger responsibility beyond just paying the fee. 
The costs of  running the collection and recycling system depend on how the product is 
designed, both with respect to recycling and to the entire life cycle environmental impacts 
as such. If  the producers choose a material that is easily collected and recycled, they 
express a more active producer responsibility. As discussed in Chapter 2, the premises 
for how easy the product is to recycle are decided in the design phase. Several argue that 
in collective systems there are, however, a lack of  incentives for design for recycling as 
such efforts do not provide reduced licence fees. However, a general optimisation of  
Producers
PRO 
Ministry of 
EnvironmentEPR regulation
EPR covenant
Other policies
Subsidies
Learning
Other policies
PRODUCTS
Subsidies
Learning
Disposal
Recovered
material
Fee
Waste
management
companies
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the product is beneﬁcial both in terms of  economy and environment and expresses 
an active responsibility. If  the producer also demands recycled material, for whatever 
reason, so that the collection and recovery systems turn into being demand-driven, and 
not only supply-driven, this behaviour by the producer expresses a strong and active 
producer responsibility. The industrial implementation of  EPR might be characterised 
as successful if  these criteria are fulﬁlled.
Strong producer responsibility is also shown through active participation and ownership 
in the PROs, since important decisions on how to design the recycling system and hence 
comply with the regulation are taken here. Moreover, a strong producer responsibility 
is present if  producers take internal decision in their organisation that contributes to 
making it easier for the PRO to achieve the targets. Finally, within EPR schemes the 
waste management companies play an important role as they are the operators of  the 
actual recovery system. Understanding the interactions between these companies, the 
upstream companies and the PROs completes the picture of  the networks of  actors 
within EPR schemes.
(Endnotes)
1 One example of  this is the Kyoto Protocol, that relies on ﬂexible market mechanisms e.g. emission trading 
systems and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM), for reducing GHG emissions.
2 For more information on the EoL Vehicle Directive, see Tojo (2004), p. 88-92 (Chapter 4).
3 Covenant is in this thesis synonym to negotiated agreement and to voluntary agreement.
4 In its early years, EPR was regarded as a policy strategy (Lindhqvist 1992, 1998), but has during recent 
years been considered as a policy principle. This change is related to the fact that EPR is not based on PPP and 
that EPR becomes more than just a take-back scheme by potentially being the broad principle to employ when 
developing environmental product policy instruments in a life cycle perspective.
5 Integrated Product Policy (IPP) is an EU initiative deﬁned as “Public policy which explicitly aims to modify 
and improve the environmental performance of  product systems” [E & Y et al. 1998, p. 33]. Another deﬁnition 
of  IPP is proposed by Centre for Sustainable Development (CfSD): IPP is a “public policy aiming at greening 
the marketplace through the integrated use of  supply and demand side tools”. Environmental Product Policy 
(EPP) is a more generic term than IPP referring to product-oriented environmental policies at a national level 
inside and outside Europe.
6 The term ‘non-EPR policy instruments’ is here employed to denote all those public policy instruments 
and measures that are not based on the EPR principle. Examples of  such instruments are found within 
governmental energy policies, transportation policies, industry policies, innovation policies as well as ﬁscal 
policies. The challenge of  IPP is to coordinate across the various departments (Ministry of  Environment, 
Ministry of  Industry and Commerce, Ministry of  Finance etc) and across the various problem areas (waste, 
climate, acidiﬁcation etc). Of  particular importance seems to be the combination of  environmental issue with 
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commercial, industrial and innovation issues. This is signiﬁcant for EPR since it aims at bringing incentives for 
ﬁrms to innovate new and improved products.
7 Davis (1998, p 32) argues that traditional policy instruments with focus on point-emissions are actually based 
on the EPR principle; ‘EPR as a broad principle states that the manufacturers of  products bear a degree of  
responsibility for the environmental impacts of  their products throughout the product’s life cycle, including […] 
impact from the manufacturer’s production process itself, …’ In that case, EPR is not only product oriented, 
but also process-oriented. However, taking into account that this does not represent an extension of  producers’ 
responsibility, we will not deﬁne these traditional policy instruments as based on EPR.
8 So far we have presented EPR as an entirely government-driven policy for inﬂuencing the producers as 
market actors. In addition, EPR is regarded as a policy principle also applicable to entirely voluntary efforts 
(OECD 2001) As discussed in Chapter 2.4, companies might, like what for instance Xerox has done, take 
responsibility to establish take-back schemes for their own products. Carrying out this entirely voluntarily 
strategy without any kind of  governmental intervention is also considered to be part of  the EPR concept. The 
motivation is in this case not driven by public policies, but rather by, for instance, environmental leadership for 
market advantage, regulation and potential regulation, economic return and better decision-making as well as 
corporate commitments to the environment, in all by the belief  that this is a sustainable business strategy.
9 A product that is not needed anymore in its present form, is usually regarded as waste. But what if  other 
people need the product, is it then also waste? Is it waste if  it is reused in the use phase? The last deﬁnition of  
waste is found in White Paper 44/1991-92 to the Norwegian Parliament: “waste is discarded movable properties 
or substances. Waste is also regarded as redundant moveable properties from tertiary sector, from production 
and treatment plants. Waste water and waste gas are not considered as waste”. (NMoE 1992)
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4. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The purpose of  the analytical framework is to explore how we are going to study the 
main research question, so that others can test the reliability by employing the same 
analytical framework and the same empirical evidence to see if  they reach the same 
conclusions. It includes some important steps:
1. What to look for – deciding on the data needed for answering the research question. 
Of  particular importance is to select data from “the inﬁnite number 
of  facts that could be recorded” (King et al. 1994, p 34) 
2. How to ﬁnd it – outlining how the data will be collected. A number of  
methods are available, ranging from literature studies, via case studies 
and comparative studies to experiments and surveys. Often there is 
a combination of  these, for instance that within a case study, surveys 
and in-depths interviews are used as tangible tools for gathering 
information.
3. How to interpret – outlining how the collected data will be interpreted. How do 
we intend to treat the data collected from empirical studies?
Obviously, the analytical framework must be adjusted to the speciﬁc purpose of  the 
research, although existing frameworks might be applied if  these are developed with 
quite similar research questions and theoretical perspectives in mind (Ayres and Ayres 
2002, foreword). In this case, the general theoretical framework provided in Chapter 
2 points towards a general analytical approach for studying industrial systems. First, 
combining the resource perspective and systems perspective in studying the industrial 
metabolism at various levels of  the system is an appropriate strategy for getting an 
overall picture of  the system. It provides information on the signiﬁcant ﬂows, on the 
most important group of  actors and on their physical relations. Moreover, the ﬂows are 
most usually expressed in terms of  weight units, although recently monetary units to a 
larger extent are employed (Strømman 2005, Brattebø et al 2006).
Second, in order not just to describe the metabolism but also to understand it, it is 
necessary to look into the underlying mechanisms of  the system. By combining the 
networks of  actors’ perspective and the systems perspective, we are able to identify the 
most critical actors within the system, their incentives, measures and strategy as well as 
the interaction between the actors, that all, to a greater or lesser extent, have an inﬂuence 
on the metabolism. In total, this provides additional knowledge to the study of  the 
industrial metabolism.
This dual approach is in line with Giddens’ structuration theory. The material ﬂows 
constitute the structures within the system, being ‘decided’ by the actors and their 
decisions. On the other hand, the existing metabolism puts restrictions on the actual 
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space of  freedom that the actors have. Hence, both approaches should be employed 
interchangeably in order to interpret the causalities.
The underlying systems perspective can be applied both on sector and company level 
depending on the type of  information sought. Usually, however, an overall picture of  
the system related to the dependent variables (for instance loop closing, fraction of  
new renewable energy sources) is gained, before moving into the system (black box) for 
ﬁnding independent variables, underlying causal mechanisms and explanations. 
Figure 4.1 Material ﬂows and inﬂuencing actors and factors
In a systems perspective, we analytically distinguish between direct and indirect actors, 
see Figure 4.1. Some indirect actors will have stronger inﬂuence to the material ﬂows 
than others. Identifying the position of  various actors can be done both theoretical and 
empirical. Some actors are pre-qualiﬁed for being particular important actors within 
EPR-systems, for instance producers and PROs. Then, an empirical study of  the EPR-
system will discover their actual inﬂuence. Further, in such a study, we are able to identify 
other inﬂuential actors in the particular EPR-system.
According to Giddens (1984), structure is either conﬁrmed or altered through actors’ 
actions. These structures comprise part of  the factors that might be decisive for the 
industrial metabolism. White (1994) includes ‘…economic, political, regulatory, and social 
factors…’ in his deﬁnition as factors that potentially inﬂuence the material ﬂows and 
the environmental consequences of  these. Moreover, Frosch (1994) suggests six areas 
of  barriers to recycling: technical, economic, informational, organisational, regulatory and legal. 
Ehrenfeld (2000b) proposes ‘barriers to sustainable practices’ as regulatory barriers, 
organisational inertia, economic obstacles and lack of  market demand. These factors can be 
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connected to various actors, for instance lack of  market demand is directly connected 
to consumers and indirectly to authorities that through regulatory mechanisms might 
inﬂuence the market demand. This clearly shows the importance of  studying the actors 
in order to discover the key factors and key conditions for an effective system. That said, 
not only external factors inﬂuence a speciﬁc actor. Internal factors, both for corporates 
and individuals, have a current underlying set of  beliefs, values and norms that are 
conﬁrmed or altered through action and input from external factors, that all might be 
decisive for the decisions made and subsequently effects on the industrial metabolism.
Public policy is one of  several inﬂuencing factors to industrial behaviour. Accepting that 
other factors may be equally or even more important, the analytical challenge is thus 
to examine the relative importance of  policy instruments. We may, for instance, very well 
think of  the situation where material ﬂows are redirected towards increased recycling 
ratios, without any technological changes on a company level, any signiﬁcant policy 
instrument, or any improved recycling facilities, but simply because this has turned out, 
for whatever reason, to be economically beneﬁcial for the direct actors.
4.1 Speciﬁc analytical framework
Our main research question stated in the introduction is:
What are the key conditions for successful industrial implementation of  collective EPR 
programmes in the Norwegian plastic packaging system, according to an industrial ecology 
perspective?
Basically, the key conditions are understood here as those factors that inﬂuence the 
results of  the industrial implementation of  EPR. Through the case study (Part II) we 
will gather empirical evidence for analysing the research question and hence identifying 
the key conditions for an effective industrial implementation of  EPR. Implicit in this 
analysis is to also discover the barriers and limitations for an effective implementation 
and, consequently, how to overcome them. As outlined above, this implies a two-step 
approach; i) analysing the overall system performance and ii) analysing the material 
ﬂows, key actors and mechanisms within the system, as well as external factors outside 
the system. 
To begin, we look into the overall results from the plastic packaging system. EPR aims 
at reducing the environmental effects of  products throughout the life cycle. The targets 
stated in the Norwegian covenant on plastic packaging are 30 % material recycling, 50 
% energy recovery as well as an un-quantiﬁed objective of  ‘waste reduction’/’packaging 
optimisation’. Obviously, the quantitative targets refer to loop closing. 
As for waste reduction, we can think of  primarily three strategies for obtaining this; i) 
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dematerialisation, ii) increasing residence time of  products in their use phase and iii) 
recycling. Although recycling is a waste reducing strategy, this is covered by the quantiﬁed 
targets, and we therefore focus on waste reduction strategies before the product become 
waste, or more precisely waste prevention as deﬁned by OECD (2000), see Figure 4.2. 
Waste prevention is related to products while, for instance waste minimisation is related 
to waste.
Figure 4.2 Deﬁning waste prevention, waste minimisation and waste disposal. Modiﬁed from OECD 
(2000)
The overall strategy for obtaining this should be to i) minimise input of  virgin material 
and ii) keep the material within the industrial system as long as possible. The latter point 
depends, however, on the energy demand for doing this and the difference in energy 
efﬁciency between the alternative products. Moreover, both strategies depend on how 
the products are designed. Since residence time is not possible to measure on an overall 
level, but needs to be studied on an individual product level, we will here measure waste 
reduction through dematerialisation. Hence, we will look at the developments of  loop 
closing and dematerialisation during the time period 1995 – 2004.
This provides only however, knowledge on the overall system’s performance. Therefore 
identifying the more detailed ﬂows we are able to analyse the underlying parameters 
for the development of  the indicators ‘dematerialisation’ and ‘loop-closing’. However, 
going into details about the material ﬂows does not provide any substantial information 
on why the ﬂows become the way they are. A material ﬂow analysis does not include 
assessments of  the driving forces and decisive factors for the observed material ﬂows. 
Thus, exploring the key conditions requires in-depth knowledge about the system of  
concern. Building on the general analytical approach presented above, this can be carried 
out in two interacting steps:
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1. Analysing the internal metabolism on various levels in the system. This points to 
identifying where signiﬁcant losses of  material quantity and material quality are 
within the system.
2. Analysing key actors and key factors in order to understand the underlying 
mechanisms and drivers on various levels in the system. This points to studying 
actors on sector levels (PRO) and on company levels along the entire life cycle, 
including primary upstream companies, downstream companies and secondary 
upstream companies.
These analytical steps constitute the analytical framework for this study and are discussed 
below.
4.1.1 Overall systems performance
The analysis of  the overall systems performance related to industrial implementation 
of  EPR will be based on Figure 4.3. The system is plastics world wide, containing three 
subsystems i) plastic packaging in Norway, ii) non-packaging plastics in Norway and iii) 
plastics abroad. Although the plastic packaging system in Norway (that is the share of  
the plastic packaging in Norway that is under the covenant, conf. Chapter 1.3), is the 
main system to be analysed in this study, the two other subsystems interact with our core 
system through recycled material from plastic packaging to the production phases of  
the other subsystems (X
3,4
 and X
3,7
). X
3,4
, for instance, is the ﬂow from node 3 to node 
4 in Figure 4.3.
However, Figure 4.3 is a simpliﬁed ﬂow sheet as some ﬂows are not indicated. For reasons 
of  simplicity, we have not included for instance the export of  collected plastic packaging 
waste to be recovered abroad. This is because the most interesting aspect with respect to 
the overall systems performance is how much of  the generated plastic packaging waste 
(X
2,3
) is actually recycled or recovered, and not where this is done. Hence, all Norwegian 
plastic packaging waste that potentially can be recovered, is recovered, whether this is 
carried out domestically or abroad, is included in X
2,3
. Moreover, and due to similar 
reasons, we have not paid attention to the import of  both virgin and recycled plastic 
packaging to ‘plastic packaging in Norway’, but rather aggregated all inﬂows of  virgin 
material to ‘plastic packaging in Norway’ in ﬂow X
0,1
. 
The material input (X
0,1
) to the system contains two possible ﬂows; virgin material and 
recycled material from other product systems. For all practical purposes, we assume that 
this ﬂow entirely consists of  virgin material. X
0,1
 also includes what is imported either 
as bulk or as ﬁnal plastic packaging. Further, input of  recycled plastics to node 1 is 
assumed to come from node 3 (closed loop), although there might be imports from the 
other subsystems as well through X
0,1
. 
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Figure 4.3 Schematic overview of  the plastic packaging system.
The production phase consists of  all activities and processes from extraction to ﬁnal 
product. Consumption is the use phase with input of  produced plastic packaging and 
output of  plastic packaging waste. For plastic packaging with a lifetime of  less than one 
year, produced (X
1,2
) equals consumed (X
2,3
). Only reusables may have a life time longer 
than a year, but these constitute only around 1 % of  total material ﬂows and are thus 
negligible (Skjervold 2003). Moreover, the output from node 3 is distributed in the ﬁve 
outﬂows X
3,1
, X
3,4
, X
3,7
, X
3,10
 and X
3,11
. Node 10 ‘Other economic systems’ represent 
energy recovery  ptions like combustion with energy recovery.
4.1.1.1 Loop closing (waste management system)
Loop closing is here deﬁned as the relation between the inﬂow of  plastic packaging 
waste (X
2,3
) and the outﬂows of  recycled and recovered material, measured on a weight 
basis. The recycling ratio (α) can be expressed as
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while the recovery ratio (β), also including the plastic packaging going to energy recovery, 
is expressed as
 
where X
3,10
 is the ﬂow of  plastic packaging waste that is energy recovered. For reasons of  
simplicity we consider the amounts going to feedstock recycling and chemical recycling 
to be within the ﬂows X
3,1
, X
3,4
, and X
3,7
 or feedstock recycled. 
The expressions above are indicators of  the quantitative performance of  the system. 
Equally important to measure is the quality of  the recycled material. Quality is deﬁned 
in various ways. For instance, Sirkin and Ten Houten (1993) in their cascading theory 
have deﬁned resource quality as ‘an expression of  a capacity to perform various tasks 
at various degrees of  difﬁculty’. Thus, the effectiveness of  the loop closing depends 
also on how the material qualities are employed in new products. If  recycled material of  
a higher quality than needed is employed in new products, the efforts in the recycling 
system to obtain high quality are not optimal (Røine et al. 2001).
Another way of  assessing quality is through the market mechanisms, by looking at the 
market price for recycled material compared to virgin material. The material value out 
of  the recycling system depends on a number of  factors, for instance the input quality 
(in X
2,3
) and the costs of  running the recycling system to get the speciﬁc material quality, 
and is therefore not an optimal quality indicator. We will, however, employ the value of  
the recycled material as an indicator of  the quality because this represents the output 
from the system, it is comparable to the virgin material, and if  we consider that the value 
of  the plastic packaging waste into the recycling system is zero, it also expresses the 
effectiveness of  the recycling system. That said, the discussion on material quality will 
be limited in relation to the quantity discussion as data on this is poor.
4.1.1.2 Dematerialisation (plastic packaging system in Norway)
Measuring dematerialisation has been subject to a number of  studies, primarily on a 
national level, but also on sector and company level. When measuring loop closing 
above, we estimated the relations between inﬂows and outﬂows in the waste management 
system as an indicator for the degree of  loop closing in the plastic packaging system. When 
measuring dematerialisation we consider the entire plastic packaging system in Norway. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, dematerialisation is primarily about reducing input of  material 
to a system. Including recycling in the system, we see from Figure 4.4 below that the 
dematerialisation dimension can be measured in at least two ways. First, dematerialisation 
can be related to total consumption (X
2,3
) of  material in the system, regardless of  the 
source of  the material. Second, dematerialisation can be measured as the net input of  
3,1 3,4 3,7 3,10 2,3( ) /  X X X X Xβ = + + +
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virgin material to the system (X
0,1
). The distinction between these two indicators is the 
fraction of  recycled material contributing to fulﬁl demand (consumption).
First, if  dematerialisation with respect to waste reduction shall take place, the consumption 
of  the material (in tons) must be reduced over time, ΔX
2,3
 < 0. This may appear if  for 
instance a function is fulﬁlled with less material (e.g. leasing (Stahel 1994) or electronic 
post (email) instead of  physical, traditional post). Proper design of  the products makes 
this possible. From an industrial ecology point of  view, due to the assumption that 
recycled material causes less environmental burden than virgin material (particularly true 
for metals), another way of  expressing dematerialisation is to assess the development of  
virgin material input (X
0,1
) over time. Hence, if  ΔX
0,1
 < 0, then dematerialisation occurs. 
These two forms of  dematerialisation are in absolute terms. 
Figure 4.4 Various expressions of  dematerialisation
However, dematerialisation is also frequently expressed as the relation between material 
consumption and GDP (Cleveland and Ruth 1999). The basic idea is that if  the material 
consumption increases more slowly over time than GDP, then there is a decoupling 
between these indicators. The function is fulﬁlled more efﬁciently and thus, there is a 
relative dematerialisation, although the total consumption in fact is increasing. Hence, if  
ΔX
2,3
/ΔGDP < 1 or ΔX
0,1
/ΔGDP < 1, there is a relative dematerialisation, see Figure 
4.4. Consequently, the upper left corner of  Figure 4.4 is the preferred expression of  
dematerialisation, while the lower right corner is the less advantageous alternative.
The material ﬂows (X
i,j
) represent the plastic packaging only, while the GDP express 
the entire economy. In order to adjust the overall GDP to the most relevant sectors in 
Norway, hence leaving out the sectors with neglectable plastic packaging intensity, we 
develop the indicator ‘GDP relevant sectors’ and use this for expressing the economic 
activities within those sectors related to plastic packaging.
If  all recycled plastic packaging were kept within the plastic packaging system in Norway, 
the indicator for dematerialisation could be expressed as 2,3 3,1 0,1  X X X∆ = ∆ +∆ . In practice, 
however, the materials go to other product systems (ΔX
3,4
, ΔX
3,7
, ΔX
3,10
) as well. Say 
Absolute 
dematerialisation
[tons/yr]
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dematerialisation
[tons/GDP]
Virgin
Material
Input
Total
consump-
tion
If �X0,1 < 0
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that the parameter γ express the relation between open loop closing (ΔX
3,4
 and ΔX
3,7
) 
and closed loop closing (ΔX
3,1
). If  the answer to fraction 3,1 3,1 3,4 3,7/( ) X X X Xγ = + + is 
close to 1, the recycling system improves the dematerialisation of  the plastic packaging 
system in Norway, while if  the fraction’s answer is close to 0, the recycling activities do 
not contribute to dematerialisation of  plastic packaging in Norway. However, since we 
are not taking into account the inﬂow of  recycled material from the other subsystems 
in Figure 4.3 we assume that export and import of  recycled material to the plastic 
packaging system in Norway outweigh each other.
4.1.2 Opening the black box
In order to understand the key conditions for effective implementation of  EPR, we 
ask: Where are the major losses of  quantity and of  quality, making the recycling ratio 
lower than 1? The answer provides useful information on where in the life cycle a 
key condition for successful implementation of  EPR may be found, and consequently 
where to concentrate measures and strategies to improve the system. Hence, we need to 
investigate further the black box of  plastic packaging recovery systems in Norway.
Moreover, we look at how the EPR policy instruments provide incentives for the 
producers to carry out changes upstream. Thus, our study is taking into account the 
efﬁciencies of  the take-back scheme and the incentives for design changes upstream 
when analysing the industrial implementation of  EPR. 
We primarily employ two analytical levels: sector level and company level, and use 
material ﬂow analysis and actor analysis in a combined manner. The system perspective 
is applied both for the material ﬂows and for the actors. As noted by Ehrenfeld (2000,p 
198) ‘One must look inside a company to see what is really happening and to identify 
those activities that authentically represent the company’s commitment to environmental 
excellence and sustainability’.
4.1.2.1 Disaggregating the material ﬂows
‘Plastic packaging’ is a collective term for all types of  packaging containing a majority of  
polymers. Being able to identify the loss of  materials within the waste management system, 
we will disaggregate this material ﬂow. There are at least three options to categories the 
disaggregated ﬂows. First, the type of  product expresses the functionality, properties of  
the product and/or for what purpose it is employed. Examples of  categories within this 
group are: ﬁlm, rigid packaging (bottles and cans), EPS and reusable packaging. Second, 
plastic packaging can be classiﬁed based on who the waste generators are, the ‘markets’, 
for instance an industrial company or a private household. Finally, the type of  polymers, 
for instance low density polyethylene (LDPE), high density polyethylene (HDPE), poly 
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propylene (PP) and PET.  Table 4.1 below shows the various options.
Table 4.1 Categories of  plastic packaging
Category of plastic packaging Examples
Type of  products Film, rigid packaging, reusable packaging, PP-bags, EPS
Type of  polymers LDPE, LLDPE, HDPE, PP, PS, EPS, PET, PVC
Waste generator Industry & commerce, agriculture, aquaculture, households
It is possible to use all these categories. However, the polymer category seems most 
complicated to employ due to the great variety of  polymers and relatively poor data 
quality (Schjefte 2003). Conversely, in the actual recycling process, the polymers are 
what count, since it is technologically difﬁcult to recycle mixed fractions of  polymers 
with various melting indexes. That said, since we employ an actor perspective we select 
to follow products and markets throughout the empirical investigation.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the waste management system. The inﬂow to the system is 
4
1,
1
M i
i
X
=
∑  
which is the total amount of  generated plastic packaging waste from the four markets; 
industry, households, agriculture and aquaculture. The latter two are separated from 
‘industry’ partly because they are distinct systems within the Norwegian EPR scheme 
on plastic packaging, partly because data of  high quality are available on this and, ﬁnally, 
partly because it will be more readily compared with EPR schemes abroad.
Figure 4.5 Processes and ﬂows in a waste management system, box 3 in Figure 4.3
M
1
 is the aggregated amount of  generated waste, which is distributed to the four sectors 
as shown in nodes 1 – 4, ‘sorting and collection’. These represent how the plastic 
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packaging waste is sorted and collected at the waste generators’ location. The collection 
efﬁciency is expressed as:
Residual waste goes straight to landﬁll, while the rest is collected, sorted and pre-treated 
by a waste management company. These processes are illustrated by boxes 5-8, and the 
corresponding efﬁciency is
 
The plastic packaging waste is sent to ﬁnal treatment; recycling, combustion with energy 
recovery or combustion without energy recovery/landﬁll. The recycling efﬁciency can 
be expressed as:
For the entire system, the recycling output is 
4
10,0 1,
1
X ( * * ) *coll treat rec M i
i
Xη η η
=
= ∑
where X
10,0
 is the output from recycling, 
4
1,
1
M i
i
X
=
∑  is the input to the waste management 
system, collη  is the collection efﬁciency, treatη  is the sorting efﬁciency and recη  is the 
recycling efﬁciency, the latter including both box 9 and 10 in Figure 4.4. Based on Figure 
4.4 above, we deﬁne the overall recycling ratio as 
1
10,0
4
,
1
M i
i
X
X
α
=
=
∑
 and the overall recovery 
ratio as 
1
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i
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X
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Obviously, the indicators above can be employed on all four markets, indicating the 
efﬁciency and recycling ratios within these sectors. Moreover, and as described above, 
each of  these ﬂows can be expressed using the same formula. For instance, the inﬂow 
of  industrial plastic packaging can be expressed as 
where ﬁlm, rigid, pp-bags and reusables represents the four type of  products we will 
look at here.
A ﬁnal dimension to be studied is how the plastic packaging is actually sorted and 
collected. For instance, the plastic packaging might be sorted for material recycling, 
sorted for energy recovery or not sorted at all (mixed waste). How the plastic packaging 
is treated, by for instance the waste generator, is particularly decisive for the loss of  
material. Various indicators can be developed from Figure 4.4 on this:
3
2,
8
,
5
treat 8
5
i M
i
M i
i
X
X
η =
=
=
∑
∑
2
1
4
,
1
coll 4
,
1
i M
i
M i
i
X
X
η =
=
=
∑
∑
10,0
rec
3,9M
X
X
η =
1, 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1M M film M rigid M ppbag M reuseX X X X X= + + +
75
Analytical framework
2
1
1
M
M
X
X
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10,0 11,0( )
X
X X
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+  (fraction of  material recycling to total amount recovered)
These material efﬁciency indicators will be extended to also include the costs associated 
with processing plastic packaging waste to useful re-granulated plastics to be employed 
in new products. As Underdal (1992) notes, including the costs of  a process provides 
information on how efﬁcient the system actually is. Costs do not tell us anything about 
the effectiveness of  reaching a target, just how costly it is. Cost studies are in a way 
important for the actors and their particular interests in the actual cases. Expressing 
the unit costs over time provides valuable information for analysing the efﬁciency of  the 
waste management system, for instance:
Only the costs of  the PRO, Plastretur, will be included here as these represent the 
additional costs for redirecting the material ﬂow towards the increased recycling ratio. 
The costs will distinguish between running costs and ﬁxed costs. Running costs are those 
costs that are directly related to the material ﬂows and that increase linearly to increased 
material ﬂow. Fixed costs, on the other hand, are independent of  the magnitude of  the 
material ﬂows. 
Plastic packaging operates in close connection with other alternative packaging materials, 
for instance metals, glass and paperboard. Although these materials are outside the plastic 
packaging system, we will include them in the analysis since they mutually inﬂuence each 
other. This reﬂects the position that the dematerialisation may appear part of  an actual 
dematerialisation activity of  plastic packaging products. However, it might also be that 
the amount is reduced due to the substitution of  one packaging material with another.
These indicators will be analysed along a timeline, basically from 1995 when the covenant 
on plastic packaging was signed until 2004. The intention is to discover trends that 
might help to explain the overall recycling ratios and dematerialisation. The timelines 
are indexed with 1995 as the base year. Finally, data is collected from various sources. 
4
10, 0
[ / ]
[ / ]
costs NOK year
X kg year
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Statistics Norway provides information on the GDP, while Plastretur, Plastics Europe 
and Mepex provide the main information regarding material ﬂows and costs.
4.1.2.1 Key actors and inﬂuencing factors
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4.1, we include an actor perspective in this study. In this 
part of  the analytical framework, where we are entering the core of  the plastic packaging 
system for ﬁnding explanations for the observed, quantitative trends displayed above, 
identifying the key actors is the starting point for getting closer to the key conditions. 
First, we distinguish between sector level and corporate level. On the sector level, we 
ﬁnd actors and groups of  actors that contribute to the overall systems performance. We 
make a distinction, for analytical purposes, between direct actors and indirect actors. 
The most important groups of  direct actors are the producers, the consumers and the 
end-of-life actors. Each of  these has a particular role in the system. Further, each of  
these groups consists of  sub-groups of  actor, for instance ‘plastic packaging producers’, 
‘packers and ﬁllers’ and ‘retailers’, all having their particular roles as well. In order to 
analyse the key conditions for successful industrial implementation of  EPR, we will 
during the empirical investigation explore the various roles of  these groups of  direct 
actors.
Figure 4.6 Actors on sector level in the plastic packaging system in Norway
Figure 4.6 illustrates various actors within the plastic packaging system in Norway. 
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Plastretur as the PRO is given a key position, being the main indirect actor. Other 
indirect actors will through the empirical studies, be mapped and their roles will be 
discussed. In Chapter 7, we study all the groups of  actors shown in Figure 4.6.
We employ Giddens’ structuration theory for looking into these groups of  actors and 
organisations. According to Giddens, the way actors behave relies on four interplaying 
categories of  structure. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the allocable and authoritative 
tools and resources give power to actors to carry out intended actions. In the case 
studies we will thus look for the strategies, resources and power the actors have to 
carry out intended actions as knowledgeable actors. This ability is indeed depending 
on their power relative to other actors as well. This underlines the important interplay 
between the actors being decisive for the ﬁnal outcome. However, there are underlying 
sets of  beliefs and norms within each corporation and individuals that also contribute 
to the decisions made and the actions taken. Understanding why corporates act the way 
they do, is of  key importance for understanding the relative importance of  EPR and 
consequently the key conditions contributing to effective implementation of  EPR.
This requires that the analysis is carried out on the company level as well. The company 
level is the single companies in the boxes in Figure 4.6, for instance the companies 
hidden behind the label ‘packers and ﬁllers’. It is on this level, within these companies, 
that important decisions are made related to innovation and product improvement, 
and the effects of  the EPR policy instruments can be understood (Ehrenfeld 2000b). 
For instance, as noted by (Fagerberg 2005), in order to comprehend ‘innovation’, 
understanding the decisions made in companies and organisations is imperative, as 
well as the exogenous conditions that inﬂuence these processes. We will put particular 
emphasis on understanding to what extent technological change and innovation have 
occurred within companies and the role of  EPR to this. Is it really so that EPR ‘…force 
designers and planners to consider issues left out of  the customary focus on cost and 
performance’ (Ehrenfeld 2001, p 224)? In short, do EPR policy instruments enforce 
upstream companies to act differently so that they contribute to making the recycling 
target easily achievable, for instance through design for collection and recycling?
Moreover, we will look into the organisational aspects within the companies being 
decisive for the product changes that, on an aggregated level, might contribute to higher 
recycling ratios. However, in order to analyse the relative importance of  EPR to these 
observed changes, we will get a broader picture of  the organisations, by looking at 
what happened prior to the introduction of  EPR. We will study how the corporates 
have changed on other resource related areas that are not directly relevant for EPR and 
the take-back schemes, for instanced energy efﬁciency, resource utilisation and internal 
waste and waste water treatment. And ﬁnally, how has EPR contributed to changed 
norms and beliefs concerning their way of  considering resource related challenges?
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In concluding the analytical framework for studying key actors and factors, we will analyse 
various actors on different levels and positions in the life cycle, and particularly focus on 
their incentives for carrying out changes (e.g. innovations and design for environment) 
that contribute to improved overall systems performance.
4.2 Research method
The research question contains two main parts: ‘key conditions’ and ‘successful industrial 
implementation’. The latter is the dependent variable that we will explain, while ‘key 
conditions’ are the independent variable. In order to identify the key conditions, we 
must therefore operationalise ‘successful industrial implementation’. As discussed 
above, loop closing and dematerialisation are characterising the performance of  the 
EPR system, and are thus indicators for the dependent variable. We measure these for 
the period 1995 – 2004 and look at the development over time to determine if  it is a 
‘successful implementation’. 
We interpret improvements over time as ‘successful implementation’. Improvements with 
regard to loop closing and dematerialisation are about increasing the recycling ratio 
and reduce the material consumption, as explained above. Identifying where the ﬂows 
of  plastic packaging face signiﬁcant losses of  material quantity and quality is thus 
important in order to understand the development over time. In the covenant, exact 
targets are given (30 % material recycling and 50 % energy recovery), but we will not 
make a strict deﬁnition of  successful saying that reaching the targets implies a ‘successful 
implementation’, while below this is not successful. In this study, we are interested in 
studying the mechanisms and driving forces, and learning from these processes. The 
targets are therefore not the important aspect. However, they will be used as points 
of  reference, but not for deﬁning ‘successful’. In our deﬁnition, thus, successful 
implementation of  EPR is that we can see improvements over time connected to loop 
closing and dematerialisation.
We will employ various data sources available on the Norwegian system for plastic 
packaging. Our main source of  information is a study carried out by Mepex Consult for 
Plastretur (Plastretur 2002a). This study estimated the total amount of  plastic packaging 
entering the Plastretur system in year 2001. Plastretur thus employed this to determine an 
updated denominator for calculating the recycling ratio reported annually to Norwegian 
Pollution Control Authority (SFT). This study was updated in 2004 (Bjørn and Syversen 
2004), and we have employed these updated numbers for 2001 as our base year. In order 
to develop time series for the period 1995 – 2004 we have employed data on growth 
rates from Plastics Europe (2005). This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
When the time series are identiﬁed, what will we look for in order to ﬁnd the key 
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conditions? We expect to ﬁnd the critical factors at places where the losses of  material 
quantity and quality are largest. We will therefore look at the processes and the ﬂows of  
plastic packaging within the system. However, in order to understand why losses appear 
at these places, we will also look into the actors that inﬂuence these critical phases.
Key conditions for successful implementation of  EPR can be studied from primarily 
two aspects. First, the key conditions for achieving high degree of  loop closing 
(downstream-related) and second, the key conditions for stimulating upstream actors 
to design differently in order to obtain dematerialisation or to prepare the ground for 
making the recycling as effective as possible 
The key conditions can be considered as critical factors for improving the loop closing 
and dematerialisation when implementing EPR. We are also looking for barriers to 
successful implementation. What seems to be the barriers for moving towards the 
targets or for improving the recycling ratio or increase the dematerialisation? We are 
not stating that if  these conditions are fulﬁlled, then the implementation of  EPR will be 
successful. We are rather saying that these are critical factors during the implementation 
of  EPR for making it successful, hence improve over time.
The ‘key conditions’ will be developed based on the empirical investigations and not 
on theory. We will, however, discuss our ﬁndings in relation to literature on the ﬁeld in 
order to bring new knowledge to the ﬁeld.
As we have elaborated more closely in Chapter 1, the case for this study is Norwegian 
plastic packaging industry. Within this system 17 organisations have been studied. The 
main organisations are Plastretur and Tine Norske Meierier (Tine). We will go more in 
detail on these organisations in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 respectively. The reason why 
selecting individual companies (and not the whole sector since this is a collective system) 
is to learn more about how companies act according to a public policy and to learn more 
about whether EPR has initiated other industrial ecology practices than present in EPR 
initially. If  it has, it would be called a successful implementation in an industrial ecology 
perspective. 
The selection of  Plastretur as the ﬁrst main case is due to several reasons. First, the 
organisation has a key role in the system and represents an institutional addition 
compared to before. Second, Plastretur is by far the company with greatest knowledge 
to the overall system. Its raison d’être is to have responsibility on sector level. Third, the 
overall objectives for Plastretur are related to the overall system performance, which is 
contrary to the proﬁt-seeking organisations on company level.
This study is based on a number of  interviews during the period 2001 – 2005 with 
employees at all levels of  the organisation, on participating observations for longer 
periods and on direct participation in the daily business activities. In practice unlimited 
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insight into the statistics, both related to material ﬂows and ﬁnancial data, has provided 
a quantitative basis for the study of  Plastretur.
The selection of  Tine as the second main case study rests on several factors. First, 
Tine pays more in fees to Materialretur than any other company. They are signiﬁcant 
consumers of  both inner and transport packaging, contributing to Materialretur with 
more than 5 % of  the total licence fee paid by plastic packaging companies. Second, 
their apparent environmental proﬁle and environmental raw material make the company 
directly exposed to the issues we are discussing here. Third, we might expect that this 
company has the motivation and resources to change their packaging routines. Fourth, 
they control the entire value chain from ‘ﬁeld to table’, which indicates that they 
presumably have a wider life cycle perspective already inherent in their organisation, 
and that they might have quantitative data on various parameters over a longer period 
of  time. Finally, Tine is owned by farmers that are directly related to the covenant by the 
plastic packaging waste that is generated due to storage of  the feed/hay. 
This study is based on more than 25 in-depth interviews with employees at various 
levels and organisational roles in the period September 2001 – October 2003, and on 
Tine’s annual reports, annual environmental reports, statistics provided by the staff  as 
well as on secondary literature about the company. A complete list of  interviewees are 
found in Appendix B
The analysis is also based on empirical data from 16 other companies. They are selected 
on the basis of  their anticipated inﬂuence. Recommendations from Plastretur on whom 
to pay attention to were signiﬁcant. In addition, companies were selected so that there 
were representatives from literally the entire value chain from virgin polymer producer 
to consumers and waste management companies and ﬁnally to recyclers and users 
of  recycled material. In order to supplement the Plastretur case on sector level, we 
needed to get an overall view of  the Plastretur EPR system as seen from the individual 
companies’ point of  view. Therefore, a web-based survey among companies along the 
plastic packaging value chain was conducted to get statistical evidence on the trends that 
could be further studied and understood through the single company studies. In addition, 
data has been collected from annual reports, personal providence, ofﬁcial documents 
and evaluation reports, as well as from several interviews with selected indirect actors. 
Finally, a three months visit to the Norwegian Ministry of  Environment was carried out 
in order to better understand the processes of  policy implementation.
How the data will be interpreted is elaborated in detail above. Empirical results will be 
the basis for developing key conditions which will be discussed against existing literature 
in this ﬁeld.
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5. POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF EPR ON PLASTIC 
PACKAGING IN NORWAY
The political implementation of  EPR on plastic packaging in Norway was, according to 
our deﬁnitions made in Chapter 3, completed on 14th September 1995. On that date the 
negotiated agreement was signed and the policy framework for industrial implementation 
of  EPR was in place. In order to better understand the industrial implementation of  
EPR on plastic packaging in Norway, this chapter provides a glimpse into the outcome 
of  policy processes prior to the industrial implementation.
5.1 Prior to a comprehensive waste policy
Norway experienced remarkable economic growth during the decades after Second 
World War. The down side of  this was increased pollution in the air, water and soil as 
well as increasing amounts of  solid waste. A growing public debate on natural resources, 
the consumption of  these and pollution followed the international debate initiated by 
Rachel Carson with her book Silent Spring in the beginning of  the 60’s (Carson 1962), and 
culminated in 1972 when Norway as the ﬁrst country in the world to do so, established 
Norwegian Ministry of  Environment (NMoE) (Jansen 1989, Nøttestad 2000)1. 
The ﬁrst major attempt to design a preventive and holistic pollution policy was through 
the White Paper No 44 (1975/76) ‘Strategies and measures against pollution’ (NMoE 
1975). It focused on issues such as accumulation of  toxic substances, ocean pollution, 
acidiﬁcation and long-term climate change, but was rather weak on waste issues. A 
holistic waste policy was not developed until 19922.
Two main pieces of  legislation are administrated by the Norwegian Ministry of  
Environment; the Product Control Act (NMoE 1976) and the Pollution Control 
Act (NMoE 1981). The Product Control Act concentrates mainly on hazardous 
substances and the problems arising from acute pollution3. The Pollution Control Act 
has been the corner stone in Norwegian pollution policy4 (Stokkeland 2000). It states 
a general prohibition against littering. Local authorities are responsible for collecting 
consumer waste5 and ‘consumer-like’ waste from small companies and treat this in an 
environmentally friendly way (§30). The local authority should “determine a fee to cover 
the costs associated with the waste sector, including collection, transport, reception, 
storage, treatment, control, etc” (§34). The costs shall be fully covered by the fee. 
Industrial companies were, according to §7, responsible for their own production waste. 
In the amendment in 2004, ‘consumer waste’ was substituted with ‘household waste’, 
which did not include ‘consumer-like waste from small companies’. This fraction is now 
deﬁned as industrial waste, together with what previously was deﬁned as production 
waste. This change, thus, extended the responsibility of  the industry.
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After the Pollution Control Act came into force in 1981, an ‘Action plan for recycling’ 
was developed, and there were some pilot projects carried out on recycling of  paper, 
plastic and organic waste. These projects, however, failed in selling the recycled material 
and were terminated without any success (Nøttestad 2000).
5.2 From White Paper to EPR
Environmental issues re-entered the Norwegian political and public arena via the UN 
Report World Commission for Our Common Future (WCED 1987). Industry started 
to look at environmental issues as business opportunities, and media and environmental 
NGOs achieved increased attention on pollution issues (Dahle 2002). They became 
signiﬁcant factors for inﬂuencing industrial and governmental activities (Nøttestad, 
2000). Another important trend was that local authorities, from the late 1980’s received 
earmarked grants for implementing waste management plans (Opoku 1999). These 
annual grants were phased out in 2002.
The White Paper 44 (1991-92) (NMoE 1992) became the fundament for waste 
management in Norway throughout the 90’s6. A large majority of  the Norwegian 
Parliament supported its main ideas and strategies of  a holistic waste policy. It stated 
that socio-economic considerations should be the basis for decisions concerning waste 
management. Due to the uncertainty however, about knowing the exact environmental 
consequences of  the different waste management options, the principle on prioritising 
preventive strategies when the options seemed “approximately equal” was stated (p. 7). 
Hence, the waste hierarchy was introduced as a guiding principle.
The White Paper argued that in order to reduce the amount of  waste to disposal sites 
and at the same time increase recycling, the actual costs of  waste management should 
be reﬂected in the product price and become visible for the producers, importers, 
distributors and consumers. Primarily two options were suggested; i) ﬁscal taxes on 
packaging as an extension of  the existing tax on beverage packaging and ii) the need 
for “the industry to take responsibility for recycling of  products and materials” (page 
7). It was nevertheless necessary to create incentives for the industry to include waste 
management aspects in product design and production, so that “the consumers were 
inﬂuenced to either avoid the product or buy a more environmentally friendly product” 
(page 7). 
There were additional reasons for suggesting increased responsibility to the industry. 
Firstly, the industry had technological knowledge to cope with such problems. Secondly, 
the trend in Europe was going in the same direction where, for instance, Germany, 
Sweden and the Netherlands all were ahead of  implementing this new type of  policy. 
Simultaneously, the European Union was developing a directive on packaging and 
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packaging waste (EU 1994) and Norway would have to comply with this. Moreover, the 
increasing internationalisation of  Norwegian industry made this necessary. Thirdly, the 
traditional role of  SFT as a controller had become both very extensive and expensive, 
and giving the producer’s increased responsibility would reduce the administrative costs 
of  SFT and NMoE (Hambro 2000). The role of  the authorities “should be to set the 
targets and control that these are reached” (p 7). Finally, the environmental problems 
were more diffuse with several actors and required another type of  policy than the 
traditional command and control policies (Aanestad, 2000).
Packaging was regarded as a major area for the follow-up of  the White Paper 44 because 
it constituted a major part of  the household waste, the amount was increasing and it 
was short-lived; this meant that experience from implemented strategies and measures 
could be gained relatively quickly. In addition, packaging was an important symbol of  
the consumer society (Berntsen 2005) and packaging was in focus in several European 
countries through the Packaging Directive (EU 1994). 
In the 1994 National Budget, in autumn 1993, a tax for one-way beverage packaging was 
approved, creating beneﬁts for reusable beverage packaging. In the revised the National 
Budget 1994, in spring 1994, the Government took this a step further by suggesting a 
packaging tax on some conserved food products. The Parliament postponed this because 
it wanted to create a comprehensive tax system for packaging based on types of  packaging 
material (not on type of  product) and asked the Government to propose strategies for 
extending the fundament for taxation on packaging, aiming to implement this in 1995. 
The basic intention for this was the need for stimulating increased use of  packaging 
that is suitable for environmentally friendly collection and recycling and establishing 
effective recovery systems for several product groups and types of  packaging.
In the 1995 National Budget in October 1994 (NMoF 1994), the Government re-
suggested a tax of  1 NOK/per unit for hard sales packaging on all food products. This 
was, once more, postponed by the Parliament who asked the Government to propose 
a general plan for all packaging waste, including an overall system of  taxation and of  
policy instruments, aiming at establishing recovery systems for these products. Moreover, 
the industry strongly opposed these suggestions on packaging tax, which would have 
increased the average costs by more than 12 % (Røsrud 2003), and consequently they 
took up the suggestions from White Paper 44 to establish a producer responsibility 
based on voluntary agreements, and developed the industry’s model for obtaining the 
environmental targets (NHO 1995, Bjerk 2005). 
Simultaneously, the Ministry of  Environment had in 1994 invited industrial representatives 
for the plastic packaging value chain and appointed a working group to “suggest 
organisational and economic practical solutions for increased collection of  plastic waste 
for recycling in Norway, including suggestions on policy instruments for obtaining 
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this”7 (NMoE 1995e, p.5; Mepex 1994). The working group, lead by the Ministry of  
Environment and consisting of  eight representatives from the plastic packaging value 
chain, concluded, based on socio-economic analysis, “with considerable uncertainty in 
the analysis” (NMoE 1995e, p. 14), that “through the ongoing processes of  reduced 
material consumption per produced unit and other waste reduction measures, the 
generated amount of  plastic packaging might be reduced by 30 % by 2000, based on 
the market share and ranges of  use that this material has today”8. The working group 
suggested the targets to be 30 % material recycling and 50 % energy recovery and that 
the plastic packaging chain should have the responsibility for achieving these targets 
within a certain deadline, formalised in a covenant between NMoE and the industrial 
representatives. It is, however, generally accepted both within and outside this group 
that this speciﬁc target was more based on political processes and negotiations between 
industry and NMoE, than on exact scientiﬁc results and calculations.
In the revised National Budget for 1995 (NMoF 1995) in May 1995, the Government 
presented two alternatives for the part of  the packaging waste that is not included in the 
present taxation system; i) an expansion of  the current environmental tax on beverage 
packaging to include all types of  packaging, or ii) the suggestion by the working group. 
The Government argued that “when choosing a policy instrument a key point is to 
ﬁnd solutions that contribute to the wanted environmental objectives at the lowest cost 
possible for society”9 and concluded that it will support giving the responsibility to 
the industry. The main reasons for this were partly the problems of  delimitation with 
a taxation system and partly that the industry itself  showed willingness to take this 
responsibility. The Parliament approved this. If  it was not possible to make agreements 
with industry or the industry did not achieve the targets, the Parliament would suggest 
taxation instead.
5.3 The covenant of 14th September 1995
The subsequent discussions between the NMoE and representatives from the plastic 
packaging chain followed the same lines as the working group had agreed upon (Røsrud, 
2000). The covenant was signed on 14 September 1995. The overall objective was to 
“reduce environmental problems caused by plastic packaging waste by reducing the 
generated amount and by increasing the collection and recovery of  this waste, where 
this is justiﬁed based on environmental, resource and economic considerations” (NMoE 
1995a, p 1). The scope was all-inclusive, except for the plastic beverage packaging 
and packaging with content of  hazardous substances, which were facing alternative 
legislation. 
The covenant stated that the plastic packaging industry should establish a non-proﬁt 
PRO by the end of  1995, and only corporates within the plastic packaging chain could 
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own shares. On the contrary, corporates that were primarily within the downstream 
phase undertaking collection, sorting or recycling, were not allowed to participate in the 
PRO. The composition of  owners should be equally distributed along the value chain, 
and all corporates within this chain were allowed to participate in the recycling system 
established by the PRO. Moreover, the PRO should aim at ﬁnding solutions for reaching 
the targets at lowest possible costs, and actively stimulate competition in all phases of  
the recovery system. Finally, the plastic packaging chain was responsible for ﬁnancing 
the activities necessary to achieve the targets.
The covenant stated explicitly that the plastic packaging chain should, together with 
corresponding PROs for other packaging materials, strive at carrying out waste reducing 
measures and report it annually to SFT. Moreover, the plastic packaging chain should 
establish a collection and recycling system by 1st July 1996 and by 1999 reach, at a 
minimum, 30 % material recycling and 50 % energy recovery. Particular targets were set 
for EPS at minimum 50 % material recycling and 10 % energy recovery. 
Moreover, the plastic packaging chain was given the responsibility to provide needed 
information to consumers and local authorities to ensure that the targets were met. By 
1st April each year, the PRO should report to SFT the result, costs, and participants in 
the system and waste reduction efforts. On the other hand, the NMoE should contribute 
to “prepare the ground for an effective collection and recycling of  plastic packaging 
waste”, and make sure that proper statistics on generated waste exist.
Recalling the classiﬁcations of  EPR policy instruments in Chapter 3, this covenant 
primarily targets producers outside their core industrial areas. However, the point of  
waste reduction points towards their core activities, which presumably would provide 
stronger incentives for the producers. On the other hand, there is no quantiﬁed target 
related to waste reduction, which might undermine this potential. This will be studied 
more closely and discussed in the succeeding chapters.
(Endnotes)
1 For more on the establishment of  Norwegian Ministry of  Environment (NMoE), see Jansen 1989 and 
Nøttestad 2000.
2 Major reasons for this was i) lack of  knowledge on these complex waste issues, ii) waste was not 
regarded as that urgent compared to other environmental problems such as oil pollution, acid rain, protection 
of  hydrometric areas, general water- and air pollution from point sources, iii) the local authorities, with poor 
economies resisted strong efforts and measures on this, and particularly the NIMBY (not in my back yard) 
sentiment was prominent, and iv) waste was not internally prioritised by the NMoE.
3 Under this Act are regulations such as deposits on automobiles and lead batteries. The latter is the 
ﬁrst EPR oriented regulation in Norway. The deposit system for automobiles was the ﬁrst of  its kind in the 
world and was the ﬁrst governmental attempt to increase the recycling of  a certain product. This system is 
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6. OVERALL   SYSTEMS  PERFORMANCE  –  DEMATERIALISATION 
AND LOOP CLOSING
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the industrial metabolism and patterns of  material 
production and consumption might be expressed through a variety of  indicators at 
different points of  the life cycle. We have chosen to focus on two ‘industrial ecology’ 
indicators that are of  high importance when characterising the resource perspective 
of  EPR systems, dematerialisation and loop closing. A fruitful entrance when studying 
deﬁned systems is to provide some insight to the context (the ’surroundings’). The 
EPR systems presented below are parts of  the larger material ﬂow patterns in terms of  
geography, type of  materials and sectors.
There are indications that the total material requirements worldwide are increasing in 
developed countries, although the material intensities show a slightly declining trend 
(Adriaaanse et al 1997). Similarly, decoupling between economic growth and resource 
throughput per capita and per unit gross domestic product (GDP) is observed for some 
countries, but the absolute resource use and waste ﬂows continue to grow (Matthews 
2000, Page xi). Figure 6.1A illustrates an increasing trend of  domestic material output 
in some selected countries, hence no absolute dematerialisation. There are however, 
decreasing trends in the material outﬂow intensity (Figure 6.1B).
Figure 6.1 Domestic material output (A) and domestic material outﬂow intensity (B) in the period 
1975 – 1996 Source: Matthews 2000
Such studies analysing the overall input, throughput and output have not to date been 
carried out for the Norwegian economy (Skogesal 2004a). However, the solid waste 
generation has increased by 13.4 % in the period 1993 – 2003, see Figure 6.2, indicating 
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no absolute dematerialisation. Simultaneously, GDP has increased by 37.0 % in the 
same period. Hence, there is a decoupling between GDP and waste generation and 
thus a relative dematerialisation on this issue. Moreover, the growth in household 
waste generation is considerably higher than the growth in industrial waste generation 
in the same period, 56.1 % and 5.6 %, respectively. Consequently, there is no relative 
dematerialisation for household waste.
Figure 6.2 Development in total amount of  waste and gross domestic product (GDP) 1993 – 2003 
in Norway. Indexed 1993 = 100. Modiﬁed from NMoE 2005, quality checked by Skogesal 
(2005a,b)
Equally important as waste generated, is how this waste is treated. Figure 6.3 gives the 
fractions of  various treatment methods in Norway in the period 1995 – 2004. We see 
that the actual amounts to landﬁll have decreased in the period, from 24.3 % to 18.0 
%, despite the 13.4 % increase of  generated waste. Measured in tons, the amounts to 
landﬁll have been relatively constant (NMoE 2005). The material recycling has increased 
from 27.7 % to 30.4 % during the same period. We also see that a higher amount of  
waste is material recycled than that which is landﬁlled. Still however, 32 % of  total 
generated waste faces unknown treatment.
Total plastic consumption in Europe rose by 5.6 % from 2001 to 2003 (Plastics Europe 
2005). Consumption of  plastics as a material has grown 5 times since 1970, while other 
materials such as steel and aluminium have grown less, 1.7 and 2.8 times, respectively. 
The mechanical recycling of  plastics rose by 11.3 % measured in tons, keeping the 
recycling ratio at around 14 % of  total consumption in 2003. Plastics to landﬁll in 
Europe is on a 1993-level. Hence, relatively speaking, the recycling ratio has increased.
As for packaging, it remains the largest fraction at 37.2 % of  total consumption in 
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2003, up 1.3 % from 2002. Mechanical recycling of  post-user plastic packaging waste 
increased by 12.6 % in Western Europe in 2002, while plastic packaging waste increased 
by just 3.5 %. Consequently, the recycling rate for plastic packaging went up from 20.5 
per cent in 2001 to 22.4 % in 2002. 
Figure 6.3 Percentage of  various treatment methods 1995 – 2003 in Norway, measured in percentage 
of  generated waste. Source: NMoE 2005
Given this introduction, in this chapter we will provide empirical information on loop 
closing and dematerialisation for the plastic packaging system in Norway. In addition, we 
give empirical information along two axes relevant for the plastic packaging system: i) 
other EPR systems in Norway and ii) EPR-systems on plastic packaging abroad. These 
are used later on as reference cases in the analysis.
6.1 Dematerialisation and loop closing plastic packaging in 
Norway
In order to calculate dematerialisation and loop closing in the plastic packaging system 
in Norway, the plastic packaging waste generation and the amount of  recycled plastic 
packaging must be known. The ofﬁcial number on plastic packaging waste in 1995 was 
95,600 tons (NMoE 1995e), but has been subject to some modiﬁcations since then. 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, NMoE has been responsible for developing sufﬁcient 
statistics on plastic packaging waste generation. Statistics Norway has on behalf  of  
NMoE executed this task (Statistics Norway 2000, 2004, 2005). Their calculations are 
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on plastics as a material group and not on packaging in particular and thus do not 
perfectly suit the purpose of  this study. However, if  we employ the most recently 2004-
statistics (Statistics Norway 2005), and the assumption that packaging comprises 22 % 
of  the total plastics consumption (Statistics Norway 2000), this corresponds rather well 
with the ofﬁcial numbers from 1995. 
According to the covenant, SFT receives annual reports from Plastretur (1st of  April) 
where the results achieved for the previous year are reported. In order to calculate the 
recycling and recovery ratio, Plastretur must employ a speciﬁc denominator reﬂecting 
the plastic packaging waste generation. By approving the recycling and recovery ratios, 
SFT also accepts the denominator used, hence being the ofﬁcial one.
Plastretur has throughout the years carried out two main studies to obtain a more precise 
denominator to be used in the annual reports to SFT (Plastretur 2000, 2003). The ﬁrst 
study calculated the supply of  goods to the market (X
1,2
 in Figure 4.3) in 1998, primarily 
based on statistics from Statistics Norway. The second study calculated the plastic 
packaging consumption in 2001 and was based on triangulation of  various sources: 
licence fees reported to Materialretur (the PRO responsible for gathering licence fees 
from all ‘packaging-PROs’), on the sector categorisations taken from NACE-codes, and 
on the packaging intensity in each sector. The 2001-numbers was later on updated in 
another study based on improved data basis (Bjørn and Syversen 2004).
However, the scientiﬁc basis and legitimacy for these denominators are beset with 
substantial uncertainty (NMoE 2000, Syversen 2005, Skogesal 2004b). For instance, 
according to Plastics Europe packaging comprised 37.2 % of  total plastic consumption 
in 2003 (Plastics Europe 2004), which is a considerably different number than the 22 %-
assumption by Statistics Norway. In order not to be that far from the ofﬁcial numbers 
reported to SFT (and thus to EU), we take the studies carried out by Mepex for Plastretur 
as the starting point for calculating the plastic packaging waste generation in the period 
1996 – 20041. According to those who carried out the two relevant Plastretur-studies, 
the last study with 2001-numbers is most reliable as the quality of  the underlying data 
for this study was better (Syversen 2005).
In order to develop time series for the plastic packaging waste generation, we employ 
statistics from Plastics Europe to extrapolate the growth rates for the period 1996 – 
2004 (Plastics Europe 2004, 2005). These statistics are based on numbers from polymer 
manufacturers and their production and sales data, indicating the volume of  plastics 
and the distribution between various product groups2. We have weighted the household 
waste with 2/3 and industrial waste with 1/3 of  the overall growth, according to Plastics 
Europe’s estimates (Plastics Europe 2004, p 7) and to Statistics Norway’s conclusion 
that the main growth in waste has appeared in households and not in industry, conf  
Figure 6.2. Moreover, we assume that the plastic packaging that becomes waste one year 
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is also recycled the same year as there is only a marginal time delay in these processes. 
We also assume that the reusable packaging constitutes a negligible fraction that does 
not disturb this picture. 
6.1.1 Consumption and waste generation – dematerialisation
Figure 6.4 shows four various calculations on the amount of  plastic packaging generated 
waste. Statistics Norway (SSB) is represented with two estimates, based on their 2004-
study (Statistics Norway 2005). One line shows the amount of  plastic packaging waste if  
we employ Statistics Norway’s own estimates of  22 % packaging of  total packaging. The 
second SSB-line relies on Plastics Europe’s assumption that packaging represents 37 % 
of  all plastics. The third line shows the ofﬁcial numbers annually reported by Plastretur 
to SFT (Plastretur 1997-2001, 2002b, 2003-2005). The last line is our estimates based 
a variety of  sources as explained above. In the continuation, we will employ our own 
estimates.
Figure 6.4 Time series on the denominator for Plastretur 1995 – 2004
All four graphs show an increasing trend. The growth rates for ‘Our estimate’ and ‘SSB 
(22%)’ show a rather similar trend, more than 31 % from 1995 to 2004, while ‘SSB 
(37%)’ increases somewhat more. Hence, there is no absolute dematerialisation in the 
plastic packaging system in Norway. We employ our estimates on the time series in the 
following analysis.
Figure 6.5 expresses the relation between the annual growth rates of  the denominator 
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(ﬂow X
2,3
 in Figure 4.3) and GDP. The latter is given as ‘GDP relevant sectors’ and 
‘overall GDP’, as discussed in Chapter 4. If  the ratio ‘plastic packaging waste generation/
GDP’ is lower than 1, the growth in plastic packaging consumption is lower than the 
growth in GDP, indicating a relative dematerialisation. The ratio ‘plastic packaging waste 
generation /GDP relevant sectors’ shows a relative dematerialisation, as the growth in 
denominator in the period 1996 – 2004 is 31 % while the growth in GDP in relevant 
sectors in the same period is 44 %, giving a ratio of  0.7. On the contrary, the growth 
in overall GDP is only 19.8 % in the same period, giving a ratio of  1.58. Hence, the 
plastic packaging intensive industry is experiencing a higher economic growth rate than 
industry overall and also a higher economic growth than growth in plastic packaging 
consumption.
Figure 6.5 Growth rate ratios between GDP and generated plastic packaging waste (X
2,3
 in Figure 
4.3) 1996 – 2004 (based on ‘Our estimate’)
6.1.2 Output from waste management systems – loop closing
Figure 6.6 shows the output from the plastic packaging recycling system. The amount 
of  collected plastic packaging is steadily increasing, while the amount actually material 
recycled is growing less quickly. For instance, from 1999 – 2002, there was only minor 
growth in the amount recycled (20,754 tons in 1999 and 20,840 tons in 2002), while 
in 2003 the number was 25,700, a growth of  23.3 % from 2002 to 2003. In the same 
period, the collection rose from 69,024 tons in 1999 to 82,640 tons in 2002 and 89,700 
tons in 2003. 
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Figure 6.6 Time series in absolute terms on collection, recycling, recovery and disposal in Plastretur 
system 1995 - 2004
Numbers are based on information from Plastretur and is based on amount actually 
recycled and sold (X
10,0
 in Figure 4.5). In the ofﬁcial numbers from Plastretur reported 
to SFT, he input to the recycling process is considered as recycled. Hence, Plastretur 
operates with higher numbers.
The recycling ratio has increased from 6.4% in 1996 to 21.5 % in 2004, while the 
collection ratio has increased from 8.6 % in 1996 to 81.1 % in 2004, see Figure 6.7. Here 
we see that the relation in percentage between energy recovery and material recycling is 
relatively stable during the last years.
This indicates that the growth in collection has not resulted in higher material recycling 
numbers, and consequently that more of  the collected plastic is sent to energy recovery. 
The reason for this is that plastic packaging in household waste is mainly energy 
recovered and the growth in this fraction has been large, which provides a higher energy 
recovery ratio.
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Figure 6.7 Time series in relative terms on collection, recycling, recovery and disposal in Plastretur 
system 1995 – 2004. The ratios are based on amount of  generated plastic packaging waste (and not 
on amount collected).
6.1.3 Discussion – dematerialisation and loop closing
So far we have assumed that the virgin material input (X
0,1
 in Figure 4.2) to the two other 
subsystems is constant and increased consumption in these subsystems comes from the 
input of  recycled plastic packaging from ‘our’ plastic packaging system. Moreover, we 
assume that there is no input from the two other subsystems to the plastic packaging 
system in Norway, neither as virgin nor recycled material. Based on this, we are able 
to calculate the material input to the plastic packaging system in Norway along two 
different lines. First, the most simpliﬁed situation where we assume that all plastic 
packaging recycled remains in the Norwegian plastic packaging system, making this an 
entirely closed loop with zero outﬂows of  recycled plastic packaging to the other sub-
systems in Figure 4.3.
Second, we include the fact that not all the recycled plastic packaging in Norway remains 
in the Plastretur system, but that parts of  it go to the two other subsystems as well. 
According to Gjester (2004, 2005) the distribution of  recycled material is as given below 
in Table 6.1. Given this distribution of  the plastic packaging, the virgin material inputs 
to the Plastretur system from 1996 – 2004, both in absolute terms and relative terms 
related to GDP, are illustrated in Figure 6.8 below.
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Table 6.1 Distribution of  the recycled material from Plastretur EPR system [%]
Receivers of recycled plastic 
packaging from Plastretur system 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Plastretur-system (X3,1 in Figure 4.3) 100 100 80 80 45 29 29 25 25
Other plastic systems in Norway 
(X3,4 in Figure 4.3)
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
Plastics abroad (X3,7 in Figure 4.3) 0 0 20 20 55 70 70 73 73
The graphs are indexed. The graph ‘virgin material input’ depicts the material requirements 
of  virgin material to comply with the consumption of  plastic packaging. It shows that 
in the period 1996 – 2004 the material input increased by 10 % if  considering a closed 
loop. Taking into account the growth in GDP in relevant sectors as discussed above, 
there is a relative reduction in virgin material input in 2004 to 76 % of  the material input 
in 1996. Hence, there is a relative dematerialisation.
Figure 6.8 Indexed time series for material input in absolute and relative terms related to distributed 
or non-distributed recycled material
Moreover, if  taking into account that not all the recycled material remains in the Plastretur 
system, we observe that the absolute virgin material input to the plastic packaging system 
has increased by 33 %, while related to the development in GDP in relevant sectors, 
the virgin material input in 2004 is 92 % of  the input in 1996. Given our assumptions 
and that the most realistic situation is that recycled material also is distributed to other 
systems as well, the conclusion is that the virgin material input in absolute terms has 
increased by 33 % from 1996 to 2004 (no dematerialisation), while in relative terms it 
has decreased by 8 % (relative dematerialisation).
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On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that there is considerable import of  recycled 
material to the Norwegian plastic packaging as well. This import is not primarily 
a consequence of  the Norwegian EPR scheme on plastic packaging. For the plastic 
packaging system as such, however, this import will improve the dematerialisation due 
to reduced inﬂows of  virgin plastic packaging. If  assuming that the import of  recycled 
material equals the export of  recycled material from Norway, the virgin material inputs 
in absolute and relative terms are + 10 % and -24 %, respectively.
6.2 Additional Norwegian and foreign EPR systems
Although the Norwegian plastic packaging system is our main concern in this study, 
the trends observed in Chapter 6.1 can be ‘tested’ on other relevant cases as well. We 
have selected two types of  reference cases; i) other EPR systems in Norway and ii) EPR 
systems on plastic packaging elsewhere in Europe.
6.2.1 Norwegian EPR systems
Figure 6.9 illustrates the development in waste management results for beverage cartons 
in the period 1999 – 2004. Norsk Returkartong is the PRO organising this system. All 
graphs show a rather stable development with the recycling ratio varying in the mid-40s. 
The generated amount of  waste is in fact slightly reduced over the period (~10%) (Leiro 
2005), so the total amount material recycled is obviously decreasing too.
Figure 6.9 Collection and recycling results in Norsk Returkartong
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Figure 6.10 Collection and recycling results in Resirk system
The trend is different if  we look at the Resirk-system, which is an EPR scheme for one-
way beverage cans and PET-bottles. Figure 6.10 shows the development in collection 
and recovery for the PET-bottles in the period 2000 - 2004. The collection and recycling 
ratios increase strongly, to close to 80 %. Interestingly, in the numbers from Resirk 
(Castellano 2005, Eik 2005) all collected materials become recycled. Consequently, the 
energy recovery and landﬁll fraction, drops to zero.
Figure 6.11 Time series in percent on collection, recycling, recovery and disposal in Renas EPR system 
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Leaving the packaging sector and looking into the electrical and electronic equipments 
(EEE), Figure 6.11, dealing with industrial EEEs within the Renas EPR system, shows 
a common trend for these products. The collection and material recycling ratios increase 
steadily throughout the period 1999 – 2004, while the amounts to landﬁ ll decline 
correspondingly. The energy recovery ratio is low throughout the period3. 
These are three examples of  Norwegian EPR systems. In Figure 6.12 the material 
recycling ratios for a sample of  Norwegian EPR systems are shown. The general trend 
is that the EEEs steadily achieve a higher recycling ratio, particularly the industrial EEE 
and consumer white goods EEE. The second trend is that packaging materials, except 
from one-way beverage PET, show no increase in the recycling ratios. As for beverage 
cartons and carton packaging the explanation is that the tonnage recycled has remained 
stable with consistent amounts of  waste generation, while for plastic packaging there 
has been a similar growth rate in both waste generation and amount recycled on a 
weight basis, and consequently a stable recycling ratio.
Figure 6.12 Recycling ratios for various Norwegian EPR systems 1999 - 2004
6.2.2 Foreign EPR schemes
Throughout Europe various plastic packaging EPR schemes exist. These differ in several 
ways, for instance related to scope (type of  plastic packaging included and markets), the 
legislation and the organisation of  the EPR scheme and measurement methodologies 
(EPRO 2005). For our comparison of  the Plastretur EPR system with other plastic 
packaging systems in Europe, we have employed data from European Association of  
Plastics Recycling and Recovery Organisation (EPRO). The intention is to identify any 
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trend in the development of  material recycling throughout the period 1996 - 2003. Year 
1996 is the indexed year for every country and the numbers are based on the amount of  
plastic packaging recycled measured on a weight basis. Figure 6.13 shows the results. 
The general trend is that there is an increase in the tonnage of  materials recycled. 
Plastretur has the steepest growth from 1996 to 2003, followed by Italy, France and 
the UK. All these countries grow by a factor of  more than 3 (although the UK-ﬁgure 
drops in 2003). As for Sweden, Germany and Belgium, these countries appear to have 
a more modest growth. An explanation for the low growth for Germany is that it was 
the ﬁrst country to start collection of  packaging waste in 1992, and after experiencing a 
steep growth in the amount of  recycling material in the period 1992 – 1996 (Lindhqvist 
2000), the major ‘potential’ was already released by 1996. This explanation is supported 
through Figure 6.14.
Figure 6.13 Indexed development of  recycling ratio for selected countries Index: 1996 = 1
We should note that Figure 6.13 shows the ofﬁcial Plastretur numbers, which use the 
ofﬁcial amount of  generated plastic packaging waste as denominator (see Figure 6.3) 
and input to the recycling process (X
9,10
 in Figure 4.5) as amount recycled (nominator). 
Hence, the numbers are higher than what is presented elsewhere.
Figure 6.14 shows the overall recycling ratio for these countries. Germany has a recycling 
ratio of  82 %, and next there is a long step down to Belgium (only industrial waste 
included) with 47 % and further down to Sweden on 35 %. Moreover, those countries 
with the steepest growth in tonnage recycled in Figure 6.13, have the lowest recycling 
ratios. 
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Figure 6.14 Overall recycling ratio for selected countries in 2003
6.3 Discussion
The results presented above have both methodological and empirical aspects. These will 
be discussed below.
6.3.1 Methodological discussion
The methodological issue is related to how the indicators are measured, as different 
ways of  measuring make it inevitably more difﬁcult to compare the results. Figure 6.15 
illustrates the different practices among various EPR schemes in the selected countries 
on how to measure the overall recycling ratio. 
We can see that the main difference is between Germany and the others. In Germany the 
overall recycling ratio is measured as the relationship between the output from sorting 
plants (node 6) and the amount for which a licence fee has been paid. Thus, free-riders 
are not taken into account. For instance, in Norway the number of  free-riders is around 
30 % (Røine 2003). The other countries measure the recycling ratio basically as the 
relation between inﬂow to box 1 (X
1
) and the inﬂows to recycling. However, there are 
variations on what recycling activities are included, some simply include mechanical 
recycling, some add chemical recycling and some also add feedstock recycling and 
energy recovery.
Another methodological aspect is connected to measuring the amount of  mechanical 
recycled material. The uncertainty is not related to how this is measured as the PROs 
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usually have reliable measuring points for these ﬂows. The uncertainty is rather related 
to where it is measured. Several countries measure the input to the recycling plant, as 
indicated in Figure 6.15, while others, for instance Norway, measure the input to the 
extruder in the recycling process, hence after pre-treatment, drying and removal of  
unwanted items. In fact no country measures the output from the recycling process as 
the amount recycled (nominator).
Figure 6.15 Flows in recycling system and calculation of  recycling ratio 
According to the EU directive, only mechanical recycling (box 8) and chemical recycling4 
(box 9) should be included into the term ‘recycling’. Hence, feedstock recycling5 is not 
accepted as material recycling. However, given the fact that feedstock recycling makes it 
possible to reuse the substances for material purposes and not only for energy purposes, 
the Norwegian government has, for instance, accepted feedstock recycling for everything 
above 22.5 % material recycling. This equals the amount that goes beyond the EU target 
on 22.5 % material recycling of  plastic packaging.
Another methodological issue is how the data for measuring the recycling ratio is 
calculated. The statistics on plastic packaging consumption, (X
2,3
 in Figure 4.3), is a 
result of  more or less structured methods, estimates and poor national statistics. The 
values of  the denominator in the different countries may deviate from the “reality”, and 
will inevitably inﬂuence the recycling ratio. For instance, Sweden with a population of  
9 million, operates with a denominator of  155 ktons (Schyllander 2004), while Norway 
with 4.5 million inhabitants has a denominator of  119 ktons (2004), both EPR schemes 
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have more or less the same scope when it comes to type of  products and markets 
included in the EPR scheme (Sundt 2004). Hence, the waste generation per capita in 
Norway is much higher than in Sweden, although these countries are comparable when 
it comes to standard of  living and culture. One explanation might be the reliability of  
the studies determining the denominators.
6.3.2 Empirical results
The general trend for EPR systems in Norway is that the recycling rates for packaging 
have increased from the start of  the industrial implementation of  the EPR schemes, but 
that it seems more challenging to take a step further. This is to a large extent supported 
by the trends elsewhere in Europe. As for EPR schemes for EE products, the recycling 
ratios seem to increase at a constant rate. We are however, not able to analyse the degree 
of  relative and absolute dematerialisation, but the trends in the recycling ratio support 
the impression that Plastretur is not in a unique position. 
However, as discussed in 6.3.1, the results hide a number of  assumptions and various 
measurement methodologies. For instance, there are various options when carrying out 
recycling activities; mechanical, chemical and feedstock. Mechanical recycling is regarded 
as most important from an environmental point of  view, which is also reﬂected in the 
EU Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste. The composition of  these recycling 
options is thus important to understand. For instance, in Germany 53 % of  what is 
counted as recycled is mechanical recycled. In Norway in 2003, 90.5 % was mechanically 
recycled. (EPRO 2005)
This discussion and the results illustrate the need for looking in more detail at the 
material ﬂows in order to explain the results. This will be done in Chapter 7.
(Endnotes)
1 However, it is important to note that developing these time series is not the key issue of  the thesis, but 
they do represent trends for the development. The key issue is to understand the industrial implementation of  
EPR.
2 The consumption of  plastics in Europe is distributed between the product groups as follows: automotive 
(8 %), households & domestic (20.1 %), building and construction (18.5 %, packaging (37.2 %), large industry 
(5.8 %), agriculture (1.9 %) and electrical & electronic (8.5 %) (Plastics Europe 2004).
3 As for Renas, Elektronikkretur and Hvitevareretur, the denominators are based on a consultancy report 
(NMoE 1996) which is considered somewhat imperfect (Murvold 2003, Rønningen 2003a, Wiik-Svendsen 2003). 
This report was the basis for the regulation and covenant in 1998, and concluded that 144,000 tons of  EE waste 
was generated annually. SFT has now revised this number, partly based on a report from Renas and partly based 
on input from Hvitevareretur, although not based on new analysis of  the issue. The new denominator, as given 
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in Figure 6.11, is 114,000 tons. (Renas 56,000, Hvitevareretur 29,500, Elektronikkretur 30,000). This is 25.3 kg 
per capita. 
4 Chemical recycling implies a change of  the chemical structure of  the material, but in such a way that 
the resulting chemicals can be used to produce the original material again. Such processes include monomer 
recovery. There are few commercial techniques available which accomplish this, but one outstanding exception is 
nylon carpet recycling.
5 Feedstock recycling is deﬁned as a change in the chemical structure of  the material, where the resulting 
chemicals are used for another purpose than producing the original material.
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7. EPR ON PLASTIC PACKAGING IN NORWAY – SECTOR 
LEVEL
Chapter 6 showed that there has been no absolute dematerialisation in the plastic 
packaging system in Norway. There is however, a decoupling between GDP and the 
consumption of  plastic packaging, while the input of  virgin material to this system 
has grown on a somewhat similar rate as GDP. From the governmental point of  view, 
these indicators are sufﬁcient to measure the achieved outcomes relevant to the policy 
objectives. However, it says nothing about why the recycling rate is actually on this level 
or anything about how to improve it. Neither does it tell us the costs of  achieving this 
recycling rate. These costs are operating costs to run the system, and relevant to the 
added value of  the ﬂows of  materials. So, how can we explain these results and in 
particular the role of  EPR in this? 
In Chapter 6 we discussed the overall performance of  the plastic packaging system in 
Norway, by looking at the relation between input and output to the waste management 
system, and consequently the recycling ratios. In this chapter we will look in greater detail 
into the actual waste management system. Where are the greatest losses of  material 
quantity? Moreover, what are the costs of  improving the recycling rate, and hence, 
reduce the loss of  material quantity? And where is the greatest potential for improving 
the performance?
This chapter starts off  by going deeper into the material and cash ﬂows in Chapter 7.1 
and 7.2. In Chapter 7.3 we elaborate on the actors related to the system. Then, ﬁnally, in 
Chapter 7.4 we present and discuss the role and responsibilities of  Plastretur in light of  
some strategic, operational and organisational issues.
7.1 Understanding the Plastretur system by studying material 
ﬂows
As outlined in Chapter 4, analysing the (in)efﬁciencies in a system requires a thorough 
understanding of  the material ﬂows. Both in EU and Norwegian legislation, as well as 
in input-output tables for economic activity and interaction in a country, we usually 
distinguish between the overall categories ‘households’ (consumers) and ‘industry’. 
In this study we disaggregate ‘industry’ into the categories ‘commerce and industry’, 
‘agriculture’ and ‘aquaculture’. The main reason for this being that Plastretur operates 
with these categories, making data availability easier. Moreover, these sectors are 
relatively clearly distinguishable at the point of  waste generation, and also operate as 
rather independent systems.
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7.1.1 Overall picture of the four markets
Below we disaggregate the plastic packaging waste generation and the recycling ratios 
into four markets. Plastretur and companies within the plastic packaging chain in Norway 
are the main sources of  information in this chapter. Plastretur develop their statistics 
based on reported amounts from waste management companies (WMC) and recyclers 
which is the basis for the payment1.
7.1.1.1 Generation of plastic packaging waste
Figure 7.1 below shows the time series of  amount of  generated plastic packaging waste 
in the period 1995 – 2004. These numbers are discussed in detail in Chapter 6. There 
is a total increase of  generated plastic packaging waste with of  more than 31 % in this 
period. 
Figure 7.1 Amount of  generated plastic packaging waste in Norway, 1995 – 2004.
This ﬂow is decomposed into the four markets and the various group of  plastic packaging 
products as presented in Chapter 42. Table 7.1 sums up this decomposition with a 
quantiﬁed example from 2004 on the amount of  generated waste. The distribution for 
the entire period 1995 – 2004 is shown in Appendix C.
The category ‘industry and commerce’ embraces all the industrial plastic packaging 
products generated as waste that are not included in the categories ‘agriculture’ and 
‘aquaculture’. This is clearly the largest category when it comes to volumes and diversity 
within the industry sector. Transport ﬁlm is the largest type of  product, amounting to 
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68 % of  the total within this sector. This product is used for transporting products from 
primary (bulk) producers and secondary producers (packers and ﬁllers) to wholesalers 
and further to retailers and single shops. For every reloading, the transport ﬁlm is 
removed (become waste) and new is added to bale and protect the products during 
further transportation. There are industrial sub-sectors that are more transport ﬁlm 
intensive than others, both in total and relative to the turnover. Grocery wholesalers are 
by far the most packaging intensive sector (Røine 2003).
Table 7.1 Plastic packaging waste generation in Norway in 2004 (in tons) (Plastretur 2005)
Industry and 
commerce
Agriculture Aquaculture Household Total
Film 32,500 7,200 ~0 39,500 79,250
Rigid 12,300 300 ~0 21,550 34,150
PP-bag 1,600 900 2000 ~0 4,500
Reusable packaging 1,200 ~0 ~0 ~0 1,200
Total 47,600 8,400 2,000 61,100 119,100
Figure 7.2 displays the development in the amount of  generated plastic packaging waste 
in the two major markets, ‘industry and commerce’ and ‘households’. We observe that 
the amount within commerce and industry has increased by 20 % from 1996 to 2004, 
while the comparable household fraction has increased by more than 49 %. The growth 
in total plastic packaging consumption is estimated to be two thirds in households 
and one third in industry and commerce (Plastics Europe 2004). Plastic packaging 
products waste from households are to a large extent ‘sales packaging’ and related to 
the daily purchase of  food, clothing and other groceries, as well as larger purchases 
such as furniture, sporting equipment, white and brown goods and other electrical and 
electronic products.
The types of  polymer in households vary, and so does the degree of  dirt on the 
packaging at the point of  becoming waste. As an example, plastic packaging protecting 
food is usually some kind of  laminate, which is very hard to material recycle by way 
of  mechanical processes (Mustafa 1993). In addition, this type of  plastic packaging is 
normally rather dirty, at least compared to the industrial transport ﬁlm. Plastic packaging 
waste generated in the household is the largest group when it comes to tonnage. The 
growth in household plastic packaging waste can be explained by a transmaterialisation 
from glass, metal and corrugated cardboard to plastics. As for industrial plastic packaging, 
this has become thinner due to polymers of  improved properties related to strength 
(Skilhagen 2002).
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Figure 7.2 Generated plastic packaging waste in commerce &industry and households 1995 – 2004
The total amount of  generated plastic packaging waste in agriculture and aquaculture 
shows a diverging trend, respectively, with the former increasing by 21 % while the 
aquaculture is decreasing by more than 37 %, see Figure 7.3. 
Figure 7.3 Generated plastic packaging waste in agriculture and aquaculture 1995 – 2004
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‘Agriculture’ includes all the plastic packaging becoming waste connected to activities 
in the agricultural sector, in total 8,500 tons in 2004 (Skjervold 2005). The main plastic 
packaging product within this sector in Norway is the ﬁlm used for storing the hay to be 
primarily used in meat and milk production, counting for approximately 85 % (Schefte 
2003)3.
The plastic packaging products from aquaculture are those used in cultivating ﬁsh in ﬁsh 
farms. Norway is a leading global actor in this market, which contributed to the generation 
of  2000 tons plastic packaging waste in 2004. The most signiﬁcant product in this respect 
is the feedbags, which are basically made of  polypropylene (although with some LDPE 
as inner bags as well). The consumption of  plastic packaging within aquaculture has 
shown a declining trend, mainly due to some technological improvements, by bringing 
the feed in bulk from feed production plants to the aquaculture ﬁelds without employing 
feedbags (Kristoffersen 2002).
7.1.1.2 Overall recycling results
Obviously, with increasing amounts of  generated waste, the amount of  recycled material 
must increase by the same rate to remain on the same recycling level. In Chapter 6 we 
saw that the overall recycling ratio was generally operating around 20 % from 1999 to 
2004. If  this indicator is disaggregated into markets, we get the picture as shown in 
Figure 7.4. 
Figure 7.4 Material recycling ratios in total and for the four markets, 1996 - 2004
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This shows that aquaculture and agriculture have the highest recycling ratios, while 
households have been close to zero, but has since 2003 increased considerably due 
to feedstock recycling. Industry and commerce is also above the total recycling ratio, 
indicating that the amount of  generated plastic packaging waste from households is 
high.
The reason for the high recycling ratio for aquaculture in 2003 was that waste was 
collected in 2001 and 2002, but not recycled before 2003 (Gjester 2004). ‘Commerce 
and industry’ is the market contributing most in tons to the total amount of  recycled 
plastic packaging, illustrated in Figure 7.5 below.
Figure 7.5 Amount of  recycled plastic packaging per market 1996 – 2004.
The industrial sector contributes more than 50 % of  the total recycled amount, leaving 
for instance the household sector far behind. However, although the amount of  recycled 
plastic packaging has increased every year since 1996, and whilst the target is moving 
closer, the target for 2004 is still more than 10,000 tons away. In other words, total 
efforts are close to 30 % below target, as illustrated in Figure 7.6.
Even these disaggregated numbers cannot explain why the overall recycling ratio as 
presented in Chapter 6, is only 21.5 %. In order to better understand the results presented 
so far, and to analyse how to possibly improve the performance in the future to comply 
with the objectives in the covenant, the material ﬂow approach guides us in identifying 
where the losses of  quantity actually are.
-
5 000
10 000
15 000
20 000
25 000
30 000
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
[t
o
n
s]
Commerce and industry Agriculture Aquaculture Households Total
112
Chapter 7
Figure 7.6 Plastretur’s material recycling target (30 %) and distance from target, measured in tons/
year
7.1.2 Efﬁciencies within each market
Inevitably material will be lost throughout the waste management system, but efﬁcient 
system will minimise the loss of  material, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
The overall recycling ratio (α
rec
) is a product of  the internal efﬁciencies in the system, 
which in Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4 was deﬁned to include the collection efﬁciency (η
coll
) at 
waste generators place, the sorting efﬁciency (η
treat
) by the waste management company 
and the recycling efﬁciency (η
rec
) by the recycler. The recycling ratio is known, while 
the sorting efﬁciency and recycling efﬁciency is estimated based on information from 
various actors (Plastretur, Folldal Recycling etc). Hence, we can calculate the collection 
efﬁciency as shown below:
tot coll treat rec  coll tot treat rec* * / *recα η η η η η η η η= →= =
The ﬁrst process within the system as shown in Figure 4.5 is ‘collection’ with efﬁciency 
η
coll
. The inﬂow to this process is the actual generated amount of  waste, while the 
outﬂow is the amount collected which is meant for material recycling. Hence, the plastic 
packaging collected in residual waste or in energy fraction, is regarded as lost in this 
collection process, going either as ﬂows 
4
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∑ . Very few collectors, if  any, 
sort the energy fraction or residual waste fraction after being collected (Schefte 2005, 
Ren Analyse 2002). Each of  these markets has speciﬁc values for this efﬁciency.
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The ‘collection’ efﬁciency is primarily determined by two factors; the degree of  source 
separation by the waste generator and to what extent the waste management company 
keep this fraction separated from other materials4. The second process in the waste 
management system, ‘sorting’ is the activities at the site of  waste management company 
(WMC) before being transported to recycling plants. Simple treatment, baling, rough 
sorting by mechanical digger or more advanced sorting are some of  the possible activities 
in this process5. 
The third process is material recycling of  the plastic packaging. As seen from Figure 4.5 
there are two steps of  the recycling process, node 9 Pre-recycling and node 10 Recycling. 
The reason for this distinction is that the statistics provided by Plastretur and annually 
reported to and accepted by Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (SFT), is based 
on the fact that the outﬂows from 9 Pre-recycling (ﬂow X
9,10
) is regarded as recycled. 
Although there obviously is loss of  material during the actual recycling process as well 
(node 10), this is not taken into account in the ofﬁcial statistics. From 2004 onwards, 
the statistics will be even “kinder” since from then on the inﬂow to node 9 (X
M3,9
) is 
accepted as actually recycled (SFT 2005). In our calculations, however, we use the actual 
output from the recycling process (X
10,0
 in Figure 4.5) as the point of  measurement. Our 
results, thus, are somewhat lower than the ofﬁcial numbers reported SFT. The reason for 
selecting these numbers is that it better corresponds to the reality, as well as it identiﬁes 
a general (political) acceptance of  showing a higher recycling rate than in fact is.
The efﬁciency of  the pre-recycling process (node 9) might be disaggregated into at least 
three sub-efﬁciencies; i) dirt and water following the material, ii) impurities that is not 
plastic packaging (wood, stone, etc) and iii) impurities that are plastic packaging, but not 
of  sufﬁcient or right quality to enter the recycling process. The efﬁciency of  the actual 
recycling process (node 10) depends primarily on the homogeneity of  the polymer inﬂow 
(e.g. melt index) and the non-polymer dirt following this inﬂow. Since the efﬁciencies 
depend on the type of  product, we distinguish between the product groups as described 
above. Below we will go through the efﬁciency factors as they appear in ‘industry and 
commerce’ and ‘households’ as these are the two most important ones when it comes 
to volumes and potential for improvements, see Table 7.1.
7.1.2.1 Industry and commerce
Figure 7.7 shows the amount of  plastic packaging recycled in tons within ‘commerce 
and industry’, disaggregated into the four product groups. Clearly, ﬁlm is the far most 
signiﬁcant contributor to the overall recycling result form industry and commerce. 
Moreover, recycling of  reusable plastic packaging has been reduced the latest years, 
mainly due to reduced amount of  generated waste (3,900 tons in 1996 and 1,200 tons 
in 2004, see appendix C). 
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Figure 7.7 Tons recycled in commerce and industry 1997 – 2004
Finally, rigid plastics are recycled to a very low extent (4.9 % in 2004), which is particularly 
interesting due to the relatively high amount of  generated waste of  this product group 
(12,300 tons) being 25.8 % of  plastic packaging within commerce and industrial, and 
10.3 % of  total amounts of  plastic packaging. 
The recycling ratios for the various groups of  products within ‘commerce and industry’ 
are given in Figure 7.8 below. Reusable plastic packaging has a high recycling ratio already 
in 1997 because there was already a well-functioning recycling system for reusables 
when Plastretur started. The recycling ratio has dropped the latest years because the 
amount has gone down, and there is not high activity in this area any more as it was in 
mid90’s (Strand 2005). 
However, our recycling ratio for reusables is signiﬁcant lower than Plastretur’s ofﬁcial 
numbers as we have excluded 1,500 tons of  screw caps from the amounts recycled, as 
these are not packaging within the Plastretur system (Syversen 2005). The ﬁgure also 
tells that the highest potential for improvements is primarily within rigid plastics due to 
high volumes of  generated waste and low volumes of  recycled material.
The recycling ratios in Figure 7.8 are results of  the efﬁciencies within the waste 
management system. These are given in Table 7.2. The efﬁciencies for sorting, pre-
recycling and recycling are based on empirical studies and experiences, and provided 
by Plastretur and various plants in Norway (Gjester 2003, 2004; Schefte 2003, 2004; 
Tamnes 2002, 2005). These are average numbers, taking into account that there are 
several sorting and recycling plants, both in Norway and abroad. The interval for pre-
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recycling (node 9) indicates that the efﬁciency has improved from 0.70 in 1996 to 
approximately 0.94 in 2004. Based on these efﬁciencies and the overall recycling ratio, 
the collection efﬁciencies for the various product groups are calculated. The collection 
efﬁciencies are shown for 2004.
Figure 7.8 Recycling ratios for product groups within commerce and industry. The denominator for each 
recycling ratio is the amount of  generated waste for the speciﬁc product in the speciﬁc market.
Table 7.2 Efﬁciencies for industry and commerce (Schefte 2005, Gjester 2005)
Recycling ratio Sorting Pre-recycling Recycling Collection
Film 0.28 0.8 6 0.70 - 0.94 0.85 0.43
Rigid 0.05 0.7 7 0.8 - 0.97 0.95 0.08
PP-bags 0.56 0.8 0.97 0.96 0.75
Reuse 1.67 1 0.99 0.98 0.43
These efﬁciencies clearly show that collection is the most inefﬁcient part of  the waste 
management system. Particularly for rigid plastics, there is a signiﬁcant potential for 
improvement. That said, the potential for improvement is, however, given by the 
difference between the current situation and the potential. This potential is decided 
by for instance i) the total amount of  plastic packaging (loss), ii) the type of  plastic 
packaging and processing technology (recyclability), iii) other types of  design for 
environment issues and iv) the drivers and barriers for improving the ﬂows. The latter 
is very important since it also involves non-technical factors, like organisational culture. 
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This advocates the need for more qualitative studies concerning the actors and factors 
inﬂuencing the stocks and ﬂows.
7.1.2.2 Households
Figure 7.9 shows the amount of  material recycled plastic packaging from households in 
the period 1996 – 2004. Although there is a steep growth the last years, particularly for 
ﬁlm, the tonnage of  recycled material is rather modest. 
Figure 7.9 Recycled ﬁlm and rigid plastic packaging from household, measured in tons
This is conﬁrmed by Figure 7.10 which shows that the recycling ratios for ﬁlm and rigid 
plastics are low, 1.4 % for rigid plastics, 2.5 % for ﬁlm and 6.5 % for feedstock recycling 
in 2004.
The low recycling ratios can be explained by the efﬁciencies in Table 7.3. The collection 
solution is decided by the local authorities, and normally they select between a bring 
system and a kerbside system. The former might take two ways, either as collection 
stations in the neighbourhood, or as one of  several fractions in municipal waste plants. 
The collection stations might be designed so that plastic packaging is collected as a separate 
fraction, or together with other materials increasing the need for sorting afterwards 
(Schefte 2004). This distinction also goes for the kerbside system. The experiences so 
far is that collecting plastic packaging in separate “clear” plastic bags in a kerbside system 
(120 litre) provides the best results (Schefte 2005, Plastretur 2005b, Plastretur 2005c). 
A critical factor as to the efﬁciency of  the household collection of  plastic packaging is 
how well the household actually source separate their plastic packaging at home.
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Figure 7.10 Recycling ratio for ﬁlm and rigid plastic packaging from household
Plastic packaging in Norway is normally collected by waste management companies 
(WMCs). As for the household waste, this is either sent to 4 sorting plants for household 
waste or sent directly to feedstock recycling in Schwartze Pumpe in Germany. Since the 
start-up in 2002, around half  of  the separately collected household plastic packaging 
waste has been transported to Schwartze Pumpe in Germany for feedstock recycling. 
This fraction is accepted as material recycling for everything going above 22.5 % (NMoE 
2003b), which is the mechanical recycling target within EU (EU 2001).
Table 7.3 Efﬁciencies for household, mechanical recycling (Schefte 2005, Gjester 2005).
Recycling ratio Sorting Pre-recycling Recycling Collection
Film 0.025 0.3 0.8 0.8 0,13
Rigid 0.007 - 0.014 0.20-0.25 0.65 - 0.85 0.95 0.07
The collection efﬁciency is here given on national level, and one explanation to the low 
efﬁciency is that just half  of  all municipalities in Norway offer solutions for source 
separating plastic packaging. For instance, Oslo (the capital) does not have such solutions, 
but has decided to implement it in 2006. 
The major differences between ‘commerce and industry’ and ‘households’ are found 
in the sorting efﬁciencies and in the collection efﬁciency for ﬁlm. As for households 
sorting, this is far below commerce and industry both for ﬁlm and rigid, indicating a 
poor source separation within the households, low-tech facilities in the sorting plants as 
well as a wider range of  plastic packaging polymers in households. Losses of  efﬁciency 
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early in the recycling chain are very difﬁcult to catch up with later in the chain (Solem, 
2004) and several advocates that households should be given stronger incentives for 
sorting properly at home (Norwegian Competition Authority 2004, Walls 2004).
7.1.2.3 Discussion
The previous chapter showed that the collection efﬁciencies are the limiting factor for 
obtaining higher recycling ratios. The plastic packaging that does not go to material 
recycling, might either go as a fraction of  source separated material for energy recovery or 
as a fraction in the residual waste. Figure 7.11 shows the amounts in energy fraction.
Figure 7.11 Amount of  source separated plastic packaging in energy fractions
As seen in Figure 7.6, Plastretur is currently approximately 10,000 tons below the target. 
If  all what is now sorted for energy recovery is ‘transferred’ to the material recycling 
fraction, this will only contribute to less than half  of  the required amounts for reaching 
the target. Hence, in order to reach the targets, parts of  the plastic packaging following 
the residual waste ﬂow must be redirected towards material recycling. This emphasis 
the need for strategies and measures directed towards the waste generators, both in 
commerce and industry and in households.
Looking at the improvement potentials within commerce and industry and households, 
we see from Figure 7.4 that the recycling ratio within industry and commerce has been 
ﬂuctuating around 30 %. The ﬁlm fraction within this market has a recycling ratio of  28 
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% in 2004, while the rigid fraction only has 4.9 % material recycling. 
Table 7.4 shows the amount of  generated waste for each market and each product and 
the corresponding material recycling ratio for these in 2004. Apparently, the potential for 
improvements are present in neither agriculture nor aquaculture because there already 
are high recycling ratios and the total quantity is low compared to the other markets. 
Hence, it is ﬁlm and rigid plastics within ‘households’ and ‘commerce and industry’ we 
ﬁnd the greatest potential for improvements.
Table 7.4 Total amount of  generated plastic packaging waste (in ton), and the material recycling rate 
(in % )of  this in 2004, as an example.
Households Comm & ind. Agriculture Aquaculture Total
ton % ton % ton % ton % ton % 
Film 39,550 9.18 32.500 28.09 7200 75.0 0 0,0 79,250 22.8
Rigid 21,550 7.9 12.300 4.9 300 0 0 0,0 34,150 6.8
PP-bags 0 0,0 1.600 56.3 900 33.3 2.000 100 4,500 71.1
Reuse 0 0,0 1.200 41.7 0 0,0 0 0,0 1,200 41.7
Total 61,100 8.7 47,600 26.5 8,400 67.9 2,000 100 119,100 21.5
If  the recycling ratio within the households increases to 25 % for both ﬁlm and rigid 
plastics, the target will be reached. This is almost as high as for ﬁlm in commerce 
and industry. Material recycling of  household ﬁlm is more challenging as it contains 
laminates, more dirty packaging (organic material) and a number of  polymers that are 
not compatible in recycling processes (Hoyle and Karsa 1997) That said, the collection 
rate for the best municipalities in Norway is 55 % plastic packaging Raadal et al. (2001) 
with a total 15 % recycling ratio. 
As shown in Figure 7.10, feedstock recycling counts for 6.5 % of  the recycling results 
in households. This controversial type of  recycling does not require the homogenous 
qualities as extrusion does, and might thus have a higher potential. That said, the feedstock 
recycling options in Germany is not stable options as the DKR that has subsidised these 
recycling plants might not any longer support them (Karras 2005), and this option for 
Plastretur then disappear. Moreover, feedstock recycling cannot be used for compliance 
up to 22.5 %, so Plastretur must anyhow ﬁnd solutions for these ﬁrst 22.5 %.
This analysis clearly shows the beneﬁts of  a material ﬂow approach to study a system like 
this. It is here shown that material ﬂow accounting on a detailed level will help the PROs 
to better manage and run the recycling systems, and that knowledge on detailed level 
is important to construct and improve the system. The analysis on this level does not, 
120
Chapter 7
however, tell us about the quality of  the recycled material. The next chapter will present 
and discuss the costs and cash ﬂows within the Plastretur system, which will provide 
better understanding of  both the efﬁciency of  the system as well as the effectiveness 
when it comes to material quality.
7.2 Understanding the Plastretur system by studying the cash 
ﬂows
Is there any correlation between the subsidies from Plastretur to the direct actors and the 
collected and recycled amount? What are the effects of  increased subsidies? The basic 
idea with EPR-system like this on plastic packaging is to transfer money from upstream 
companies (cost) to waste management companies (income) making it economically 
more attractive to recycle. Below we will follow the cash ﬂows in the Plastretur system. 
We will, however, not go into the particular company costs.
7.2.1 Overall picture
7.2.1.1 Income
The EPR system for plastic packaging is ﬁnanced by the fee paid by producers of  plastic 
packaging, by ﬁllers and packers, by wholesalers and by importers. The producers of  
empty packaging for the packaging sent directly to the ﬁnal consumer-use (plastic bags), 
packers and ﬁllers. Retailers pay the fee for plastic bags. The fee is by a majority of  the 
interviewees regarded as the same as a governmental fee, because both represent a cost, 
but in this case, the fee gets to the industry itself  to organise a recovery system, and not 
to the government. The fee is paid to Materialretur, which is a ﬁnancial coordinating 
PRO for all material companies like Plastretur. It was established in 1997, due to the 
potential synergetic effects in co-organising the fee collection and to reduce the number 
of  free-riders (Guttuhaugen 2000). From 1st of  January 2000 Materialretur has been the 
only actor in Norway that has licence to use the “Grüne Punkt”. Companies that do not 
pay the fee, is not allowed to use this label, and Materialretur uses this actively to recruit 
new members (Guttuhaugen 2000).
There are basically two reasons for why the income from licence fee is lower than 100 
%. First, through frequent audits Materialretur discovers that companies pay licence fee 
for less than they actually are using. For instance, packers and ﬁllers have frequently not 
reported transport packaging, but only the inner-packaging. The second reason is that 
there are free-riders in the system. These are companies that do not pay the licence fee, 
but that despite this take the beneﬁts of  using the system. Being a voluntary system, 
Materialretur does not have the legislative authority in order to reduce the number of  
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free riders, but must rather go through the market mechanisms. Figure 7.12 below shows 
the actual income as fraction of  the potential income. 
Figure 7.12 The licence fee per unit and fraction of  total income to the potential income
7.2.1.2 Overall cost picture
Similar to the material ﬂows we will look at the cash ﬂows in the Plastretur system at 
various levels of  aggregation. Given the objective of  redirecting the material ﬂows towards 
material recycling, the overall cost picture can be expressed as the total costs Plastretur 
actually has divided by the tons actually material recycled. Without any governmental 
interference or consequently any role for Plastretur, the material ﬂows would have been 
entirely market-driven, as it was before the introduction of  EPR in 1995. The costs 
of  Plastretur can therefore be argued to be denoted entirely to increase the material 
recycling ratio. However, in addition the single companies have administrative costs 
connected to reporting, payment of  the licence fee and other tasks that follows with 
this. We will not provide cost picture of  these company costs.
While Materialretur is concerned about the income side, Plastretur is concerned about 
how to distribute the money to the recovery sector most efﬁciently. Figure 7.13 below 
shows the development of  the total costs for Plastretur for the period 1996 – 2004. The 
total costs show a steady increase during the entire period. The main reason for this is 
the increase of  running costs. The ﬁxed costs have actually shown a reduction from 
2001 and onwards). Fraction of  ﬁxed costs to the total costs is reduced during the last 
years, from 35.6 % in 2001 to 22.8 % in 2004.
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Figure 7.13 Total costs, running costs and ﬁxed costs for Plastretur 1996 – 2004
Fixed costs are those costs that are not directly associated with the material ﬂows (per 
ton) throughout the Plastretur system. In Figure 7.14 we distinguish between three 
types of  ﬁxed costs; i) projects, ii) administration and iii) communication. Projects are 
undertaken to improve the performance in certain phases of  the Plastretur system, and 
to initiate new ﬁelds of  particular interest for improving the quantity and quality of  the 
material going to recycling. One example is the ‘Quality Project’ where representatives 
from Folldal Gjenvinning, the largest ﬁlm recycler in Scandinavia, get paid by Plastretur 
to educate waste management companies how the plastic packaging should be collected 
and treated in order to obtain the highest input quality to the recycling process (Plastretur 
2002b, Aursland 2002). 
Besides the ﬁnancial support paid to collectors, sorters and recovery companies, 
Plastretur use a lot of  resources and money on information and communication in 
order to recruit more member companies, establish co-operation with municipalities, 
information campaigns and start-up-subsidies both within commerce and industry and 
within the household segment, all in order to make the recovery system more effective.
Indeed, running costs will increase with increasing amount of  recycling, given the same 
technology and contracts. Consequently, the way these running costs can be reduced 
is to alter the contractual unit costs (commitment) or the ﬁnancial mechanisms, for 
instance by reducing subsidies for energy recovery or by letting more being recycled in 
low-costs countries abroad. If  we go into details here, we may disaggregate the costs into 
the various phases, in order to discover where the highest costs actually are, in sorting, 
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collection, recycling, information etc. For instance, why are the unit costs increase every 
year from 1998 to 2004? Figure 7.14 below illustrates this on an aggregated level. Based 
on this, we may develop unit costs for the different markets and products.
Figure 7.14 Cash ﬂows through the value chain for 2004
7.2.2 Running costs
Figure 7.15 provides the overall running cost-picture for the period 1996 – 2004. The 
collection and sorting costs are the major contributor to the costs, with the material 
recycling costs following second, although these have dropped signiﬁcantly the last 
years. This can be seen in connection with the growth of  recycling activities abroad, 
see Table 7.3. During the same period, the transport and storage costs have increased 
because these are mainly connected to recycling activities abroad. 
Figure 7.16 displays the distribution of  running costs between the four markets. 
Commerce and industry is the market with highest total running costs, but household 
costs are increasing due to the increased efforts in that market the latest years. To get a 
similar picture as for the material ﬂows, we will now provide information on running 
costs for ‘commerce and industry’ and ‘households’.
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Figure 7.15 The total running costs fractions for various processes in the waste management system.
Figure 7.16 Total running costs for the four markets
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Figure 7.17 illustrates the running costs for commerce and industry. The same trend as 
in Figure 7.15 can be observed. Collection and sorting costs are highest, with material 
recycling costs as second.
Figure 7.17 Running cost for commerce and industry
Figure 7.18 illustrates the running costs for households. We observe that the collection 
and sorting costs are relatively more dominating than the collection and sorting costs 
for the other markets. The reason for this is that Plastretur in addition to the subsidy for 
delivered sorted plastic packaging that all four markets get, also subsidies local authorities 
on collection and sorting from households.
Figure 7.18 Running costs for households
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In total we might say that all four markets show more or less the same trend with high 
collection and sorting costs and with material recycling costs following second. 
7.2.3 Unit costs 
Chapter 7.1 and 7.2 have so far provided information on material ﬂows and cash ﬂows. 
In this chapter we will, as outlined in Chapter 4, combine these in order to point out 
some interesting development trends with regards to efﬁciency.
Figure 7.19 Total costs related to tons recovered and recycled, index 2004
The total costs per ton recovered are rather stable. The main reason for this is that 
the energy recovered fraction constitutes close to 70 % of  total recovered amount. 
Plastretur does not pay for this fraction except from the transport to energy recovery 
in Denmark for the amount source separated for energy. The largest amount of  energy 
recovered amount comes from residual waste from households which Plastretur does 
not subsidise. The unit costs per ton material recycled are considerably higher, being 
just above 5000 NOK/ton. The unit costs have increased slightly during the latest years, 
somewhat contrary to what might be expected given that systems will be more efﬁcient 
by the time.
Turning to the unit costs based on running costs, Figure 7.20 shows the same trend; a 
relatively stable unit cost related to recovery, but a growth in the unit costs related to 
recycling. How can we explain this? 
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Figure 7.20 Running costs related to tons recycled and recovered. Indexed = 2004
One explanation to the rising unit costs is that in the beginning of  the operative period 
of  Plastretur EPR system (1996 – 1998) there was lots of  reuse plastic packaging entering 
the system. Plastretur does not pay anything for this fraction, but it contributes to the 
actual recycling results. Since then, this amount has been reduced dramatically, and at 
the same time the ‘cheapest’ fractions when it comes to unit costs among ﬁ lm has been 
utilised already. In order to increase the recycling ratio even more, the more expensive 
fractions like rigid and household waste must be taken into account. 
Figure 7.21 Running costs per ton material recycled in three markets. Indexed: 2004
Figure 7.21 clearly shows that the unit costs for commerce and industry have risen 
more than 50 % since 2001, which explains the trends in the previous ﬁ gures. The unit 
costs for household packaging are shown in Figure 7.22. Obviously, the unit costs are 
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many times higher than for the other markets, although the difference has decreased 
considerably the latest years, mainly due to the introduction of  feedstock recycling. 
Figure 7.22 also clearly illustrates why Plastretur has not paid too much attention to 
household waste in the early years. 
Figure 7.22 Running costs per ton material recycled in households
7.3 Interconnected actors – the market mechanisms
So far we have been looking at the ﬂ ows of  materials and cash between actors. In this 
chapter we will go more in detail into the direct and indirect groups of  actors that 
constitute the Plastretur system, by discussing their roles and responsibilities in the 
system and how they relate to each other. Figure 7.23 shows the actors and their relative 
inﬂ uence on the actual material and cash ﬂ ow. 
The direct actors are production companies, trading companies, packers and ﬁ llers, 
the industrial users of  plastic packaging (aquaculture, agriculture, industry etc), private 
consumers (households), waste management companies (collection and sorting), 
recycling companies in Norway and abroad as well as secondary production companies 
that use recycled plastic packaging material in their products. 
The most important indirect actors are Plastretur, Materialretur (PRO), Ministry of  
Environment, Norwegian Pollution Control Authority, the scientiﬁ c communities and 
business organisations.
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Figure 7.23 Direct and indirect actors in the EPR system of  plastic packaging
In order to provide a picture of  the complexity of  the Plastretur system, Figure 7.24 
shows the connection between the direct actors as far as the material, product and cash 
ﬂows are concerned.  
Figure 7.24 The actors, material ﬂows and cash ﬂows within the Plastretur system. Numbers from 
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Figure 7.24 shows the ﬂow of  materials and cash between the different actors. The 
squares are the actors, the whole lines are material ﬂows and the dotted lines are cash 
ﬂows. The ﬁgure also shows the role of  Plastretur receiving money from producers and 
packers and ﬁllers (through Materialretur), and distributing these to the actors in the 
recovery phase to encourage recovery activities.
7.3.1 Direct actors
According to the analytical framework presented in Chapter 4, we distinguish between 
upstream actors, downstream actors and secondary use actors.
7.3.1.1 Upstream actors
The plastic industry comprises virgin polymer producers and plastic packaging producers as 
well as plastics recyclers. Their role in the Plastretur system is to ‘contribute to recycle 
collected plastic packaging waste and to establish and develop markets for recycled 
plastic packaging’ (Plastretur 1995), and this group of  actors holds 1/3 of  the shares in 
Plastretur. Virgin polymer producers do not pay licence fee to Materialretur except for 
the plastic packaging they use for protecting their products and packaging on imported 
goods. The plastic packaging producers are employing primary or recycled plastics for 
making plastic packaging products. This is traditionally a large and powerful industry 
with Stenqvist and Norfolier as the biggest actors, but recently they face very small 
margins due to high competition. These companies pay licence fee to Materialretur if  
they are producing plastic bags, building ﬁlm, service packaging, agriculture plastic and 
plastic for market gardens and agricultural goods. The fee is usually included in the price 
of  the product.
The packers and ﬁllers are those who use the plastic packaging for protecting the ‘real’ 
product. Those companies that during their production use plastic packaging are those 
who basically pay the licence fee to Materialretur. These are represented in Plastretur 
through the ‘Food Industry Association’ both as shareholders (1/3 of  the shares) 
and as board members. Both producers of  goods within the secondary industry and 
service companies within tertiary industry are packers and ﬁllers as long as they employ 
packaging during their activities. Importers of  empty packaging are committed to pay 
licence fee as well, as shown in Figure 7.14. Currently there are around 1,800 fee payers 
to Materialretur and a majority of  these are ‘packers and ﬁllers’. There are, however, just 
a handful of  these that are participating actively in the organisation of  the Plastretur 
EPR system, either through shares in Plastretur, board members in Plastretur or through 
‘The Industrial Packaging Optimization Committee’ (NOC). It is mainly the industrial 
associations that represent the individual companies. Hence, the daily contact with 
Plastretur EPR scheme is not present and most often limited to the bimonthly date of  
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licence fee payment (Fredriksen 2003, Kildal 2003)
The last group of  upstream actors are those industrial and private actors that are the 
last link in the upstream packaging chain constituted by the wholesaler and the retailer 
business. In addition to being the last group of  actors upstream, they are also part of  
the ﬁrst group downstream, the waste generators. Obviously, all the actors presented 
above generate plastic packaging waste during their activities. Major waste generators 
are, as presented above, categorised in four markets. Within the commerce and industry, 
the grocery traders both as wholesalers and retailers are the most important actors. There 
are four large supermarket chains in Norway, having signiﬁcant inﬂuence within the 
Plastretur system, both as shareholders (1/3) and as the customers to the major packers 
and ﬁllers. The last point is signiﬁcant as competition between suppliers and between 
the supermarket chains (Rommetvedt 2002), particularly since international supermarket 
chains establish business in Norway, is a key element in the development of  the Plastretur 
system. According to the shareholder agreement, their role in the Plastretur system is 
to ‘contribute to efﬁcient control so that all their suppliers of  goods pay licence fee in 
order to avoid free-riders’ (Plastretur 1995, p 2). Obviously, the wholesalers have the 
power not to buy products from companies not paying the licence fee (Maldum 2003).
However, both wholesalers and retailers are signiﬁcant waste generators mainly of  clean 
and dry transport packaging of  high quality. Due to ﬁnalisation tax introduced in 1999 
and generally higher waste management costs for residual waste, it has become more 
expensive for them to deliver the plastics to the waste disposal sites than to collectors of  
plastic packaging waste. The collectors contracted by Plastretur are obliged to receive the 
plastic waste for free (Sundt 2002). However, some wholesalers utilise the commercial 
potential of  their valuable plastic packaging, by demanding getting paid for their plastic 
packaging. At the same time they reduce their waste management costs (Langolf  2002). 
The multi-sided role of  this group of  actors, both being plastic packaging users, plastic 
packaging waste generators and controllers of  their suppliers, emphases their signiﬁcant 
position within the Plastretur EPR system.
Household plastic packaging constitutes the largest fraction within the Plastretur system. 
On the waste generation side of  the consumers’ activities, they are treating their plastic 
packaging waste according to the waste management system set up by local authorities 
(see Chapter 6 for more). Some argues that there are few economic incentives for 
consumers to sort packaging at source, and current source separation systems (kerbside 
system or bring system) invite the environmental conscious people to act accordingly, and not 
those who are acting mainly due to economical reasons (Bruvoll et al. 2000, Norwegian 
Competition Authority 2004). However, plastic packaging is just a part of  the entire 
waste generation within households which local authorities must take into consideration 
in order to obtain an optimal system (Plastretur 2005b, Plastretur 2005c). 
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7.3.1.2 Downstream actors
In general, direct downstream actors are not a part of  the agreement between plastic 
packaging industry and the Norwegian Ministry of  Environment. The waste management 
business is an independent sector making proﬁts out of  treating waste in the most 
economic beneﬁcial manner. Plastretur aims at inﬂuence this market through measures 
and strategies such as subsidies, contractual arrangements and information so that the 
competition between the market actors contribute to improved material and product 
ﬂows towards loop closing.
Plastretur has contracted 120 waste management companies (WMC) in Norway. These 
companies guarantee to receive plastic packaging waste for free from waste generators at 
their sites, but can require payment if  collected at the waste generators place. Plastretur 
guarantees that the WMCs have a place to deliver the plastic packaging waste. WMCs get 
paid, through the recovery companies due to quality control carried out by recyclers (see 
Figure 7.14). The payment depends on the type of  polymer (e.g. ﬁlm and rigid) and the 
quality of  the plastic. The recovery companies can reduce the payment if  the deliveries 
from WMCs do not comply with quality criteria given in the contract. Moreover, the 
WMCs choose themselves to what extent they sort the plastic packaging before sending 
it to recyclers. The largest waste management company in Norway, Norsk Gjenvinning, 
built in 2001 a sorting plant for increasing the quality of  the plastics. 
As seen from Figure 7.25, the recycling abroad has increased the latest years, and 
Plastretur has established an ‘export storage’ for quality control and joint transportation 
to recyclers, particularly in the Baltic States. Experiences show that the quality control is 
not as strict as by Norwegian recyclers, although they receive the same payment. Hence, 
major Norwegian WMCs claim that Plastretur prioritise quantity to quality (Kopstad 
2003).
The local authorities are not part of  the covenant on plastic packaging, despite the fact 
that they according to the Pollution Control Act are responsible for the plastic packaging 
from households. The municipalities thus claim that Plastretur and the other PROs on 
household packaging are 100 % ﬁnancially responsible for the packaging comprised by 
the EPR regulations (Igesund 2004). Thus, they require payment for their actual costs 
connected to collection and sorting of  this packaging, although the local authorities are 
by law imposed to collect and treat the household waste in the environmentally best 
manner. On the other side, Plastretur is responsible for achieving their recycling targets 
and are thus free to decide how to spend their ﬁnancial resources in order to reach 
this as efﬁcient as possible. However, the mutual interdependence between the local 
authorities (supplying packaging waste) and Plastretur (PROs) (demanding packaging 
waste) creates a close co-operation between Plastretur and more than 250 municipalities. 
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The municipalities are paid directly by Plastretur to create and distribute information 
material and for establishing collection points. They also receive NOK 1100 pr ton 
(2004) from Plastretur for plastic packaging going to the regional sorting companies 
which have the quality control of  the collected plastic packaging. 
During the latest years, combustion without or with poor energy recovery and landﬁlling 
have become more expensive due to the ﬁnalisation tax (and recyclables will be banned 
from 2009), and local authorities, like waste management companies, look for solutions 
that reduce their costs due to this. Recycling and recovery activities are in line with 
this. On the contrary, several local authorities own landﬁlls that represent a substantial 
income for them due to these increased prices.
Recovered material of  high quality is a main driver in the EPR system. If  the quality 
is good enough, it is able to compete with virgin material in making new products. 
The material recovery companies and the sorters are guaranteed a minimum price from 
Plastretur. There are material recyclers both in Norway and abroad receiving plastic 
packaging collected from Norwegian waste generators. Folldal Gjenvinning is the largest 
Scandinavian ﬁlm recycler with an annual capacity of  10,000 tons in 2004, increasing 
from 5,000 tons in 1998. The recyclers are allowed to refuse entire loads from WMCs 
or parts of  it.
Figure 7.25 Fraction of  plastic packaging recycled abroad
The general picture is that recyclers abroad offers better prices for plastic packaging waste 
than Norwegian recyclers can do, basically due to lower labour costs. Foreign recyclers 
have the capacity to sort an additional round before entering the recycling process. On 
the other hand, Norwegian recyclers are part of  the Plastic Industry Association, which 
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holds 1/3 of  the shares in Plastretur. Due to this, there have been examples where the 
interests of  these companies and not of  Plastretur have been decisive for the conclusion 
made on issues such as how much of  the collected plastic packaging shall be recycled 
in Norway. This is particularly relevant for ﬁlm, as shown in Figure 7.25 below. The 
present situation is that Folldal Gjenvinning is guaranteed 10,000 tons a year in order 
to maintain their recycling capacities. During the ﬁrst years of  the Plastretur system, 
plastic packaging waste collected in Norway was recycled abroad due to lack of  recycling 
capacities in Norway, but in the latest years, the cost aspect has also given incentives for 
increasing the export also of  ﬁlm.
The energy recovery of  the rest fraction from household waste is mentioned above. This 
energy recovery counts for almost all the entire energy recovery in this EPR system 
(see Appendix C). The energy recovery at industrial sites, gets plastic waste from the 
sorted plastic of  low quality from households and from the industrial plastic waste of  
low quality. In 1996 – 1999 the energy recovery was carried out at Norcem cement 
production plant in Brevik, Norway, or at Sande Paper Mill in Sande, Norway. Since 
2000, there has been a tender and Plastretur has since then used Aalborg Cement in 
Denmark as the energy recover. 
7.3.1.3 Secondary upstream actors
The recycled material must eventually be employed in new products, either packaging 
(closed loop recycling) or non-packaging (open-loop recycling). Recycled material is 
competing with virgin plastics, and must satisfy the similar criteria as far as quality, 
quantity and stability in delivery is concerned. There are some examples of  Norwegian 
companies that have employed recycled plastic packaging material. The most important 
products are garbage bags, plastic bags and cable cover plates.
7.3.2 Indirect actors
7.3.2.1 PROs
Plastretur is, despite its key role in meeting the objectives in the covenant, basically an 
indirect actor in this EPR system. It does not own the material, except from the part of  
the system where plastic packaging waste is sent abroad to be recycled there. As shown in 
Figure 7.24, Plastretur is mainly occupied with the end-of-life phase, while Materialretur 
is dealing with income-related activities. Materialretur was established in 1997 by 6 
‘packaging’-PROs (plastics, corrugated cardboard, beverage cartons, carton, glass and 
metals) in order to coordinate all activities directed towards the licence fee payers and 
to prevent that conﬁdential information from licence fee payers becomes available for 
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competitors being involved in the PROs (Røine 2002). Plastics is a particular challenging 
material in this context as there is a high number of  licence fee payers (~1800) compared 
to for instance beverage cartons with just a handful of  fee payers.
EPR on plastic packaging in Norway is a voluntary scheme, and Materialretur must develop 
their strategies accordingly in order to avoid free-riders and underreporting. Of  particular 
importance in reducing number of  free-riders has been the ‘control membership’ (Sundt 
2003, Røine 2003) Companies with such membership have committed themselves to 
make sure that all their suppliers are members of  Materialretur. If  not, they will not 
be allowed to sell to the controllers, making it a kind of  ‘green procurement’ system. 
Another strategy that has proven successful is to concentrate recruitment efforts on 
speciﬁc business sector and motivate every (large) company within this sector collectively 
to agree that they will be members of  Materialretur (Røine 2002). In addition, a new 
governmental procurement regulation requires that every company being supplier to the 
regulatory authorities and directives (NHD 2004). Moreover, Materialretur has exclusive 
right to use ‘Die Grüne Punkt’ and employ this as an argument to recruit new members. 
This is particularly relevant for importers and international companies10.
However, there are barriers for participating: Firstly, companies might, on principal 
basis, not be interested in participating, arguing that this is a voluntary scheme. Secondly, 
companies might be frustrated by the complex reporting system, due to a wide range 
of  products with no knowledge on the weight of  the packaging. This is particularly 
relevant for importers of  products that have only knowledge to the product and not the 
packaging. Thus, heavy administrative load and costs in addition to the actual licence fee 
might create free-riders. The covenants on packaging have stimulated the relevant actors 
to form different discussion fora, meeting places where experiences and solutions are 
exchanged. One example is that the packaging chains have established ‘The Industrial 
Packaging Optimisation Committee’ (NOC) that aims at cope with the packaging 
optimisation objective in the covenant (see Chapter 5.3). This was established in 1999 
as a consequence of  the ﬁrst evaluation carried out on the EPR packaging schemes by 
Norwegian Pollution Control Agency (SFT), which claimed that the PROs were initiating 
too few efforts in order to cope with the challenges of  waste generation (SFT 1998). To 
the extent it does not inﬂuence the objective of  reaching the targets, Plastretur is not to 
deal with upstream activities, including waste reduction efforts (Skilhagen 2003).
7.3.2.2 Authorities
The roles of  various authority bodies in the EPR schemes are diverse. Local authorities 
are already mentioned as a direct actor being responsible for household waste. Local 
authorities are also indirect actors as the administrator of  the relevant regulations, in 
particular the Pollution Control Act, while the operative part of  the local authorities’ 
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activities now to a larger extent is privatised. These are usually 100 % owned by the local 
authorities, competing with other private WMCs. 
The central authorities are operating at different levels. The Norwegian Ministry of  
Environment is the signing part in the covenant and is basically making sure that the 
development of  the EPR schemes goes in right direction towards the targets. For 
instance, in year 2000 NMoE did a large evaluation of  the covenants on the packaging 
area (NMoE 2000, NMoE 2001b). They have a very limited role and shall not interfere 
with the industrial EPR system unless there is a need for clariﬁcations and interpretations 
of  the covenant not concerning the industrial implementation. Their only sanctioning 
mechanisms is related to introducing a tax instead of  the covenant. However, since the 
NMoE has put a lot of  prestige in these EPR schemes, and they consider this to be like 
a regulation (Hambro 2003), they remain silent as long as the targets are reached.
Lkewise, SFT is just receiving the annual report from Plastretur, and without capacity 
to control the numbers provided by Plastretur, they have limited role in the system. 
However, it was SFT that decided in 2004 that the measuring point for material recycling 
should be at the point of  inﬂow to the recycling plant (Flow X
M3,9
 in Figure 4.5), and 
not into the actual recycling process. The argument was that it should harmonise with 
EU standard. In this context, we should also mention that the central authorities are 
represented in every county through an environmental governor, which reports to SFT 
and has a major inﬂuence on the local environmental policy. These make decisions 
concerning emissions to water, air and soil. The strictness of  these when considering 
an application for emissions, are traditionally to a large extendt varying throughout the 
counties. Thus, various regions face different strictness of  enforcing the law. 
In an IPP perspective as discussed in Chapter 3, NMoE also is the key actor that has 
implemented ﬁnal treatment taxes and that prepare how to implement the EU landﬁll 
directive in Norway. These policies are also inﬂuencing the choice of  waste management 
solutions among the direct actors. For instance, after introducing the ﬁnalisation tax in 
1999, we saw particular two things happen; the export of  waste for energy recovery in 
Sweden increased and more companies started to source separate their waste. Hence, 
various policies (the covenant and the ﬁnalisation tax) might point in the same direction 
and contribute to similar outcome. 
7.4 Plastretur
Chapter 7 so far has provided insight into the material and cash ﬂows that characterise 
the EPR-system for plastic packaging in Norway. It has also looked into the direct 
and indirect actors that, to a greater or less extent, have contributed to the observed 
development. As seen from Chapter 7.1, the tonnage of  recycled plastic packaging has 
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increased considerably since 1996, and so has the recycling ratio, although this has found 
a stable level just above 20 % the latest years. The questions are: How has Plastretur 
contributed to this development? What strategies and instruments have Plastretur 
employed that has turned out successful? And to what extent has Plastretur provided 
signals and feedback to upstream companies so that these incorporate considerations 
on recycling issues into their design process? 
We will look into these questions below by ﬁrst drawing a picture of  the role of  Plastretur, 
its position within the already existing market as well as some overall principles governing 
the activities (Chapter 7.4.1). Then we go through the entire life cycle and discuss the 
strategies and measures that Plastretur employs towards the direct actors (Chapter 7.4.2). 
Finally, we go beyond the administrative (management) and operational issues and look 
into the interactions between the owners, the Board and the Ministry of  Environment 
in order to explore topics these actors meet (Chapter 7.4.3).
7.4.1 Objectives and governing principles
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the existence of  Plastretur was ‘decided’ in the covenant 
from 14th September 1995. On 6th November 1995, Plastretur was founded as a non-
proﬁt company that on behalf  of  the owners (‘the producers’) should “develop, run, 
manage, monitor and organise collection and recovery of  plastic packaging to meet the 
objectives of  50 % energy recovery and 30 % material recovery” (Plastretur 1995). As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the EPR scheme took form as a ‘communal voluntary work’ 
since the EPR scheme was based on industry’s own initiative and model for a producer 
responsibility. The common spirit of  being a ‘voluntary’ framework seemed during 
the ﬁrst year to motivate a majority of  the ‘producers’ which to a larger extent than 
a regulation provided a good atmosphere for achieving results (NHO 1995, Maldum 
2003, Sundt 2004, Bjerk 2005). However, there still are some companies that just relate 
to regulations and found this as not anything to take into account.
From the start in 1996, the main objectives were clearly stated:
1. Achieving the targets in the covenant
2. No free-riders
3. Lowest costs possible for Plastretur
The overall objective has been to reach the targets stated in the covenants in order to 
avoid sanctions and packaging tax from Ministry of  Environment, which the owners 
of  Plastretur themselves had proven was a far more expensive solution (NHO 1995). 
The second point is connected to the challenge of  avoiding competitive advantages 
for free-riders. If  not paying the licence fee, they would get reduced costs, but still 
take beneﬁt from using the system, and thus reduced waste management costs as well. 
138
Chapter 7
Fair competition on equal basis is of  high importance for commercial actors. The last 
objective is therefore about running the Plastretur system as cost-efﬁcient as possible so 
that reaching the targets can be achieved at a minimum cost.
In reaching these objectives, Plastretur developed a model based on certain governance 
principles. Plastretur early decided to develop a market-based model that utilised 
already existing infrastructure and market actors. All WMCs in Norway that committed 
themselves to the requirements set by Plastretur, were allowed to sign standard contract 
with Plastretur. The number of  WMCs increased steadily from a dozen in 1996 to 85 
in 1998 and further to 120 in 2004. Every WMC gets the same ﬁnancial condition, 
which intends to increase the competition between them and consequently make the 
system more efﬁcient. WMCs own the material, but in order to get paid from Plastretur, 
they must pass the material on to one of  those material recyclers that Plastretur has 
agreements with.
As a consequence of  this Plastretur has been an indirect actor in the system by neither 
buying/selling plastic packaging waste, nor owning infrastructure or waste management 
facilities. Instead of  ownership, the strategy was based on contracting waste management 
companies and recycling companies. Hence, Plastretur had basically two points in the 
end-of-life phase where interaction with the market occurred.
Basically, the contracts contained mutual commitments for both Plastretur and the 
direct actors. Plastretur guaranteed WMCs that they could deliver all collected plastic 
packaging waste, if  fulﬁlling certain quality criteria, to those recyclers that Plastretur 
had contracted. The WMCs would then receive subsidies from Plastretur, through 
the recyclers as shown in Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.24. The contracts with recyclers 
guaranteed that Plastretur should subsidise these for the recycled plastic packaging 
sold to the market. However, Plastretur did not guarantee that the recyclers should get 
enough raw material to run their processes, but that they should work for increasing the 
collection and hence the supply of  plastic packaging waste. The role as a guarantor is 
the main ﬁnancial risk element for Plastretur, because if  they could not ﬁnd recyclers, 
they had the responsibility to ﬁnance an alternative, thus more expensive, treatment. 
Moreover, Plastretur did only ﬁnance operational activities and not investments in new 
equipment and process technology. Hence, the technology development of  the waste 
management sector was primarily up to the direct actors themselves, but Plastretur has 
contributed with information and as initiator. 
The subsidising principle was ‘net cost coverage’ which meant that Plastretur should 
ﬁnancially support activities downstream to the extent that it became economically 
beneﬁcial for actors to act so that more plastic packaging was directed towards material 
recycling. However, since every direct actor signed the same standard contract with 
the same level of  subsidies, this principle was applicable on national level and not on 
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company level. Hence, those being effective got a comparative advantage compared to 
their less efﬁcient competitors. Being a market-based collective EPR system indicates 
that the Plastretur system is not based on full cost coverage (as in Germany), but rather 
on shared ﬁnancial responsibility.
The design of  the subsidising policy has since 1998 almost entirely been focused on 
increasing the material recycling. The energy recovery target was by then almost reached 
through incineration with energy recovery of  household residual waste and source 
separated plastic packaging for energy recovery (Plastretur 1999).
Poor experiences from for instance Germany where there were lack of  recycling 
capacities for large amounts of  collected packaging waste, inspired Plastretur from the 
beginning to focus the recycling phase and developing markets for secondary use. The 
slogan was ‘planning from behind and forward’. However, after a couple of  years it 
was realised that the large challenge was not related to the recycling phase but to the 
collection phase. During 1998 it was free recycling capacity and a high demand for 
collected plastic packaging waste as input to the recycling processes (Plastretur 1999). 
As a consequence of  the third objective mentioned above, a governing principle has 
throughout the period been to put the measures and efforts where the unit costs 
are lowest. As seen from Figure 7.21, this has primarily been within commerce and 
industry, and secondary within agriculture and aquaculture. Plastic packaging waste 
from households was due to high unit costs (see Figure 7.22) decided not to be the main 
focus area. However, in order to secure legitimacy, household waste has been prioritised 
among those local authorities that are ‘willing and able’ since 1999 (Sundt 2000). 
From the very beginning the strategy was to improve the reputation of  plastics and 
plastics waste through openness and transparency, high credibility and reliable statistics 
(Sundt 2002), resulting in comprehensive environmental studies and major efforts to 
decide the denominator (Plastretur 2002a)11. The communication strategies have been 
based on the principle that very speciﬁc campaigns should be directed towards the 
actors in the system, and not as general information campaigns to the public, like for 
instance Norsk Returkartong (EPR scheme on beverage cartons) did. One reason for 
this is that Plastretur ﬁrst and foremost has been focusing on industrial actors and not 
plastic packaging waste from households. This is cheaper, but has the consequence that 
Plastretur and the Plastretur EPR system has not become a brand.
As for the scope, the main focus has always been related to direct actors in the end-of-
life phase. Some attention was initially put in developing markets for recycled material, 
but few, if  any, efforts where heading towards the primary upstream companies. The 
governing principle was that efforts and measures should all increase the recycling ratio, 
and actions towards upstream companies proved to be a too long way to go in order to 
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see effects of  the results. Measures towards upstream companies have been taken care 
of  by NOC.
7.4.2 Strategies, measures and instruments towards direct actors
Plastretur has employed various types of  instruments for inﬂuencing direct actors in 
order to achieve the recycling targets. We may distinguish between four different types 
of  instruments: i) contracts, ii) ﬁnancial support, iii) projects and iv) information.
By contracts we mean signing agreements with operators. This can take various forms; 
for instance signing standard contracts with all interested parties or invite to a tender 
competition. Usually a contract is guaranteeing the operator a certain minimum price per 
ton of  output, as a subsidy to its business. The contracts are therefore often combined 
with economic incentives to stimulate the market and the material ﬂows of  plastic 
packaging.
The basic principle in Plastretur’s subsidising policy is that payment is given at two points; 
i) to the collector (WMC) at the point delivered to recycler (or export storage) and ii) 
to recycler when the recycled material is sold to their costumers. In order to receive 
subsidies from Plastretur, WMCs must receive sorted plastic packaging for free from 
the waste generator, but they can charge for the transportation from waste generator to 
their plant. Moreover, the recycler must, in order to receive subsidies from Plastretur, 
guarantee to receive baled and sorted plastic packaging from WMCs and to process 
this into sellable material. However, if  the quality is poor and does not comply with 
the quality criteria in the contract between WMC and Plastretur, the material recycler 
can decide to reduce the payment accordingly. Every transaction that releases payments 
from Plastretur requires communication from both parties conﬁrming the amount 
(volume) agreed upon. This also serves as input to the statistical management tools of  
Plastretur.
The choice of  instruments and strategies are indeed depending on how the roles and 
business models for your company are formulated. In this chapter we will discuss 
Plastretur’s strategies for inducing changes on the material ﬂows, and particularly look 
at the costs of  these.
7.4.2.1 Upstream companies
As mentioned above, Plastretur employs few direct strategies and instruments on upstream 
companies. There is very limited interaction with these companies. One exception was 
in fact a seminar on design for recycling in 2002. The feedback from the upstream 
companies participating on this seminar was overwhelming, but still there have not been 
any similar seminars, mainly due to the fact that downstream activities were prioritised 
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(Braathen 2002). The basic contact with the fee-payers is through Materialretur, and the 
experiences are that it is difﬁcult and time-consuming for Materialretur to explain the 
recovery system, ﬁnancial mechanisms and the technological aspects related to recycling 
systems. Hence, the feedback loop from waste management system to upstream 
companies is very weak. 
Plastretur is ﬁnancing Materialretur’s activities, both as the general ﬁnancial support but 
also through projects particularly aiming at recruiting more members to Materialretur in 
order to reduce the number of  free-riders. Total costs to Materialretur were 5.6 million 
NOK (19 % of  ﬁxed costs) as shown in Figure 7.14. The other indirect inﬂuence 
Plastretur has on the upstream companies is through ﬁnancing a fraction of  the activities 
within NOC. Beyond this, there is neither institutionalised nor random interaction 
between Plastretur and NOC, and consequently no knowledge transfer either. However, 
according to informants in Plastretur administration, there has been some one-way 
contact from Plastretur to NOC, but not the other way. Thus, the feedback loops from 
the waste management system (potentially brought by Plastretur) to the producers in 
order to inﬂuence the product design process, is non-existing. That said, as pointed out 
by Plastretur’s chairman Steinar Skilhagen, ‘the collective task is to reach the targets in 
the covenant. The task of  ‘waste minimisation’ and ‘packaging optimisation’ is to a large 
extent an individual task that cannot be solved as a collective issue (Skilhagen 2002).
7.4.2.2 Waste generators
As identiﬁed in Chapter 7.1, a main challenge is to collect more of  the plastic packaging 
from the waste generators. What have been Plastretur’s strategies to cope with this 
challenge? First, Plastretur has during the entire period from 1996 – 2004 not subsidies 
any waste generators proportional to the amount of  generated waste. The strategies 
have rather been projects and information campaigns directed towards key waste generators. 
Examples of  these are shopping centres, retailers and wholesalers in convenience chains 
and building sites, and the scope has primarily been ﬁlm, but at shopping centres there 
has also been focus on rigid plastics (bottles and cans).
Plastretur has run several projects at shopping centres from 1998 and onwards. In 1998, 
the average source separation of  plastic packaging waste was 5 % at such centres, while 
it in 2003 was close to 80 % at those centres projects had been run (Bratterud 2003). 
Plastretur (2002c) argues that there is a potential of  increased collection of  close to 
2,000 tons from shopping centres in the Oslo-region. Plastretur’s strategy has focused 
on costs when ‘selling’ the message. The main point is that residual waste is the far most 
expensive fraction, and reducing this by source separation is a proper strategy. Secondly, 
transportation is costly and reducing the frequency of  collection through compressing 
the plastic packaging. The racks are able to compress the packaging down to 1/5 of  
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original volume. Finally, ‘correct the ﬁrst time’ has been a slogan when approaching 
waste generators because this potentially creates more value than if  for instance plastic 
packaging of  non-compatible polymers are mixed into one bag. All these three points 
contribute to reduce the waste management costs and should be obvious for every 
industrial waste generator that pays relative to the amounts generated.
Practical drivers for successful plastic packaging collection at shopping centres are to 
visualise the economic potential for doing this, get the centre management engaged 
in this so that they can inﬂuence the entire centre, including sanctions if  shops do 
not follow up, educate the employees in the shops and ﬁnally that there are racks with 
transparent plastic bags for source separation in every shop (Bratterud 2003).
These projects have, according to Plastretur, been highly successful, and Plastretur has 
through these cases produced a number of  success stories, focusing on cost reductions. 
These are published at Plastretur’s homepage, at seminars and meeting with direct actors, 
in media and brochures. The challenges, however, is to reach out to the vast majority of  
waste generators. Even in Norway, being a small and transparent country, advocating 
the message is difﬁcult.
7.4.2.3 Waste management companies
The main instrument targeting waste management companies are standard contracts 
with guaranteed minimum prices for delivery to recycler, given that the batch satisﬁes 
certain quality criteria. Figure 7.26 provides the contractual unit prices for ﬁlm, rigid 
plastics pure fractions, rigid plastics mixed fractions and rigid plastics mixed PP & HD. 
The ﬁlm unit price has been stable around 1500 NOK/ton, while the rigid plastics have 
been more ﬂuctuating. The higher prices on rigid plastics can be seen as a strategy for 
increasing the amounts. As seen from Figure 7.8 and 7.9 this might have caused the 
slightly increase in the recycled amounts of  rigid plastics. The same ﬁgures show that 
ﬁlm has increased signiﬁcantly measured in tons, but more modest in recycling ratio. 
We can therefore expect that the increased recycling of  ﬁlm is due to growth in the 
quantity of  generated waste and not due to altering guaranteed minimum prices from 
Plastretur.
Another strategy that targets waste generators indirectly is all information and ‘education’ 
of  the waste management companies, so that these can bring this further to waste 
generators. The strategy has been to do the marketing work in close cooperation with 
the waste management network.
As can be seen from the unit costs in Figure 7.21, this has increased for commerce and 
industry the latest years. This is mainly due to three aspects. First, that the efforts on 
rigid plastics have increased and this fraction has higher negotiated costs than for ﬁlm. 
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Second, rigid plastics are recycled abroad which increase the costs of  transportation and 
costs to the export storage. Third, due to rising ﬁnancial subsidies on this fraction, the 
collection has increased as well, making the total running costs higher.
Figure 7.26 Guaranteed minimum prices for waste management companies for delivering ﬁlm and rigid 
plastics to recyclers
Another project for increasing the quality of  the input to the recycling process is the 
‘Quality project’. Plastretur pays two employees from Folldal Gjenvinning to visit waste 
management companies and educate these on how to collect from waste generators, 
how to sort at their waste management plants. Downstream actors and Plastretur are 
generally satisﬁed with this type of  knowledge creation, and the project is considered 
to be successful. Folldal Gjenvinning argues that there are considerable improvements 
in the quality of  their raw material coming from the waste management companies that 
they have paid a visit (Tamnes 2002). 
That said, Plastretur does not provide speciﬁc incentives for the waste management 
companies to sort the collected plastic packaging. Since the payment from Plastretur is 
the same whether sending it to export or to domestic recyclers, WMCs often prefers not 
to increase the quality but rather send it to export instead. To counteract this, Folldal 
Gjenvinning has paid more for sorted plastic packaging, which comply with Norsk 
Gjenvinning’s argument that increasing the quality should give higher prices.
Another issue related to waste management companies is that the large retailers and 
wholesalers (supermarket chains), as waste generators, has during the last years started to 
send plastic packaging directly to recyclers without going via WMCs. The quality of  this 
plastic packaging is generally very good (Rogstad 2002) and the supermarket chains have 
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argued that they should get the same price as the WMCs do (1500 NOK/ton) because 
it is similar or even better quality than delivered by WMCs. However, Plastretur has only 
paid 1000 NOK/ton. Plastretur has argued that if  all large waste generators also shall 
get 1500 NOK/ton, then the market model is damaged. This model is based on the 
premise that the waste generators shall deliver for free, not to get paid for their waste. 
However, supermarket chains have been invited to sign contracts as a WMC, which 
include the requirement to receive plastic packaging waste from other waste generators 
as well so that every WMC is treated equally. This has been refused, due to the reasons 
mentioned above, by the supermarket chains.
7.4.2.4 Local authorities
Contrary to most EPR systems for plastic packaging in Europe, the Plastretur system 
includes almost all of  the plastic packaging generated as waste in Norway, conf  Table 7.1. 
This implies that Plastretur has a certain ﬂexibility regarding where they will put most 
efforts and resources in order to reach the targets. Ever since the very beginning in 1996 
the strategy has been to develop a cost-effective system where the ‘cheapest’ and easiest 
tons are ﬁrst collected and recycled (Plastretur 1997, Sundt 2000). Obviously, the plastic 
packaging waste from household is much more diverse, dirty and, thus, more expensive 
to obtain high collection rates and high quality of  the regranulates (conf. Chapter 6.2). 
Plastretur has therefore had a strategy that the efforts related to household waste are 
limited to those municipalities that are “willing and able”. Since it is the responsibility 
of  the individual municipalities to design the collection system for household waste 
(according to the Pollution Control Act, §30), only those municipalities that actually want 
to start source separation and that have the ability to do so (Schefte 2002), are invited 
to do so. The ability is related to the size of  the municipality. The experiences were that 
it was almost equally time- and resource demanding to serve and assist a small local 
authority as a larger one. 
The last years, Plastretur has intensiﬁed the priority on household waste, due to reasons 
of  legitimacy and in order to increase the amount collected. The legitimacy is due to 
the fact that the plastic packaging becoming waste in households are to a large extent 
been subject to licence fee which then also would have expected to be recycled. It 
might however be argued that this is a consequence of  the collective EPR system. If  
there should have been a guarantee that plastic packaging becoming waste also should 
have been recycled, then we are either entering a type of  individual EPR system or a 
system like in Germany, with the consequence of  being a far more expensive system. 
The licence fee in Germany has been ten times the fee in Norway for plastic packaging 
(Sundt 2004). Hence, for the packers and ﬁllers the collective Plastretur system seems 
to be the cheapest model, while at the same time the legitimacy towards the consumers 
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must be there.
Still the unit cost per ton recycled is very high compared to the other markets. First, 
Plastretur pays the municipalities 1100 NOK per ton collected (2004) and 1000 NOK 
per ton delivered to one of  the four contracted sorting plants. The sorting plants get 
similar prices as for industrial packaging (see Figure 7.30) when received by the recyclers. 
In addition, however, they also get 2000 NOK per ton as a bonus. This bonus is intended 
to stimulate the sorting plants to do a proper job, because low sorting efﬁciency increase 
the unit cost of  household waste considerable since Plastretur already has paid 2100 
NOK per ton for the inﬂow to the sorting plant.
Plastretur started in 2002 to send plastic packaging to Germany for feedstock recycling 
instead of  energy recovery. This avoids the sorting process, and becomes therefore much 
cheaper. The recycling ratio has increased considerably due to this strategy. However, 
due to uncertainty on whether this option will remain in the future, Plastretur has still 
long-term contracts with sorting plants in Norway. This has induced considerable 
investments at these sorting plants.
Finally, Plastretur has the latest years been more active in stimulating local authorities 
to start with collection of  plastic packaging. They provide advice, information material 
and knowledge transfer to those deciding to start with this. Plastic packaging comprises 
approximately 50% on volume basis and 15 % of  mass basis of  the household waste. 
Based on experiences from other local authorities, Plastretur recommends a kerbside 
system for plastic packaging, for glass and metal and for paper, as well as separating 
organic waste for the residual waste. This reduces the frequency of  collections of  
residual waste from every week to every fourth week, and thus the overall costs. This 
has proven to be an effective way of  increasing the collection of  plastic packaging from 
households.
7.4.2.5 Material recyclers
The main strategy towards material recyclers is contracts including ﬁnancial mechanisms. 
Film recyclers in Norway have got 1500 NOK per ton sold to the market, except from 
in the period 1997 – 1999, where the guaranteed minimum price was 2250 NOK 
per ton. If  ﬁlm is sent abroad for recycling Plastretur receives 1200 NOK per ton (in 
2004). Although this price depends on the Platts index for virgin polymers, there is a 
considerable price difference between these two options. 
However, costs connected to export storage and transport is close to 1000 NOK 
per ton, but still recycling abroad remains considerably cheaper. In 2004, Plastretur 
contracted Folldal Gjenvinning for a new ﬁve-year contract, intending to supply the 
146
Chapter 7
material recycler with up to 10,000 tons a year. From an economic point of  view, this is 
obviously not the most cost-efﬁcient solution.
Approximately 50 % of  all plastic packaging contributing to the recycling ratio is actually 
recycled abroad. There are basically two reasons for this. First, the Norwegian recycling 
industry does not have capacity and ability to recycle all collected and sorted plastic 
packaging, for instance PP-bags and rigid plastics. Second, the cost level abroad is lower 
than in Norway.
7.4.2.6 Secondary upstream producers
There has been limited focus on stimulating potential users of  recycled plastic packaging 
to do so. Except from occasionally guidance to single companies contacting Plastretur to 
get advice on how to proceed on such an issue (Schefte 2002, Malthus 2002), a project 
was initiated, ﬁnanced partly by Norwegian Research Council, in 2004 on this issue. The 
intention was to establish project groups with participants from the entire value chain 
from sorters of  plastic packaging waste, via recyclers to secondary upstream producers 
and ﬁnal users of  products, with Plastretur as the coordinating body, and through 
this cooperation try to remove some of  the present barriers for this. The interest of  
Plastretur in this project is that due to an increasing amount of  recycled plastics on the 
market, with potentially limited range of  products that might use this material, there 
is on a long term basis a risk for not having proper markets for recycled material. In 
that case, Plastretur as a guarantor for the WMCs to ﬁnd a receiver for their collected 
plastic packaging waste runs a ﬁnancial risk as the alternative of  energy combustion 
or landﬁlling are more expensive and does not contribute to meeting the targets in the 
covenant.
7.4.3 Representing the producers – the Board and owners
So far we have discussed the ﬂows of  material and cash within the recycling system, the 
various actors who are part of  or inﬂuence this system, and the role of  Plastretur in 
achieving the recycling objectives. In this chapter we will look at a more strategic level 
as seen from the owners of  Plastretur, the representatives for the ‘producers’ and how 
they have contributed to the obtained results. 
The owners of  Plastretur contributed in 1994 and 1995 to design “the industry’s model” 
as an alternative to the packaging tax suggested by the government. They argued that 
their model would reach the same environmental objectives at a considerably lower cost 
(1/10). The fact that their model was accepted provided a common understanding of  
the actual responsibility and that all together now should contribute to achieving these 
targets. The feeling of  contributing to a voluntary communal work was highly present 
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and contributed signiﬁcantly to the results during the ﬁrst years (Sundt 2003, Maldum 
2003). The ﬁrst evaluation in 1998 initiated the foundation of  NOC, while during the 
main evaluation in 2000 (NMoE 2000), showed that Ministry of  Environment was 
basically satisﬁed with the development of  the Plastretur system, although the targets 
were not yet reached within the ‘deadline’ by end of  1999. 
The covenant was renegotiated during 2001-2003, and remained by large unchanged, 
except from two minor alterations. The term ‘waste reduction’ was substituted with 
‘packaging optimisation’ and there was no requirement that the targets should be fulﬁlled 
by a PRO, only that the plastic packaging industry should make sure that there was an 
operative recovery system (NMoE 2003).
This time, it was in reality no negotiations (Maldum 2003) as the Ministry of  Environment 
was committed to follow the instructions laid down in the declaration by the new 
government that took ofﬁce in October 2001. That said, it was somewhat easier to 
accept the ambitious targets due to several reasons. Firstly, the industry did not feel 
‘the stick’ of  tax introduction so realistic since NMoE did not employ it when the ﬁrst 
covenant expired without reaching the targets. The fact that Ministry of  Environment 
had signed the covenant in 1995 and after that in practice left everything to the industry 
and at no point of  time threatened with sanctions had made the owners of  Plastretur 
more relaxed related to the targets. NMoE, though, claimed that the threat of  economic 
instruments replacing the covenant is still there (Hambro 2003). 
Secondly, companies argued that by voluntary it means that they can, in practise, do what 
they want. On the contrary, the covenant is considered by Ministry of  Environment as 
a kind of  regulation with in practice no time limits (Hambro 2003). The consensus is, 
thus, more based on the fact that this is the preferred solution to the agreeing partners, 
than that they both fully agree to the content of  the agreement.
Thirdly, the plastic packaging industry argued that the EU level had lower recycling 
targets (22.5 %), and that there was no reason for Norway to have stricter targets than 
the competing countries. The industry, however, accepted the 30 % recycling target if  the 
agreement also stated that the targets should be subject to ‘socio-economically’ evaluation 
during the period of  the agreement. This was due to the fact that the industry is now 
more experienced with costs, operational arrangement and technological possibilities, 
and that the industry itself  was in position to deﬁne what was an socio-economic 
optimal level of  recycling  (Skilhagen 2003). Thus, in 1995 the targets were accepted as 
the socio-economic optimal level, while in 2003, the targets were not considered to be 
absolute as the socio-economic optimal level might vary. In this sense it can be argued 
that the industry speculate in not achieving the targets, without taking the risk of  being 
exposed to the whip.
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This tendency was also reﬂected in the objectives and the governing principles agreed 
upon by the Plastretur Board. Prior to 2003, the main objective was to reach the targets 
in the covenant, while from 2003 onwards the main objective was to ‘achieve the 
recycling objectives of  the Board. The purpose of  the covenant shall be the basis for 
deciding annual targets in combination with how to reach the targets’ (Plastretur 2003b). 
Apparently, the Board found it legitimate to decide their targets themselves based on the 
purpose of  the covenant to ‘ﬁnd socio-economic optimal solutions’.
This new interpretation of  the covenant indicates that the business aspects of  this 
EPR scheme have become more dominating. However, already from the start in 1995, 
the owners of  Plastretur had particularly interests in how the strategies and subsidies 
from Plastretur were formulated. For instance, the major plastic packaging producer in 
Norway (Norfolier) owns Folldal Gjenvinning and use recycled material from Folldal in 
its production of  plastic bags and garbage bags. The plastic packaging producers have 
since 1995 experienced an increasingly competition, particularly from foreign companies 
(Løvold 2003). This competition is particularly visible in retail segment and grocery trade 
where for instance 700 million plastic bags are sold annually. Norfolier is necessarily 
interested in that subsidies to Folldal Gjenvinning are as high as possible or that long-
term contracts can create predictable conditions for the supply of  recycled material 
to their own production. In this sense, it can be argued that through this recycling 
system, the plastic industry is paid by others (packers and ﬁllers and consequently the 
consumers) since the system provides cheaper raw material to their productions, making 
this a major contribution to their survival in the tough competition.
Another example is the supermarket chains that are large waste generators and, as 
mentioned above, argue for getting paid as much as possible for their plastic packaging 
waste. They had 1/3 of  the shares in Plastretur and was thus in the position to inﬂuence 
the guiding principles for payment to waste generators. The intolerable situation 
occurred that the administration in Plastretur argued against its owners, while the Board 
was somewhat paralysed, unable to take a position. The situation turned out even more 
complex when the supermarket chains argued heavily for a fusion between all the various 
PROs for packaging materials. The packers and ﬁllers joint this position after some time 
as the supermarket chains, after all, were their main customers. A basic principle when 
establishing a PRO for each material was, however, to avoid disturbing the competition 
between these materials. 
That said, the convenience chain was the only actor involved in all the other material 
companies (except the PRO for glass) and argued therefore for making the EPR schemes 
more effective through a fusion. During the following process there was no arguments 
saying that a fusion would make it easier to reach the targets, but rather rhetoric 
arguments such as ‘it is now time to move on’ (Leiro 2003), and threats to establish their 
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own PRO if  the packaging producers did not agree to this solution. The next move was 
that the supermarket chains carried out changes in the articles of  association in Norsk 
Returkartong, the PRO for beverage carton, stating that this company now were allowed 
to treat plastic packaging as well. Although Norsk Returkartong was considerably smaller 
than Plastretur when it comes to ﬁnancial turnover, material ﬂows and complexity, the 
plastic packaging producers were now squeezed against the wall. However, in order to 
agree upon a fusion, and through this loosing its decisive role in the new company, they 
got a long-term contract for Folldal Gjenvinning securing their existence for ﬁve more 
years. Part of  the deal was, however, not to merge Plastretur and Norsk Gjenvinning, 
but to outsource all the operative activities, including all employees, to a new PRO, 
Emballasjeretur.
These two examples illustrate the trend that can be observed throughout the period 
from 1995 – 2005. The pendulum has gone form the voluntary communal work for 
reaching the targets set in the covenant, towards employing these EPR schemes as part 
of  business strategies for being better prepared for competition. There was few, if  any, 
arguments presented during the merging process that convincingly showed that this 
would be beneﬁcial for reaching the targets.
(Endnotes)
1 From 2005, there is online registration making the system considerably more efﬁcient (Skjervold 2005)
2 We will here employ four main product groups; i) ﬁlm (‘soft’ ﬁlm normally of  low density polyethylene 
(LDPE) or polypropylene (PP)), ii) rigid plastic packaging (‘hard’ bottles and cans of  high density polyethylene 
(HDPE), polystyrene (PS) or PP), iii) PP-bags (woven bags of  PP particularly in use in agriculture and 
aquaculture for feed and fertiliser) and iv) reusable plastic packaging (usually like rigid plastic packaging). The 
reason for making a distinction between rigid plastic packaging and reusable plastic packaging is threefold. 
Firstly, reusables have life time longer than one year, contrary to rigid (and ﬁlm and PP-bags) plastic packaging 
that is reckoned here to have a lifetime of  less than one year, with, hence, no accumulation. Secondly, reusable 
plastic packaging is included in the ofﬁcial, obtained results for material recycling, but is not subject to any 
ﬁnancial support (subsidy) from Plastretur. Finally, reusable plastic packaging is a separate category in Plastretur’s 
statistics and is therefore convenient to treat as a separate fraction. 
3 Other signiﬁcant products are fertilisers used on the crops land and food for animals is usually packed 
in bags of  pp. Moreover, cultivating ﬂowers and vegetables are also within the agricultural sector, and ﬁnally, 
solar collector ﬁlm used for protecting particular vegetables on the ﬁeld, e.g. strawberries, turnips cabbage and 
cabbage heads, are also included in the product spectrum for agriculture that Plastretur is responsible for.
4 First, the efﬁciency of  how well the waste generator actually is sorting in various fractions are important, 
high efﬁciency here means that a high fraction of  plastic packaging is sorted for material recycling, without 
taking into account whether this fraction contains various products (e.g. ﬁlm, rigid, PP-bags or reusables) 
or polymers (e.g. LDPE, HDPE, PP or PS) that have to be separated later on in order to be recycled. This 
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8. EPR ON PLASTIC PACKAGING IN NORWAY – COMPANY 
LEVEL
In Chapter 7 we presented the EPR system for plastic packaging with a main focus 
on Plastretur as the key organisation. Obviously, the covenant has proven successful 
in increasing the recycling level for plastic packaging. These results are, however, not 
only dependent on how well Plastretur performs, but also to a large extent how well the 
direct actors within the plastic packaging system are able to contribute to the recycling 
results. How powerful is the covenant to stimulate direct actors to act according to 
the intentions in the covenant? More concrete, which incentives does EPR provide to 
initiate change processes in ﬁrst generation upstream companies, in second generation 
upstream companies and in downstream companies in the waste management system? 
How does this contribute to i) increase the recycling, ii) optimise the packaging and 
iii) inﬂuence the overall environmental performance in the company, also related to 
non-packaging issues? The focus in this chapter will be on explaining the efﬁciencies 
accounted for in Chapter 7, by looking at underlying interests and driving forces for 
technological and organisational change and innovation. 
Employing the networks of  actor’s perspective, we will provide insight into the various 
actors, their interests and driving forces and how their interactions constitute the actual 
outcome we observed in Chapter 7.
8.1 Technological change and innovation (TCI) – a survey in the 
plastic packaging sector
One important aspect of  the industrial implementation is related to the actual changes 
in the products of  the companies. This is the core of  the companies’ business and the 
disaggregated fundament for the observed trends on a sector and society level. Hence, 
studying technological change and innovation on company level is imperative when 
analysing the industrial implementation of  EPR. Moreover, it is important to discuss the 
factors inﬂuencing technological change and innovation (TCI) in companies in order to 
understand the mechanisms (Fagerberg 2004).
To gather statistical knowledge on these issues, we have carried out a web-based survey 
among these companies. The survey was primarily developed to get statistical evidence 
on the inﬂuence of  the covenants on TCI. As a secondary aim, the survey should show 
the main driving forces for the observed development in TCI. For more information, 
see appendix D for details about the questions and answers. 
This survey was part of  another study on TCI in the plastic packaging industry and electric 
and electronic industries in Norway (Røine and Lee 2006). The anonymous, web-based 
survey was sent to 431 people in 291 Norwegian companies within the plastic packaging 
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efﬁ ciency is depending on how easy it is to source separate at the actual place where the plastic packaging waste 
is generated or the ‘infrastructure’ at the site where the waste is collected by the waste management company, 
for instance outside single shops, shopping centres or at the sites for bring systems in households. Second, the 
efﬁ ciency of  ‘collection’ also depends on what the waste management company actually do when they collect 
the fractions: Are these mixed or are they kept separated when transported to the sorting and pre-treatment site. 
However, fractions can obviously be transported together without actually being mixed which make them still 
‘sorted for material recycling’, and, hence, the efﬁ ciency is not reduced due to this jointly collection.
5 The waste management company (WMC) has usually three options for dealing with the fraction meant for 
material recycling; i) sending it directly to material recycling after baling (no sorting), ii) no sorting at WMC site 
but sending it directly to a more specialised sorting plant or iii) sorting at their own sites. The ﬁ rst option gives 
an efﬁ ciency of  nearly 1 since no activity, and consequently no loss of  material, is happening. However, there 
might be weight differences between inﬂ ows and outﬂ ows due to water run-off, but this will also inﬂ uence the 
size of  the inﬂ ow and no change in the amount of  plastic packaging is the consequence. The efﬁ ciencies for the 
two latter options depend on the quality of  the inﬂ ows with respect to diversity of  qualities, on the degree of  
dirt and unwanted items and qualities and on the level of  advanced sorting technology.
6 Some waste management companies sort in the residual waste, but only to get hold of  bigger items or larger 
fractions. However, this is regarded as marginal here. We therefore just measure the inﬂ ows of  plastic packaging 
collected for material recycling.
7 This is an average, pure fractions like plant cases are close to 1.0 in efﬁ ciency, while blended fractions are 
around 0.5.
8 These numbers include feedstock recycling, and we have calculated the distribution between rigid plastics 
and ﬁ lm based on the denominators (64 % ﬁ lm and 36 % rigid). If  not including the feedstock recycling the 
recycling ratios for ﬁ lm and rigid plastics from household would have been 2.5 % and 1.4 %, respectively.
9 100 tons to feedstock recycling is included| in the ﬁ lm fraction.
10 From 1 January 2006 Materialretur change name to “Grønt Punkt Norge” [Green Dot Norway].
11 See http://www.plastretur.no/research-development.html for more information on the research and 
development activities that have been carried out.
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chain with 95 respondents, providing an answering rate of  32.6 % (companies) and 22.0 
% (people). However, the e-mail addresses for 314 of  those receiving the survey were 
provided by The Norwegian Packaging Association (DNE) and it is likely that some of  
these have their main focus on non-plastics packaging issues, making these irrelevant 
for the survey and we could therefore not expect replies from them. Moreover, 21 
of  the 431 did not receive the message due to incorrect e-mail addresses. Taking into 
account that one company generally does not provide more than one answer, we might 
assume an answering ratio of  close to 40 %. Out of  95 responses, 93 were valid, and 
the majority of  replies were from upstream actors compared to downstream actors, 60.2 
% (N=56) and 37.6 % (N=35), respectively. The remaining 2 valid replies were from 
a research institute and a PRO and were held outside the statistical analysis because 
they are not direct actors, but are included to deﬁ ne the total number of  respondents 
(N=93). The receivers of  the survey were primarily contact personnel for the EPR 
system on plastic packaging (downstream) and for packaging issues (upstream). Table 
8.1 shows the distribution between the various actors.
Table 8.1 Distribution of  respondents to the survey
Aggregating Table 8.1 into upstream and downstream categories1, we end up as shown 
in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2 Categorisation of  upstream and downstream responding companies to the survey
15 16,1
26 28,0
8 8,6
2 2,2
26 28,0
5 5,4
4 4,3
7 7,5
93 100,0
A Norwegian producer og plastics or plastic packaging
A Norwegian user of plastic packaging (packer&filler)
A wholesaler or retailer in Norwegian tertiary sector
A industrial organisation or PRO
A waste management company
A sorting or waste treatment company
A recycler company
An importer of plastic packaging
Total
Frequency Percent
56 60,2
35 37,6
2 2,2
93 100,0
upstream
downstream
other
Total
Frequency Percent
154
Chapter 8
Technically, we asked three types of  questions. Firstly, a multiple choice question from 
which only one answer could be ticked. Secondly, a multiple choice question from which 
one or more answers could be chosen. Finally, the survey included open questions where 
the respondents could freely formulate the answers. 
8.1.1 Results
While the complete results from the survey are found in Appendix D, we will here 
highlight the main outcomes. The overall picture is whether technological changes have 
been carried out or not. Table 8.3 below shows a difference between upstream and 
downstream companies in this respect. 75.0 % of  the upstream companies and 48.6 % 
of  the downstream companies have conducted technological changes the last 10 years 
that have reduced the environmental impact, summarising to 64.5 % in total.
Table 8.3 Have you conducted changes in plastic packaging or related processes during the past 10 years 
that have reduced environmental impact?
Equally fundamental is the role of  environmental aspects when carrying out these 
changes. Table 8.4 below illustrates this, indicating that environmental issues have been 
important for the respondents, although relatively more important for the downstream 
companies than for those upstream. This difference may be explained by how these 
companies methodologically interpret the question. A downstream company working 
with the actual ﬂows of  plastic packaging waste can state that the process improvements 
(efﬁciency) directly provide environmental gains, while product development upstream 
to a greater extent involves other arguments such as consumer functionality and product 
protection. Environmental aspects might be considered important by the respondents 
if  the changes involve a win-win situation. Moreover, it might be that the environmental 
aspects have been considered, but were not powerful enough in contributing to the 
actual solution selected.
We ﬁnd that 38.1 % of  those upstream companies (75 %, ref  Table 8.3) answer that 
they have conducted changes in plastic packaging or related processes during the past 
10 years consider environmental issues to have been very important when making the 
,0% 75,0% 25,0%
5,7% 48,6% 45,7%
2,2% 64,5% 33,3%
upstream
downstream
Total
Not answered Yes No
Have you conducted changes in plastic packaging
or related processes last 10 years?
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changes. 54.8 % state that it has been ‘somewhat important, but not among the most 
important ones’. The corresponding numbers for downstream companies are 64.7 % 
and 35.3 %. Thus, more upstream than downstream companies have carried out changes, 
but the environmental argument seems more important for the latter. In total, of  those 
answering that they have conducted technological changes in the past 10 years that have 
reduced the environmental impact, 46.7 % say that ‘environmental issues have been very 
important’ when making the changes, while 48.3 % said that ‘environmental issues had 
been somewhat important’ when making changes. Only 5 % argued that environmental 
issues were not important. 
Table 8.4 Have environmental issues been important when carrying out technological changes?
Turning to the type of  changes, Table 8.5 demonstrates the distribution of  answers. 
In general, there are more changes upstream than downstream. The most important 
changes downstream are ‘increased suitability for material recycling’ (28.6%), followed 
by ‘reduced waste generation in production phase’ (17.1%). Interestingly, 26.8 % of  
the upstream companies denote that they have increased the suitability for material 
recycling. 
Table 8.5 Type of  changes
Explanations for this might be several and some are pointed out in the answers to the 
survey. First, respondents upstream might consider paying the licence fee as increasing 
the suitability for material recycling. Second, reducing the material consumption 
38,1% 54,8% 7,1%
64,7% 35,3% ,0%
46,7% 48,3% 5,0%
upstream
downstream
Total
Yes, very
important
Somewhat important, not among the
most important ones No, not important
Have environmental issues been important when carrying out technological changes
[%] upstream downstream total
Reduced consumption of materials 62,5 2,9 38,7
Elimination of toxic substances 39,3 0,0 23,7
Substitution of substances 21,4 8,6 16,1
Reduced energy consumption in production phase 17,9 2,9 11,8
Reduced waste generation in production phase 39,3 17,1 30,1
Changed functionality 17,9 2,9 11,8
Increased suitability for material recycling 26,8 28,6 26,9
Generally increased efficiency in the processes 28,6 8,6 21,5
Other changes 7,1 11,4 8,6
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(dematerialisation) might also be a part of  this. Third, some argue that increasing 
the homogeneity of  the packaging is an example of  increased suitability for material 
recycling. Forth, internal source separation is stated as contributing to increased 
suitability for material recycling. Thus, without making it technologically easier to 
material recycle, respondents can argue that they contribute to increased suitability for 
material recycling.
The most important changes for the upstream companies are related to ‘reduced 
consumption of  materials’ (62.5%), ‘elimination of  toxic substances’ (39.3%) and 
‘reduced waste generation in production’ (39.3%). Interestingly, out of  the 75 % upstream 
companies saying they have conducted technological changes the last 10 years, 92.5 % 
state that they contribute to reducing the amount of  waste. Hence, most of  those making 
changes, contribute to dematerialisation. For the upstream companies, eliminating toxic 
substances has also been important (39.3%), although this is not directly a part of  the 
covenant. In order to display the inﬂ uence of  EPR polices on the technological changes, 
Table 8.6 shows that ‘continuous changes on several types of  plastic packaging’ are 
dominant both for upstream and downstream companies. 
Table 8.6 Frequency of  the changes
More than 60 % of  the upstream companies carry out continuous changes on their 
product. An obvious explanation for this is that more than 27 % of  the upstream 
companies are ‘producers of  plastic packaging’, and these will necessarily carry out 
continuous changes. Moreover, additionally 46 % of  the upstream companies are packers 
and ﬁ llers and these are also dependent on developing the packaging continuously 
according to costumer requirements (survey).
Another aspect of  these changes is when they are carried out. Table 8.7 shows clearly 
that for upstream companies, the changes happen all the time, although with a peak 
in 1998 – 2000. This correlates with the implementation of  EPR. In general we see 
that upstream companies are, to a larger extent than downstream companies, making 
continuous changes. As for downstream companies, the changes seem to be rather 
evenly distributed from 1998 on. 
5,4% 8,9% 60,7% 3,6%
14,3% ,0% 20,0% 2,9%
8,6% 5,4% 45,2% 3,2%
upstream
downstream
Total
Once on several
types of plastic
packaging
Once on one
type of plastic
packaging
Continuous changes
on several types of
plastic packaging
Continuous changes
on one type of plastic
packaging
What is the frequency of the changes?
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Table 8.7 Timing of  the changes
Turning to the main drivers for these trends, Table 8.8 presents the key results. Overall, 
‘cost reductions’ (49.5%) and ‘environmental consciousness in the company’ (41.9%), 
as well as ‘the covenant on plastic packaging’ (28.0%) are those alternatives answered by 
most respondents.
Table 8.8 Drivers for observed changes
‘Cost reduction’ is the most important factor upstream (60.7 %), followed by internal 
environmental consciousness (44.6 %), pressure from market (37.5 %) and the covenant 
(32.1 %). In addition, a number of  respondents wrote in the open questions that 
‘consumer functionality’ and ‘product attractiveness’ are two signiﬁcant drivers for 
changing the packaging. Although these can be placed under the categories ‘pressure 
from market’ or ‘pressure from competitors and suppliers’, this illustrates an important 
point, namely the fundamental role of  packaging to both protect the main product and 
to sell the product. These remain the main drivers for change. One respondent wrote:
“It is not pressure from the authorities that constitute the greatest driving force in these 
questions. I have worked in various companies, and will argue that it is the determined 
willingness to orient towards optimal solutions, including the environmental aspect, that 
continuously contributes to the choice of  materials”.
However, this questionnaire does not discover how strong the drivers for change 
actually are. The interviews and in particular company studies are to reveal this. Table 
8.8 indicates two main drivers downstream; cost reduction (34.3 %) and environmental 
[%] upstream downstream total
The coventant on plastic packaging 32,1 20,0 28,0
Other Norwegian environmental regulations 8,9 5,7 7,5
Environmental regulations in EU 10,7 5,7 9,7
Other Norwegian 'non-environmental' regulations 10,7 0,0 6,5
Cost reductions 60,7 34,3 49,5
Pressure from market 37,5 8,6 25,8
Pressure from competitors and suppliers 23,2 17,1 20,4
Environmental consciousness in the company 44,6 40,0 41,9
Pressure from media, NGOs 7,1 8,6 7,5
Other contributing factors 3,6 2,9 3,2
3,6% 17,9% 7,1% 46,4% 5,4%
,0% 14,3% 17,1% 11,4% 5,7%
2,2% 16,1% 10,8% 33,3% 5,4%
upstream
downstream
Total
1995 - 1997 1998 - 2000 2001 - 2003 All the time Not able to specifiy
When were these changes in general carried out?
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consciousness in the company (40.0%), supporting the upstream results that these are 
the major drivers.
According to these results, the covenant has obviously had an inﬂuence on the observed 
changes, on 32.1 % of  the upstream companies and 20.0 % of  the downstream 
companies. 28.6 % of  the upstream companies have both reported that they have 
carried out changes in the last 10 years and that the covenant was a driver for this. The 
difference between the covenant on the one hand and the other policy measures on the 
other is however striking, and this might be explained by the explicitly stated focus on 
the covenant in this survey. Indeed, R&D support, tax levels and other policy measures 
have inﬂuence on the degree of  technological change as well. 
There are basically two main barriers for carrying out technological changes as displayed 
above. Firstly, the cost savings are too low to be economically beneﬁcial. Secondly, the 
demands for environmentally friendly packaging from costumers are generally weak, 
making it an uneconomic argument to change packaging according for these reasons. 
Table 8.9 illustrates this.
Table 8.9 What were the main reasons why changes were not carried out?
Several respondents argue in their written answers that ‘competing interests’ when 
developing packaging is preventing the changes that, ideally, should have been carried 
out if  the intentions in the covenant had been completed. This will be a key point to 
investigate further in the particular case studies later in this chapter.
We also asked what would be decisive factors for the respondents to make environmentally 
friendly changes in the future, see Table 8.10. Overall, increased pressure from customers 
is considered to be the key driver for this, particularly for upstream companies. Still on 
the market side; increased demands for cost reductions are also important, while on the 
regulatory side, stricter environmental regulations in both EU and Norway will stimulate 
changes. Interestingly, only 4.3 % believe non-environmental regulations to be signiﬁcant 
for carrying out changes. This can be interpreted in at least two directions. First, there 
is a need for stricter, mandatory measures for the industry to develop environmentally 
friendly solutions, and consequently that voluntary measures are too weak to do so. 
[%] upstream downstream total
Too high development costs 14,3 2,9 9,7
Too low cost savings 21,4 20 20,4
Lack of incentives from the covenant 3,6 11,4 6,5
Lack of incentives from other EU and Norwegian regulations 5,4 5,7 5,4
Lack of demand for env friendly packaging 28,6 17,1 24,7
All others in the sector produce the same making no difference 12,5 5,7 10,8
Other factors preventing changes 21,4 20 20,4
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Second, the respondents do not grasp the effects non-environmental policies might 
have on their actual environmental performance.
Table 8.10 What will be decisive factors for your company to make environmentally friendly changes 
in the future?
8.1.2 Discussion
Given the results from the survey, we will now look further into the various companies 
to ﬁnd support for our preliminary conclusions.
8.1.2.1 Methodology
The respondents say what they believe are the most important factors. Ticking an 
alternative indicates that a factor has been inﬂuential, but not how strong it has been and 
the relation to the others. Thus, all might have ticked ‘the covenant’, but no one might 
ﬁnd it the most signiﬁcant factor. Therefore, interviews must be carried out to discover 
the strength of  these drivers.
The questions on changes and environmental importance (e.g. Table 8.8) can be 
understood in various ways. Firstly, environmental issues can be considered as an 
initiating factor for making changes. Secondly, environmental issues might have been 
considered during the innovation process, but not necessarily with signiﬁcant impact on 
the end result. Finally, the question can be understood as that environmental issues had 
a major inﬂuence on the end-result, for instance that the most environmentally friendly 
solution was selected, although it was somewhat more expensive or did not provide 
sufﬁcient attractiveness to the consumer. Another methodological aspect is what type 
of  environmental issues are regarded as important. For instance, reducing the amount 
of  waste can easily be argued to represent an even stronger economic driving force 
[%] upstream downstream total
Changes in the covenant 19,6 25,7 21,5
Stricter Norwegian environmental regulations 37,5 25,7 32,3
Stricter EU environmental regulations 33,9 20,0 28,0
Stricter non-environmental regulations in EU/Norway 3,6 5,7 4,3
Increased pressure from costumers 80,4 31,4 60,2
Increased demand on cost reductions 35,7 48,6 39,8
Increased pressure from competitors and/or suppliers 26,8 17,1 22,6
Increased environmental consciousness within the company 35,7 20,0 29,0
Increased pressure from NGOs and media 16,1 17,1 16,1
Increased knowledge on environmental impacts & solutions 35,7 17,1 28,0
Other factors 10,7 11,4 11,8
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than elimination of  substances actually does. Low response on the question concerning 
barriers might indicate that they do not have a conscious picture of  these factors or 
that the pre-deﬁned answering options provided in the survey did not cover the actual 
response needs. This is supported by the fact that more than 20 % have marked for 
‘other factors’. 
8.1.2.2 Empirical results
The written comments show some interesting aspects. One of  these is related to the 
fact that we did not obviously cover the broader product development and the primary 
function of  the packaging – to protect the main product and to make it more attractive 
to the consumer. Hence, when consumers are buying products, they should ﬁnd these 
attractive and interesting, and the degree of  environmental friendliness, particularly 
related to recyclability, is primarily not relevant. However, if  it is discovered that 
the product is unnecessarily over-packed or that the packaging in other ways is not 
optimised, the opinion might turn away from the product. That said, it might seem that 
the covenant has some inﬂuence on the changes carried out. 32.1 % of  the upstream 
companies state the importance of  this.
The upstream companies constitute a particularly important group of  actors as they are 
those actually being responsible for meeting the targets in the covenant. Theoretically, 
EPR may inﬂuence upstream companies in several ways. First, the covenants invite them 
to take responsibility by paying the licence fee and by being involved in the return systems. 
Second, EPR might be an incentive for optimising the packaging solutions along various 
dimensions; within its own production and processes, in relation to the consumers and 
in relation to the entire life cycle including design for recyclability. Finally, EPR might 
inﬂuence companies to think in an industrial ecology direction also on other non-
packaging ‘environmental’ issues such as energy, transport, waste generation, emissions 
to water and air from production, as well as organisational changes. By identifying the 
internal change mechanisms on these issues we are to a larger extent able to analyse the 
signiﬁcance of  EPR to the observed changes.
More than 1800 companies pay licence fee to Materialretur for their use of  plastic 
packaging. To grasp the underlying mechanisms and driving forces for the signiﬁcance 
of  EPR to these companies, a number of  structured interviews have been carried out, 
including Tine Norske Meierier, Lilleborg, Brødrene Sunde, Baca, Toro, Friele, Rosenlew 
and Stenqvist. Tine Norske Meierier is subject to a thorough study, while the other 
companies are employed as controlling cases for the main TINE-case.
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8.2 TINE Meieriene/ TINE Norske Meierier
Tine Norske Meierier BA (Tine), a dairy cooperative, is by far the biggest Norwegian food 
production company. Prior to April 2002, the dairy cooperative in Norway consisted of  
10 independent dairy companies, called Tine Meieriene (TM), with altogether more than 
60 dairy processing plants and a coordinating, sales and marketing company, called Tine 
Norske Meierier, 100 % owned by the 10 dairy companies. The TMs were owned by 
more than 20,000 milk-producing small-unit farmers in Norway. The role of  the dairies 
was, and still is, to collect and process the milk into a wide range of  products, while 
Tine Norske Meierier coordinates and supervises these dairies and carry out product 
and process development, in addition to sales activities and marketing campaigns. The 
annual turnover in 2001 was 10.5 billion NOK and there were 4,378 employees in the 
10 diary companies and 681 in Tine Norske Meierier. Appendix E provides some key 
ﬁgures about the organisation2. Moreover, the sources of  information to this chapter is 
primarily taken from annual reports (Tine 1996a – 2005a), environmental annual reports 
(Tine 1996b – 2005b) as well as from interviews with key personnel, see Appendix B.
Following the material ﬂow approach identical to the previous chapters, Figure 8.1 
schematically provides the raw material inputs, utilities, product outputs and emissions 
related to Tine. 
Figure 8.1 A schematic material ﬂow approach to Tine Meieriene and Tine Norske Meierier
We will primarily look at packaging as the key utility and will analyse how efforts to 
incorporate EPR have been realised in the entire organisation. The most important 
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raw material is milk, having in 2004 a throughput of  1.47 billion litres of  cow milk and 
20.0 million litres of  goat milk, producing main groups of  dairy products like milk, 
cheese, yoghurt and butter. The throughput has been reduced every year for the last 10 
years. The market share of  Tine for these products in Norway are generally very high 
(between 85 % and 98 % in 2000), although there now is a decreasing trend for some 
products due to increased competition. The large wholesalers and retailers in grocery 
in Norway are the major customer of  Tine, in addition to institutional households, 
typical service companies such as hotels, airlines and restaurants as well as to other food 
industry companies3.
The annual indexed costs have been rather stable at around 5 billion NOK.4 For instance, 
in 2000, the distribution of  costs was: personnel (30.9 %), packaging (24.2 %), transport 
(16.5 %), maintenance (6.8 %), administration (6.4 %), commercials (5.1 %), depreciation 
(7.3 %) and energy (2.8 %). Packaging represents a major cost for Tine, approximately 
1.3 billion NOK in 2000, accounting for around 25 % of  the total costs in the period 
1996 - 2004. The main packaging materials are liquid carton (63 %), cardboard (20 %) 
and plastics (15 %), measured on a weight basis. 
Up until the mid-90’s, Tine had in reality monopoly on producing and receiving raw 
milk and on producing dairy products. Due to EU competition laws, to negotiations in 
GATT/WTO and a general trend of  increased industrial competition, other Norwegian 
companies were from 01.01 1997 allowed to produce dairy products, and Tine as a 
market regulator had to supply these and other companies in the food sector with raw 
milk based on certain rules5. Moreover, during the 90’s Tine faced the challenge of  
decreasing milk consumption in Norway, and one declared objective of  Tine has been 
to reduce the rate of  decrease of  the consumption. Another trend is that 90 % of  
the processing plants, mainly the small ones, have been shut down during the last 20 
years, resulting in increased centralisation and longer transportation distances (Johansen 
2001a). In addition, Tine is, as is the majority of  the companies in the food industry 
in Norway, protected by high tariff  rates on imported food6. All these elements made 
Tine realise that the cooperative was not organised in an optimal way to meet these new 
challenges. Consequently, Tine was reorganised into a traditional industrial group in 
2002. 
In our context, the key interest is the development in the packaging solutions and how 
EPR schemes have inﬂuenced this development. Below we will present results on this.
8.2.1 Packaging consumption and intensity
Being an upstream company, Tine can contribute to the targets in the covenant through 
their key activities in (at least) three ways: i) reduce packaging consumption (dematerialise), 
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ii) increase own source separation of  solid waste generation, iii) design for recycling. 
In addition to this, they can contribute by paying licence fees to the PROs. Table 2 in 
Appendix E illustrates some key environmental indicators for Tine 1995 – 2004.
Figure 8.2 Packaging consumption in Tine Norske Meierier 1995 – 2004. ‘Beverage carton’ and 
‘total’ is shown on the secondary y-axis (on the right hand side).
Figure 8.2 shows the development of  key indicators related to packaging consumption in 
the period 1995 – 2004. This is the input of  packaging as a utility for bringing products 
onto the market, see Figure 8.1. 
The total use of  packaging was reduced by 18.0 % from 1995 to 2001, while from 
1996 to 2004 the total packaging consumption has increased by 0.91 %. From 2001 to 
2004 the packaging consumption increased by 6.2 %. The total use of  packaging is at 
the lowest level in 1999 and 2000. As for plastic packaging, the consumption seems to 
follow a growth trend, increasing by 29 % in 1995 – 2001 (~4 % annually), by 44.8 % 
in 1996 – 2004 (~5% annually), and by 10 % in 2001 – 2004 (~2.5% annually). Hence, 
the growth in plastic packaging consumption has been reduced during the last years, 
but the total consumption is still increasing. The big jump from 1999 to 2000 is mainly 
because 395 tons of  transport packaging was included in the 2000 number, but not for 
the previous years (Eide 2001). This, in addition to more precise measuring methods, 
makes the numbers from recent years more reliable than those from earlier.
Taking 1996 as the starting point, the fraction of  plastic packaging consumption to total 
packaging consumption has developed from 10.7 % to 15.3 % in 2004. This indicates a 
transmaterialisation towards plastics or a change in product segments. The liquid cartons 
constitute the largest packaging fraction, being 66.4% in 1996 and 60.4% in 2004. 
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Figure 8.3 Overall packaging intensity for TINE. Indexed for inﬂation with 2004 as reference point
The inﬂation-adjusted indicator on packaging intensity is shown in Figure 8.3 and 
indicates a slightly reduction from 2.33 in 1995 to 1.87 in 1998 and up to 2.28 in 2004. 
This is a reduction of  2.15 % from 1995 – 2004, of  19.7 % from 1995 – 1998, but 
an increase of  21.9 % from 1998 - 2004. In the period 2000 – 2004, the packaging 
intensity rose by 3.63 %. However, the 1995-number is methodological unreliable and 
most probably too high (Eide 2005), and the packaging intensity during the period 1996 
– 2004 shows an increase by 12.3 %.
Figure 8.4 Packaging intensity for plastics, cardboard and beverage cartons. Indexed 2004
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Figure 8.4 disaggregates the overall packaging intensity into the various materials. As far 
as the beverage cartons are concerned, they show a relatively stable trend during 1996 
– 2004, but with a drop in 1998 – 1999. As for plastic packaging, the packaging intensity 
has increase more or less over the entire period, from 0.22 in 1996 to 0.35 in 2004. 
The drop in packaging intensity in 2004 is mainly due to the relatively high increased 
turnover that year. 
Figure 8.5 Packaging intensity based on packaging consumption and input of  raw milk for selected 
materials. ‘Beverage carton’ and ‘Total’ relate to the secondary y-axis (right)
Another way of  expressing the packaging intensity is to compare the packaging 
consumption in relation to input of  raw milk and output of  products on weight basis. 
This indicator is not, in general, dependent on the price levels and other economic 
factors, and might therefore, to a greater extent, express the technological development 
than the packaging intensities in Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4. The packaging consumption 
in relation to input of  raw milk is given in Figure 8.5, while the packaging consumption 
in relation to output of  products is displayed in Figure 8.6.
We observe the same developing trend over the period 1995 - 2004, namely that more 
plastic packaging is employed per input of  raw material and output of  products, rising 
from 1.60 in 1996 to 2.68 in 2004. The same applies to cardboard, while for beverage 
cartons the packaging intensity was at the lowest level in 1999 and 2000 and since then 
it has increased again. 
Moreover, the packaging intensity based on output of  products shows the same trend 
as the packaging intensity based in input of  raw material.
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Figure 8.6 Packaging intensity based on packaging consumption and output of  products for selected 
materials. ‘Beverage carton’ and ‘Total’ relate to the secondary y-axis (right)
Turning to the actual costs in order to comply with the covenant, we see from Figure 8.7 
that the total licence fee costs (around 24 million NOK in total) is declining in relation 
to total packaging costs, from 2.2 in 1996 to below 1.5 in 2004. 
Figure 8.7 Relative packaging licence fees – in total and for plastics
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Thus, the relative importance of  the licence fee to total packaging costs has been 
reduced. The total licence fee is just below 0.5 % of  total costs. Moreover, the plastic 
packaging costs are pending around 6 million NOK, being close to 0.40 % of  total 
packaging costs. For comparison, the packaging costs of  total costs have during this 
period been approximately 24 % on average. The modest increase in plastic packaging 
costs from 1999 to 2000 can be explained by purchase of  reusable packaging and updated 
measurement methodology (Solgaard 2005)
8.2.2 Analysis
In order to understand the trends observed above, we now move into the box “Tine 
Meieriene and Tine Norske Meierier” in Figure 8.1. We will start by seeking explanations 
for the trends by looking into particular examples of  packaging changes7. These changes 
are the outcome of  internal processes within Tine. The role of  EPR as one potentially 
contributing factor will be discussed in relation to other factors suggested.
8.2.2.1 Packaging improvements and optimisation
Packaging improvements and optimisation are at the core of  the covenants8. This 
analysis will distinguish between two different types of  packaging improvements and 
optimisations; i) improvements in existing products and ii) packaging optimisation in 
new product development projects. In Table 8.11 the most important packaging reducing 
efforts during the years 1995 – 1999 are listed.
Table 8.11 Some packaging reducing efforts
Year Efforts Reduction [tons/yr] Material
1996 Removal of  bottom plate in goat cheese 33 Metal
1996 Change in lid in yoghurt-cup 39 Plastics
1997 Reduction in beverage carton 425 Beverage carton
1997 Removal of  outer cover in 4-pack milk 392 Cardboard
1997 Weight reduction in 175 ml yoghurt 10 Plastics
1997 Weight reduction in lid of  yoghurt 26 Several
1998 Reusable case for maturing of  cheese 1093 Cardboard/
plastics
1999 New yoghurt-packaging 87 Plastics
Total 2085
As seen from Figure 8.2, the packaging reductions were approximately 2000 tons from 
1997 to 1999, and Table 8.11 explains how this has occurred. Our informants in Tine 
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brought up four areas where substantial packaging reducing efforts have been carried 
out, as indicated in Table 8.11: i) Various changes to the yoghurt packaging, i) reusable 
case for maturing of  cheese, ii) removal of  outer cover in 4-pack milk and iv) reduction 
in beverage carton. The two ﬁrst examples are related to plastic packaging, and we will 
discuss below how these changes came around. 
The packaging of  different types and sizes of  yoghurt has gone through several 
improvement steps during the last ten years, with a major 87 tons a year reduction in 
1999 (Tine 2000b). This packaging has changed considerably from previously being a 
complex packaging solution with a number of  different materials, into a simple mono-
material packaging of  plastics only. This reduced the purchase costs considerably as well 
as reduced transportation costs due to lighter packaging and formation of  the packaging 
during the ﬁlling process. This required investments of  30 million NOK. The yoghurt 
example resulted in both de- and transmaterialisation and a packaging solution that was 
obviously easier to recycle, but was the covenant the driver for this?
The improvements on the yoghurt packaging started in the early ‘90s when Tine 
experienced an increasing pressure from environmental NGOs and consumers 
(individuals/schools) concerning the ‘God Morgen’-yoghurt. These raised important 
environmental questions, particularly the lack of  return systems for beverage cartons, 
and the use of  too much packaging in the ‘God Morgen’ yoghurt. Tine was at a loss 
for good answers, and decided in 1992 to start studies based on life cycle assessment 
(LCA). This created an extended collaboration between Tine and its packaging suppliers, 
to gather better knowledge of  the environmental performance of  their products, and 
particularly the packaging (Solgaard 2001). These LCAs were very important to how 
Tine reacted to the pressure from the market. Thus, this example shows that external 
pressure from NGOs and consumers were major factors for the packaging changes in 
‘God Morgen’-yoghurt. During the interviews, everyone brought up this as the most 
representative example of  major packaging improvements9.
The reusable maturation cases for cheese substituting corrugated cardboard is the most 
signiﬁcant contributor to dematerialisation through less packaging (see Table 8.11). This 
transmaterialisation partly explains why the amount of  plastic packaging has increased 
during the late ‘90s while all other packaging materials show a decreasing trend (Sylte 
2002). Previously, corrugated cardboard was used for maturing the cheese within Tine. 
In 1998, this was substituted with reusable plastic cases, and consequently the packaging 
consumption and the packaging costs were dramatically reduced, 1,200 tons and 15 
million NOK, respectively. Interestingly, the taste of  the cheese also improved (Solgaard 
2002). 
TINE had previously developed a unique corrugated cardboard case that was reused 
several times. The EU Directive on food hygiene prohibited this practice, stating that 
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everything returnable to food processing production sites should be washed. Moreover, 
the four large supermarket chains in Norway started to request cheese in unit weight 
forms, which was easier conducted by plastic cases than corrugated cardboard cases 
(Sylte 2002). Finally, TINE started using plastic pallets instead of  wooden pallets, 
making the cleaning process of  these also much easier. All these factors contributed to 
the development of  new maturing cases. The role of  the covenants for this packaging 
improvement was expressed by the project leader:
On a general basis, the covenants make it even more important to reduce amount of  
packaging. They indirectly inﬂuenced the development of  these cases, but the directly 
contributing factor for this was the demand from the supermarket chain to have unit 
weight cheese which the plastic maturing cases in plastics were a lot easier to conduct.
Hence, the change towards maturing cases based on plastics was driven both from 
the customers and the authorities, but it turned out to have ‘unintended’ positive 
consequences for TINE as well through reduced costs, improved product quality and 
reduced amounts of  waste10. 
These examples of  packaging improvements involve dematerialisation and 
transmaterialisation, based on modiﬁcations of  existing packaging solutions without 
changing the actual product. The packaging consumption and packaging intensity 
depend, however, also on innovations related to new products and new packaging 
solutions. These solutions might be based on new process and material technology, 
or on existing technology but with a different shape and appearance. Quantifying 
the reduction in packaging consumption is impossible since no reference points are 
available. Thus, instead we must go into the actual development process to analyse the 
signiﬁcance of  covenants on this.
In 2002, Tine developed a new packaging solution for the product sold at schools through 
a “school milk agreement”. 55 % of  all pupils in compulsory schools in Norway have 
this agreement. In order to attract the pupils and to reverse the declining trend of  milk 
consumption, a new type of  screw top packaging was developed. A comparative LCA 
between alternatives concluded this to be one of  the poorest solutions, environmentally 
speaking (Solgaard 2002). Moreover, it did not ﬁt into the standard transport packaging 
for Tine and a new cardboard-based tray was developed, causing an additional waste 
problem for the schools. Moreover, this is an example where the aspect of  design 
for recycling is not taken into account, since more materials are present. This type of  
decisions and arguments might be an explanation for the trends of  increased packaging 
consumption displayed in Figure 8.3. However, Tine argues that this packaging can be 
recycled as a traditional beverage carton, since the screw cap in plastics are removed 
together with the remaining plastics in the beverage cartons and combusted with energy 
recovery.
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8.2.2.2 The role of EPR
The examples above provide some explanations for the packaging trends within Tine, 
and indicate a limited role of  EPR in these trends. To some extent this runs contrary to 
the results from the survey where 32.1 % of  the upstream respondents indicated that 
the covenant was a driver for the packaging changes. However, we argued above that 
a methodological weakness with the survey is that it does not include the strength of  
these drivers. The question is therefore: Can we ﬁnd evidence for the role of  EPR, and 
its relative importance to other inﬂuencing factors? 
Generally speaking, the design changes that might come along as a consequence of  
the covenant are related to dematerialisation, to design for recycling and to reuse of  
recycled material. The survey indicates that dematerialisation is the most frequent type 
of  changes (62.5 %), while increased suitability for recycling is marked by 26.8 % of  the 
respondents, see Figure 8.5. 21.4 % answered that they had ‘substituted other substances’, 
and this included the use of  recycled material. How reliable are these results if  tested on 
Tine? Moreover, the pressure from EPR might either come through Plastretur, through 
Materialretur, through the Industrial Packaging Optimisation Committee (NOC), 
through the market and their commitments in the covenants or through the covenant 
itself  as a cognitive understanding of  (the moral) responsibility (Ehrenfeld 2000b). 
There is no doubt that Tine has participated in the EPR schemes. Tine is the largest licence 
fee payer in Norway for plastic packaging and beverage cartons and has organisationally 
been involved in the EPR systems through ownership and board members in the 
PROs11. Complying with the legal commitments downstream is, hence, no problem. The 
interesting question is, however, to what extent this has inﬂuenced Tine’s daily activities. 
Below we will discuss more thoroughly how Tine has been inﬂuenced by the covenant, 
not only as licence fee payer, but beyond this, trying to ﬁnd evidence for the question 
of  to what extent the covenant contributes to technological change and innovation and 
changed behaviour. 
Dematerialisation
Packaging is a substantial cost (~25 %, Tine 1997a – 2004a), and efforts to reduce the 
use of  packaging, reducing the weight of  packaging resulting for instance in reduced 
transport costs, have always been an important issue for Tine (Johansen 2001b). The 
covenant has provided an additional cost load of  0.4 % (see Figure 8.7) and represents 
a much weaker incentive than reducing the cost of  purchasing packaging.
Why is cost reduction a more signiﬁcant driver for carrying out dematerialisation 
than the covenant? First, Tine has since the mid 90’s faced an increasing competition 
along the entire value chain due to the deregulation of  the Norwegian market in 1997 
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(Rommetvedt 2002). As one informant in Tine put it:
“The competition intensiﬁed, both due to other cheese making companies, and from abroad 
and from other non-dairy products like water and lemonade. In addition, the pressure 
from the authorities increased (agriculture policy) and the consumer behaviours changed 
into new habits (one-person households and food on the run), resulting in an entire new 
focus in our industry. We had to think differently, both related to marketing and internal 
cost reduction. Obviously, cost reduction is very important and I think that environmental 
measures with high costs not will be implemented”.
Another explanation to the increased focus on cost reduction is the signiﬁcant pressure 
from the four major supermarket chains. More than 80 % of  Tine’s sale is through 
these (Tine 2005a). The supermarket chains are under a big pressure being focused 
on reducing costs (Rommetvedt 2002, Borch and Stræte 1999). One way of  doing 
this is to press their suppliers to accept lower prices for their products. Hence, the 
food industry has relatively poor cards on their hand, and the supermarket chains 
are constantly strengthening the demands on their suppliers. This has been the trend 
for several years, making Tine realise that the organisation did not provide optimum 
conditions for meeting these challenges (Tine 1999a). A new organisational model was 
the consequence, established in 2001. Moreover, the supermarket chains are to a larger 
extent selling their own brands, making the market less for the traditional companies 
(Borch and Stræte 1999). 
The on-going discussions within World Trade Organisation (WTO) on reducing the tax 
barriers on agricultural products, and the EU’s new competition directive (EU 2004), 
have additionally strengthened the political framing conditions, making Tine “more 
exposed to harder competition in the market” (Tine 2004a, p 9). To meet this, Tine 
argues that they need to “create growth through innovations and new-launching” (Tine 
2004a, p 33) and on both volume products and niche products. This increased focus 
on innovation and the increased competition can be illustrated by the fact that in 1999 
15 new products sent to the market, while in 2004 more than 50 new products were 
introduced (Selmer-Olsen 2005).
Finally, another cost reduction factor is that the subsidy from Ministry of  Agriculture has 
been reduced during the last 15 years, meaning that Tine must improve their efﬁciency 
in order to maintain the milk price pr litre to its owners, the farmers. This has also 
resulted in a cost-effective centralisation of  production capacity, reducing the number 
of  plants from 800 in 1980 to 53 in 2004. Another way of  explaining this centralisation 
is that the technology development, with high degree of  automation, resulted in larger, 
more expensive machines where the packaging is formed inside the ﬁlling machine. 
This also reduces the transport costs of  the packaging from packaging producer to Tine 
since the packaging is not longer preformed and less ‘air’ is transported. On the other 
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hand, the centralisation causes more transport since the distance from farmer to plant 
to consumer is longer.
The packaging trend in Tine is that the potential for packaging reductions on existing 
packaging is overall utilised (Refsholt 2002). This is conﬁrmed with the development of  
packaging consumption as presented in Chapter 8.2.1. Now the focus is on standardising 
the packaging for optimising the transportation and for standardising the appearance in 
the supermarkets. The supermarket chains are demanding in this respect, by for instance 
requiring smaller product units due to a tendency of  smaller families (more single 
persons) and food-on-the-run. Moreover, the packaging consumption has increased 
also due to increased intermediate transport because of  fewer dairies and hence longer 
transport distances.
The inﬂuence of  EPR compared to these factors can be assessed in at least two ways 
– directly from the covenant so that Tine perceives the content of  the covenant as 
stimulating for changing own practice or through the work done by Plastretur, the other 
PROs and NOC. As for the latter, Plastretur did not focus on stimulating upstream 
companies to design for recycling or to optimise their packaging (Sundt 2000). Moreover, 
since the covenants do not inhibit speciﬁed targets on waste reduction, the pressure from 
this was not that strong either. NOC was not founded before 1999, and could not be 
inﬂuencing the observed developments in Table 8.11. Being involved in negotiations and 
in PROs increase the attention/focus on this, but only to the extent of  establishing the 
return system, and not on doing changes to the input to this system (Solgaard 2002). 
To sum up, although the packaging improvement examples correlate with the EPR 
system, there were other more signiﬁcant explanations than the covenants to why 
these changes occurred. Dematerialisation efforts have mainly come forth as a result 
of  cost reduction. Cost reduction has become increasingly important due to tougher 
competition and reduced subsidy. As noted by general director “there is no single signal 
from the covenant or the intention behind the covenant that makes a force on Tine” 
(Refsholt 2002).
Design for recycling? – On Tine’s packaging strategy
When turning to the second aspect of  EPR, the incentives for producers to design for 
recycling (Ehrenfeld 2000b, Lifset 1993), we must understand the role of  the recycling 
aspects to other aspects in the product design process. Does EPR alter the strength of  
this role? 
Design for recycling means that the product, e.g. the plastic packaging, is designed so 
that it will be easier to recycle, including all steps in end-of-life phase (collection, sorting, 
transportation and recycling). Obviously this has to do with the actual recycling system 
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present, but we can put forth some general measures that can be taken to improve the 
design for recycling. First, the packaging can be marked with instructions on how the 
consumer shall source separate it, how to clean it, compress it and so on12. Second, 
reducing the amount of  non-recyclable materials, for instance laminates, would make 
it easier for all actors in the end-of-life phase, including consumers, collectors, sorters 
and recyclers. Finally, another measure is to reduce the number of  materials in the 
packaging, making it more homogenous. Of  the examples provided so far, only the God 
Morgen Yoghurt can be deﬁned as a design for recycling project. No examples of  the 
other categories are found. New packaging solutions are important factors for success 
(Tine 2004a, p 7), but with an average of  15 major new packaging solutions annually, no 
one of  these have paid particular attention to waste management issues (Solgaard 2005). 
How can we explain this?
Tine’s packaging strategy is to develop and choose packaging that i) are recoverable and 
ii) can enter the return systems organised by the PROs (Solgaard 2002). These criteria 
are both easily fulﬁlled. When the energy recovery target is present in the covenants, 
it is literally no packaging from Tine that cannot be recovered. Second, the packaging 
chosen can necessarily enter the return systems because there are return systems for all 
types of  packaging material in Norway. For example, the new packaging for school milk 
containing a screw cap in plastics and thus increases the heterogeneity in the packaging 
making it more difﬁcult to material recover, but still it is recoverable and can still enter 
the return system.
The responsibility for the EoL phase is outsourced to Plastretur (and the other PROs 
on packaging materials). No one of  the interviewees mentioned design for recycling as 
part of  the optimisation term, rather that “we optimise along the value chain until the 
product is consumed” (Solgaard 2001). Since improvements in the design for recycling 
are not rewarded with reduced fee, there is then no incentive for doing so. The covenant 
is not representing any driving force concerning packaging optimisation (Refsholt 
2002).
A second explanation to the lack of  focus at design for recycling is that the packaging 
solutions are optimised for the purpose of  attractiveness, food safety and consumer-
functionality (Sverdrup 2001). Attracting consumers through exquisite packaging 
appearance and through functional solutions that make the product last longer and less 
product is lost, are areas with larger focus the latest years. “We have to be attractive in 
the few seconds a consumer decides what to buy” (Solgaard 2005).
In order to better understand how environmental issues are dealt with during product 
innovations, we need to look into these processes. Groups with representatives from 
various departments in Tine (sales, product, packaging, purchase and process) representing 
different aspects of  the product development process are set up to run the developing 
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process13. The core task of  the group is obvious; developing a popular product for the 
market to maximise the proﬁt for the company. In doing this, a number of  aspects, in 
addition to the actual product, is taken into account; the existing production process 
and the available equipment and technology for this, the packaging to be used and the 
way it should be used for marketing, the logistics from production site to consumers, 
the potential environmental harm caused by the production process and the packaging, 
the costs of  the production and the raw materials (Nagle 2001). Indeed, TINE has made 
huge investments in production and processing technology, which may lock in other 
potentially better solutions (Johansen 2002). The ﬁnal product will always become the 
result of  balancing these different factors, and the environmental issue is consequently 
only one out of  many factors. The question is: How are the environmental arguments 
weighted in the decision making process? 
The person representing the technical packaging aspect in the product group is also 
appointed the environmental responsible. This group in the R&D department has 
consisted of  2-4 persons, during the last years even fewer (Sætra 2002). He expresses 
his organisational position as:
I am the environmental leader, but am on the third level in the organisation, with 
consequently limited impact or decision making authority. The environmental responsible 
must be lifted to a higher level in the organisation.
He has advocated the environmental aspect, potentially also the design for recycling 
issue, but within the project groups there are clearly different priorities between the 
various departments, as expressed by one informant: 
The discussions are usually between the department of  purchase and the others because 
the former is very focused on reducing costs. This is often in contrast to the priorities of  
the market department and the R&D department. Moreover, the market department 
argues for packaging that is attractive to the consumers, which often is contrary to an 
environmental argument. And ﬁnally, within the R&D department there are also various 
aspects to take into account, for instance environmental issues and product durability. 
Those speaking the environmental voice have necessarily various points to assess. For 
instance, the relative environmental load of  the main dairy product to the packaging is 
1:10, meaning that spill of  the main product are far more environmentally necessary 
to avoid. The packaging must therefore be made in such a way that it maintains and 
protects the main product in a healthy and secure way. This is an argument for packaging 
optimisation, and not packaging minimisation or design for recycling. Within the area 
of  packaging, EPR emerges just as an additional factor, making the decision-making 
process even more complex. In this discussion, both the environmental argument in 
general and the design for recycling argument in particular (that does not provide any 
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economical proﬁt) become weak. If  the product is not sold, optimising for recycling is 
indeed irrelevant.
That said, during these processes, the dairy products are the major issue, while the 
packaging is one necessary condition for attracting consumers and for protecting the 
product. The consumer does not have a strong incentive for selecting the product with 
the most environmentally friendly packaging. Tine is obviously more concerned about 
the product than the packaging, and it is argued that the packaging will never be more 
than a factor supporting the main product. Other factors like production processes and 
existing process technology, utilities like energy, transportation, consumption and end-
of  life aspects are subordinate to developing the actual product. Obviously, the role of  
the covenant in this is non-existing as it does not provide any incentives. During the 
interviews it became clear that very few knew of  the covenant and its content. Those 
knew of  it argued that “this is something taken care of  by Plastretur”. 
Environmental consciousness – reputation or reality?
Given the discussion above, it should be relatively clear that the covenant, or any internal 
or external actor that tries to advocate it, has minor inﬂuence. However, EPR is said to 
be forcing designers to think differently. Can we ﬁnd evidence for this in the Tine-case? 
Has the general environmental consciousness become stimulated by the covenant?
The informants argue that Tine is an environmentally conscious company. To what 
extend this awareness actually is included in the product development processes is more 
uncertain. There is an observed uncertainty on how the environmental awareness should 
be included and taken into account in practise. And if  an life cycle assessment (LCA) 
shows that one solution should be preferred to another, the most economical beneﬁcial 
solution, in shorter or longer perspective, is always chosen (Eide 2001).
The new packaging on school milk is a good example. LCAs on variants of  the new 
school milk packaging showed that the selected packaging is performing less well than 
other alternatives. Those speaking the ‘environmental case’ have nevertheless accepted 
that the choice is taken and the point is then to make this as good as possible (Solgaard 
2002). Another example is the centralisation process, which has been carried out, despite 
the fact that this increases the transport distances, and is not environmentally preferable. 
There are other arguments than the environmental ones, which are stronger and more 
powerful to that discussion.
Tine has been awarded the best environmental company in Norway eight years in a row. 
All informants in Tine mention this position as important for Tine to keep. Moreover, 
this is also used as an internal argument proving that Tine is an environmental conscious 
company. One major reason for this is said to be the fact that milk dairy products are 
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based on pure and healthy raw material, and Tine’s identity and reputation is related to 
this fact. Since Tine is within the food industry, careful attention to safe and hygienic 
production and packaging is an absolute necessary condition for the products.
Another consequence of  the increased environmental focus in society in early 90’s in 
general and in Tine in particular, was that Tine in 1994 published their ﬁrst environmental 
report. During the latest years the environmental reports have been subject to major 
improvements with respect to the number of  indicators and the overall perspective. 
Tine was awarded the best environmental report in Norway in 2004. The environmental 
reports were reviewed by an auditing company, which in 1998 suggested that Tine 
should develop a system for mapping and controlling their materials and energy ﬂows, 
primarily within the diaries, but also throughout the value chain. This has resulted in 
a database and an environmental accounting system, where all the diaries shall update 
the database on a number of  indicators concerning the production of  diary products, 
of  transportation, of  the further use of  by products and so on. The informants could 
report that this has created an increased interest in environmental issues, and at the 
same time a better knowledge of  the process and product system they are a part of.
Despite an initial impression of  Tine as an environmentally conscious company, this 
empirical study so far indicates that this does not materialise into the real decisions 
where there are other aspects that are weighted far more. Consequently, the design for 
recycling argument is to some extent present, but not decisive.
Understanding the resource perspective
Based on the previous paragraphs we might conclude that the covenant has neither 
contributed signiﬁcantly to the dematerialisation processes of  packaging nor to 
the design for environment. It thus seems that the environmental consciousness of  
the company is not a key characteristic of  the organisational culture. EPR has not, 
consequently, inﬂuenced the basic values and beliefs concerning environmental issues. 
“The environmental issues are dealt with those four persons in R&D”, one interviewee 
stated, and this statement was conﬁrmed by others during a company presentation14. To 
test this hypothesis, we will brieﬂy investigate the activities within non-packaging areas 
related to environmental issues. We will focus the discussion on primarily two issues; i) 
internal waste management and ii) overall resource management.
As mentioned above, the internal waste generation and source separation in TINE is 
also contributing to the efﬁciency of  the plastic packaging EPR system since we can 
assume that a majority of  the waste generated within TINE is packaging, being directly 
relevant for the covenant. According to Appendix E, the amount of  generated waste 
has increased with 55 % from 2000 to 2004. In the same period, however, the absolute 
amount going to landﬁll is reduced by 8 %. The explanation for this can be found in 
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the amount of  source separation in TINE, either for energy recovery or for material 
recycling, going from 51 % of  generated waste in 2000 to 63 % in 2004. According to 
Selmer-Olsen (2001), TINE started systematic source separation of  internal waste in 
2000, and more dairies start separating their waste.
It seems that an internal pressure combined with a pressure from Plastretur and other 
PROs through illustrative examples are key factors for why these systems have come 
along, and of  course combined with the cost reduction potential. However, not starting 
before 2000, more than 6 years passed by without utilising the direct connection between 
the EPR systems and Tine’s own waste generation and waste management.
Second, the overall resource management will be discussed in relation to the extent which 
process innovations are carried out on existing plants and processes. There are basically 
two major issues to deal with; reduction of  border milk and utilisation of  ingredients 
in the whey. Emissions from border milk are the major source to water, representing 
a main environmental problem for a number of  plants. 40 % of  the plants do not 
comply with the concession limits set by the authorities (Eide 2001). Border milk is the 
rest of  the milk present in the tanks after processing the raw milk to drinkable milk in 
batch operations. Hence, it will always present, but reduction is possible if  the process 
is optimised (Selmer-Olsen 2002). The amount of  border milk decides the need for 
puriﬁcation plant, and traditionally there has been a trend towards these plants instead 
of  optimising the processes. The border milk case is indeed an environmental challenge 
as it is presented here, but on the other hand, the solutions to the challenge might 
also cause economic beneﬁts. This is an example of  motivation being strengthened by 
economic prospects and not environmental consciousness. 
The whey problem has been subject to lot of  research (Selmer-Olsen 2001). Previously, 
the whey was sold to pig farms as ‘liquid’ animal feed. Now, the protein is separated from 
the whey, dried and processed into being an ingredient in diet additions. Other parts of  
the whey is also utilised as ingredients in other food industries. The main reason for 
this change is argued to be the altered focus from milk being the product towards milk 
as containing a number of  substances. This has been driven by the economic rationale 
that by utilising the raw material better, the economic bottom line will improve (Selmer-
Olsen 2005).
According to Selmer-Olsen (2002) there is now a change in the way Tine is looking at the 
milk as the raw material in their production. Previously, the milk was the starting point 
for processing it into being a drinkable product for consumers. This has slightly changed 
into considering milk as containing a number of  substances, protein, sucrose, minerals, 
fat and so on, all being ingredients for use in food processing industry. Separating 
these from the milk production is regarded as an economically very interesting path 
for the future. This will indeed reduce the emissions to water and it will represent a 
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potentially increased income. This improved resource efﬁciency/utilisation thus has an 
equally important economic aspect as an environmental aspect. As noted by several, the 
economic argument is indeed more attractive to those making decisions about what to 
do within the problem.
8.2.3 Concluding the Tine-case
The informants say that EPR has played an important role in creating the systems for 
collection and recycling for plastic packaging, and that this is important according to 
the social responsibility of  TINE and the environmental proﬁle the company wants to 
express. EPR has to some  extend contributed to a generally increased environmental 
awareness within the company, but in general very few within product design and 
packaging department reﬂected more on this than that this was a downstream issue. 
Some secondary effects, partly due to EPR, can be observed, for instance participation 
in packaging based discussion and interest groups (e.g. NOC), environmental reporting 
and database for mapping the material and energy ﬂows in Tine, and sharp focus 
on providing reliable information through annual environmental reports. There are, 
however, several other factors than EPR that has contributed to this.
Some of  the factors are the increased competition, economical reasons (reduced costs) 
with environmentally friendly consequences, the top ranking in the MMI’s investigations 
(which seems to be more important for the environmental motivation than EPR), the 
need to avoid skeletons coming out of  the cupboard since the company is regarded 
an environmentally conscious and responsible one and the pressure from different 
external actors. Without EPR nothing would have been done in the end-of-life phase, 
but packaging reduction by TINE would have happened anyway. Tine’s reputation as a 
social responsible company is here important to protect15.
All the factors mentioned here contribute to cost reduction, and EPR has minor 
signiﬁcance in these processes. The main point is that there are basic economical 
reasons for doing this, and environmental reasons are of  secondary concern. “We are 
not selling environment, but products”, an informant said. Luckily, there is often win-
win situations, and the efforts are both economical and environmental favourable for 
the company. “There is no problem fulﬁlling environmental goals when this at the same 
time reduces costs”, another informant said.
It seems obvious that the covenants act as sleeping pillows for Tine. Other companies 
(Plastretur and Norsk Returkartong) are carrying the responsibility for Tine in end-
of-life phase and it does not seem to stimulate Tine to carry out product and process 
innovations in order to make this job easier. As far as the reputation is concerned, they 
can always argue that this is taken care of  by these companies.
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Although Tine is perfectly aware of  the need for being an environmentally conscious 
company, it seems that they have not taken the big steps to do a systematic evaluation 
of  the environmental problems at hand, and the core idea of  industrial ecology, namely 
that there are often economic beneﬁts connected to preventive approaches. Although, 
Tine is slowly turning towards this by looking at milk as consisting of  a number of  
ingredients, the covenant has neither inspired to think preventively (cognitively), nor 
to give sufﬁcient incentives (legislative) for the producers to act preventively in this 
process.
8.3 Other upstream companies and organisations
Can we ﬁnd support for the conclusions in Tine within other upstream companies 
as well? We have interviewed 9 upstream companies and three industrial associations, 
see appendix B. The biggest polymer producer in Norway, Borealis, argues that there 
are strong driving forces for making more specialised polymers adjusted to a more 
demanding market. Borstar® is an example of  a new polymer that is very strong and 
that makes it possible to for instance produce thinner ﬁlm when extruding this quality. 
This will then lead to dematerialisation since less material [in kg] is used to fulﬁl the 
function (Skilhagen 2002). The cost savings related to these is usually divided between 
the polymer producer and the plastic packaging producer (and the ‘packer and ﬁller’). 
On the other hand, Folldal Recycling argues that this strong polymer is making their 
recycling process more difﬁcult, troublesome and expensive to carry out, in line with 
other type of  contaminations like nylon, strap bonds and EPS. In general, the ability of  
the virgin polymer producers to manufacture almost any specialised polymer demanded 
makes it even more difﬁcult for the recyclers.
For packaging producers the trend is consequently thinner, stronger and cheaper 
packaging products in order to be competitive through better quality and lower prices. 
The margins are very small and supermarket chains put a strong pressure on the 
plastic packaging producers (Kildal 2002). Key characteristics of  the Norwegian plastic 
industry in general are high costs, small home market, long transport distances and an 
enormous technical development making the plastics more diverse. The sector is to 
a large extent facing international competition, which have been clearly more visible 
during the last 10 years. Thus, there is a ﬁght within the plastics industry to survive with 
very small margins. Although the majority of  the plastic producers and plastic packaging 
producers confess to EPR, the overall focus is to survive and ‘nice to do’ points must be 
left more unintended (Flesland 2001). Thus, the focus on source separation is a direct 
consequence of  companies focus on reducing costs.
We did not need to have a covenant to obtain source separation in companies. The covenant 
might have been increasing the focus on this, but not more (Kildal 2002).
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Interviews with packers and ﬁllers support the ﬁndings within Tine. The main focus is 
primarily to protect the product “since this is what the consumers buy” (Friele 2001), 
and, secondary, to reduce material consumption (see Figure 8.5) in order to reduce the 
costs (see Figure 8.6), while the inﬂuence from the covenant is marginal (Havre 2001, 
Friele 2001). 
The industrial associations (e.g. NHO) consider the packaging covenants as successful.
“More than 70 % is recovered, at a considerably lower cost than the suggestion by the 
authorities. The only problem is number of  free-riders, which brings along a continuous 
discussion on whether to have a regulation or a covenant. The main argument for having 
a regulation is that this induces a public control instruments” (Fredriksen 2002) 16. 
NHO also considers the covenant to be successful in relation to packaging optimisation 
(Fredriksen 2002, 2005). The main activity has been to establish a methodology for 
measuring material consumption (Hanssen et al 2003) and to employ this for mapping 
the development. Packaging optimisation is deﬁned as
continuous improvements throughout the value chain that maintain sufﬁcient protection to 
the product with lowest resource consumption and environmental impact as possible (SfA, 
2001, p 5)17. 
However, the value chain stops at the consumer, leaving the recycling aspect outside the 
deﬁnition of  packaging optimisation. Hence, even SfA being established to stimulate 
preventive actions within upstream companies, omit the EoL aspect of  packaging. 
Examples of  design for recycling efforts cannot be found in the annual reports from 
SfA. Consequently, the signals from the covenant to the product designers are weak. 
This deﬁnition of  packaging optimisation is supported by the ‘Industrial association 
for wholesalers and retailers’ (DMF). This organisation is very active both in Plastretur 
and in NOC. The main focus is to optimise the packaging from producer to retailer. 
This includes optimal utilisation of  the pallets in order to reduce transportation costs. 
Improvements have been made among the largest companies, but still the pallet utilisation 
is just above 70 %. Since the supermarket chains are large waste generators as well, 
DMF wants to increase the value of  this waste by demanding payment from Plastretur 
(see Chapter 7.3). DMF also argues strongly for a bring system where all the household 
packaging waste is collected in one bag and sorted afterwards (Maldum 2003). 
As mentioned in Chapter 7.3, the supermarket chain Coop has switched their attention 
towards making money out of  plastic packaging waste, see Figure 8.8. The basic idea 
is to redirect the clean and dry transport plastic packaging waste from ‘Coop-retailers’ 
and ‘other retailers’ towards ‘Coop wholesaler/storage’, instead of  sending it to waste 
management companies (WMC). Coop argues that they will achieve a higher collection 
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ratio than the WMCs (Coop 2003). Hence, there is a strong competition between WMCs 
and Coop on this. According to Coop (Langolf  2002), the potential is 3000 tons a 
year, only from the Midt-Norge district. The net effect of  this is however lower as the 
amounts sent via WMCs to Folldal Recycling will become lower.
Figure 8.8 Flow of  plastic packaging related to Coop collection and sorting centre
8.4 Waste generators and downstream companies
The efﬁciencies calculated in Chapter 7, is a consequence of  the actions by the direct 
actors. In this chapter we will present some results and viewpoints from these actors. 
Fourteen comparable waste generators (retailers and wholesalers) and eight comparable 
waste management companies, all contracted by Plastretur for receiving plastic packaging 
from commerce and industry, were interviewed.
8.4.1 Waste generators and waste management companies
All waste generators we interviewed started with source separation during the period 2000 
– 2001. The main reason for this was mainly the introduction of  the ﬁnal treatment tax 
in 1999 which made it more expensive to generate residual waste. They sorted primarily 
ﬁlm, while some had an energy fraction. But no one was sorting rigid plastics. On 
average the waste generators assumed the contamination in the ﬁlm fraction to be less 
than 5 %. As for the residual fraction, some argued that less than 5 % plastic packaging 
waste, while the other reckoned the amount to be between 30 – 40 %. Hence there was 
either large variation in the sorting quality or variation in their actual estimates.
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As shown in Chapter 7, there are several examples of  waste generators that have started 
to source separated, and saved money because they can deliver these fractions for free, 
instead of  paying 1000 NOK per ton in disposal fee. Why is it so that not every waste 
generator prefers source separation if  this is more proﬁtable? First, we have found 
that educating both the management and the personnel, which within the supermarket 
chains or specialised trades often are relief  counter hands, is very difﬁcult and not 
prioritised in a hectic daily routine. The products in the store are the main focus and 
dealing with waste does not get ﬁrst or second priority. Second, they are not specialised 
on plastics and cannot separate one type of  polymer from another, which can explain 
why it is difﬁcult to source separate correctly the ﬁrst time. Third, often the buildings 
are often small and not designed for treating a number of  source separated fractions.
 For instance, IKEA has close to 15 different fractions that the employees are obliged to 
source separate. Fourth, the waste generators are usually subject to long-term contracts 
with waste management companies and respondents argue that ‘there is no incentive 
for doing differently as long as the prices and framing conditions are already set’. Waste 
generators also argue that the waste management companies are used to handle large 
containers with residual waste, and earn money on this. Neither waste generators nor 
waste management companies are experts on plastic packaging, and this, together with 
the factors mentioned above can explain why Folldal Gjenvinning gets various qualities 
from their suppliers.
No one of  the waste generators had ever received any feedback from waste management 
companies to improve their source separation. This support the general impression from 
the interviews with the waste management companies that these were very satisﬁed with 
their own activities. “There is not much more we could do, given the current prices and 
framing conditions”, one informant said. Moreover, it was a common understanding 
that their waste management plants were not designed to treat clean fractions, except 
from corrugated cardboard and paper. This seems to be a major obstacle in order to 
obtain an efﬁcient collection and sorting system that can contribute to increase the 
recycling ratio. In order to fully adapt one self  to handling plastic (packaging) fractions 
as well, investments are needed. None of  the interviewees dealing with industrial plastic 
packaging waste had adjusted to the new reality of  separated fractions. One exception 
is the specialised sorting plants of  Norsk Gjenvinning in Larvik and at Gardermoen. 
These produce high quality, sorted plastic packaging waste. 
The collected plastic packaging that is already separated by the waste generator is 
usually not treated by the waste management company, but sent directly to the ‘export 
storage’ or to another recycler. The tendency is that the export storage has been less 
strict, although this was not the intention in the quality assurance (Gjester 2003) and 
that the waste management companies because of  this have preferred to send their 
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collected plastic packaging to them instead of  sending it to domestic recyclers. The 
waste management companies are somewhat still in a waste regime and do not educate 
the waste generators on how to do this correctly. Experiences show that if  Plastretur go 
directly to the waste generators rather than via waste management companies, this has 
far better effect (Bratterud 2002). 
The problem, however, is that Plastretur (or any other PRO) cannot run speciﬁc project 
targeting any large waste generator. It is the waste management companies that have the 
primary contact with these and should therefore be the one to carry out this education. 
Moreover, it runs contrary to the market model if  Plastretur in a too large extent does 
projects targeting waste generators since waste management companies are one of  two 
primary points of  contact within the waste management system for Plastretur.
The waste management companies want Plastretur to be supportive, and contribute 
with knowledge, solutions and subsidies. This is different from the traditional industrial 
thinking where those in the ﬁeld are the knowledgeable actors, and those in ofﬁces do 
not understand what is needed out there. Plastretur tends in this sense to be a sleeping 
pillow for the waste management companies which do not look for new possibilities 
and solutions.
8.4.2 Sorters
As mentioned above, it is only the largest Norwegian waste management company, 
Norsk Gjenvinning, which runs a specialised sorting plant for plastic packaging. It 
started in 2001, and the intention was to improve the quality of  the plastic packaging 
from the waste management companies before sending it to recycling. They found it 
economically interesting to start this activity. 
The result is that the amount of  quality 1 sent to Folldal Gjenvinning is much higher than 
before, evidently improving the quality out of  the recycling process. Folldal Gjenvinning 
gets 70 % of  all their natural raw materials from NG. The supermarket chains provide 
mainly the rest (Rogstad 2002). Table 8.12 shows the deliveries in 1998 and 2002 of  
various qualities as input to recycling process.
The main reason for this improved performance is the sorting plant in Larvik. Previously, 
Norsk Gjenvinning experienced that lots of  high quality foil waste sent to energy 
recovery due to bad sorting, and lots of  low quality foil went to material recycling 
due to bad sorting. 80 % of  all plastic packaging collected by Norsk Gjenvinning goes 
through the sorting plant. With 45 % of  the market share, Norsk Gjenvinning is the 
most important supplier to Folldal.
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Table 8.12 Deliveries of  plastic packaging in tons from Norsk Gjenvinning to Folldal Gjenvinning in 
1998 and 2002. Source: Bjørn Kopstad (2003) 
1998 2002
Natural (quality 1) 48 1714
White (quality 2) 252 252
Blend (quality 3) 1003 1256
Not accepted 155 103
Sum 1458 3325
The value added due to improved quality of  the plastic packaging is, however, not 
reﬂected in Plastretur’s subsidies. Plastretur does not pay more for better quality. 
According to Kopstad (2003), Plastretur have changed the boundary conditions since 
Norsk Gjenvinning decided to build the sorting plant. The export storage has been 
established making it more attractive for waste management companies to deliver there 
instead of  improving the quality through sorting and sending it to material recycling at 
Folldal Gjenvinning. According to Kopstad (2003), Plastretur prefers quantity to quality, 
and argues that other waste management companies get similar subsidy from Plastretur 
without providing the same quality. This hinders a real competition. In normal market 
situations, the market price for a good is reﬂected in the quality of  it.
8.4.3 Recyclers
In the plastic packaging industry, Folldal Gjenvinning, producing re-granulates from low 
density poly-ethylene (LDPE), is an important case. It was established in 1994 through 
a governmental subsidy of  40 million NOK. This was given partly due to a recent 
close-down of  a corner-stone company in the local community and partly because of  
the coming covenant (Løvold 2003). Since then, the company has gradually improved 
its products, but mainly as a result of  higher quality and quantity of  their raw materials, 
and not as a result of  technological innovations (Rogstad 2002). Their existence entirely 
depends on the EPR schemes, both for reasons of  raw material supply and subsidies. 
Table 8.13 shows the development of  the various recycling qualities at Folldal 
Gjenvinning. As mentioned above, the fraction of  natural quality has increased steadily. 
According to Rogstad (2005) the supply from Norsk Gjenvinning only contains 2-3 
% contaminations, while the supply from COOP is fed directly into the production 
process. Previously before Norsk Gjenvinning started sorting and supermarket chains 
started to deliver their plastic packaging, the input quality was not very good. The 
agricultural ﬁlm was often dirty and sandy and contained a lot of  water. Contaminations 
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from other polymers with different melt index than LDPE, in particular PP, EPS, PVC 
and nylon cause problems in the production line. This has resulted in high costs due to 
shutdowns and damaged equipment. This emphasis the importance of  proper sorting 
before the polymer enters the extruder. During the latest years, the new cross-chained 
polymer Borstar®, developed by Borealis, cause problems for the machines and the 
production. 
Table 8.13 Distribution of  outﬂow qualities from Folldal Gjenvinning
[%] 1998 2001 2002 2004
Natural (quality 1) 4.7 0 12.0 28.0
Off-white (quality 2) 0.0 15.7 9.4 16.0
Colored  (quality 3) 36.8 12.8 9.2 50.0
Blend 58.5 67.7 68.4 6.0
The prices on these products are depending on the qualities. ‘Natural’ varies with the 
Platts index and is normally around 60 % of  virgin material. Blended is more constant.
8.5 Secondary upstream companies
In order to close the loop, the recycled plastic packaging must be employed in new or 
existing products. If  not, the entire recycling process is just a long energy-demanding 
way around to ﬁnal treatment. We might therefore ask: How has the covenant stimulated 
companies to employ recycled plastic packaging material and to create a market demand 
and not only a market supply? And what are the experiences with using this material 
in new production? We have brieﬂy looked into several companies that have employed 
recycled plastic packaging, and we will provide a short glimpse of  the results.
The main markets for recycled plastic packaging are carrier bags and refuse bags (Gjester 
2003). Norfolier, as the largest owner of  Folldal Gjenvinning (45 %) employs recycled 
plastic packaging from Folldal Gjenvinning in refuse bags, in order to reduce the costs 
and increase the margins (Løvold 2003). In this aspect, the covenant has contributed to 
improve the competitiveness of  certain companies. The quality demands of  the recycled 
material are relatively low for refuse bags.
If  we turn the attention towards carrier bags, the situation is somewhat different. 
Another plastic carrier bag producer, Stenqvist in Trondheim, Norway, is a key actor 
in the plastic packaging loop in Norway. First, the company is a major licence fee payer 
to Materialretur, because they have approximately 40 % of  the market in Norway for 
carrier bags. Second, they spend recycled material from Folldal Gjenvinning in their 
carrier bags. 
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According to Buhaug (2002) it is challenging to employ regranulate in extruding 
processes. The main problem lies in the fact that the supply of  recycled material is rather 
unpredictable and unreliable and “it is hard to know what you actually get”. If  breakdown 
occurs due to poor quality, production is lost for some hours and the potential proﬁt 
for using recycling material is lost. Their customers demand 80 percent regranulate, but 
according to Buhaug (2002) this is impossible due to existing technology and variability 
in the input material. The economic calculation has to include a number of  elements: 
i) the reduced costs when employing recycled material instead of   virgin material, ii) 
the extra costs involved, for instance as a consequence of  more often breakdowns, 
more wear and tear on the equipment as the regranulate is polishing the equipment, 
iii) more time has to be spent on maintenance, iv) refusal and reduced income from 
the customers due to poor quality and v) increased material use as thicker products is 
required to remain the same strength. In total, the costs of  employing recycled material 
are not 60 percent, but closer to 80 percent. All these factors increase the ﬁnancial risk 
connected to the usage of  recycled plastic packaging. According to Buhaug (2002) it is 
primarily the market that demands this type of  products. We have, however, not studied 
whether the covenant has had a signiﬁcant role in this market pull.
Another case study might throw light upon this question. Rosenlew Industries (at 
Geithus, Norway) used to produce poly-ethylene-based carrier bags and refuse bags. 
Since the 1960s, refuse bags with recycled PE had been produced. In 1997, Rosenlew 
introduced a carrier bag consisting of  65 % recycled PE. The question is: Why did 
Rosenlew launch this environmental carrier bag in 1997 and not before? 
It seems to be several reasons to this, and we will present these by looking at the situation 
as it appeared to Rosenlew in 1994 and 1997. By doing this we will be able to explain 
the different boundary conditions Rosenlew was facing, and that had inﬂuence on their 
decision-making processes.
In 1994, two major external relevant factors happened. First, the Folldal Gjenvinning had 
recently been established with substantial economic support from the NMoE. The major 
plastic packaging producers in Norway own Folldal Recycling, and Rosenlew is one of  
the owners. The support of  NMoE was mainly due to the forthcoming implementation 
of  extended producer responsibility and a precondition was that material recycling 
should happen in Norway (Løvold 2003). During the ﬁrst year of  operation, the quality 
of  the plastic produced or recycled at Folldal Gjenvinning was not that good. Rosenlew 
was the third biggest fee-payer to Plastretur in 1996, meaning high costs to them.
Despite this, in 1995, Rosenlew continued to use only virgin material in their production 
of  carrier bags. There were, according to the company itself, no triggering factors that 
could act as a catalyst for starting to use recycled poly ethylene. This catalyst appeared 
in late 1996. Rosenlew’s biggest customer, Hakon-gruppen merged with the Swedish 
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supermarket chain ICA. They had an outspoken environmental proﬁle, with for 
instance an environmental carrier bag in their stores. The merged company explored 
the possibilities of  introducing a similar carrier bag for the Norwegian market as well. 
The main argument for this was economic; they wanted a cheaper bag. Improving their 
environmental performance was of  secondary concern (Riksen 2000). Rosenlew, due 
to close relations to the merged company, was involved in these discussions, and quite 
quickly presented a draft plan for how to produce such a bag on their production site. 
All the reasons so far have been external, or boundary conditions, for Rosenlew. What 
about the internal reasons for the company to engage in this in 1997? 
First, their major customer demanded this bag, and in order to maintain and even tighten 
the bonds to this company, Rosenlew needed to follow up. Producing cheaper bags due 
to lower raw material prices would make them even more competitive, although this 
would give a technically less ﬂexible and more vulnerable production and the economic 
margin would be lower. Secondly, Rosenlew had a ‘sister company’ in Sweden, with 
experience from producing such carrier bags. Rosenlew could therefore draw beneﬁt 
from their experiences, making the test period and technical adjustments quicker and 
cheaper (Andersen 2000). Further, in 1997 the efﬁciency of  the collection and sorting 
system of  plastic packaging had improved, and Folldal Recycling produced recycled 
PE with substantial higher quality than in 1995. Rosenlew could have bought used PE 
from abroad, but since the market demand was not there, they did not. Of  course, 
Rosenlew could have made a strategic choice saying that they would contribute to create 
such demand, but they did not. Thus, the main driving force for these changes was 
the demand from the market, while factors like the covenant, the existence of  Folldal 
Gjenvinning and the sister company in Sweden were only premises being advantages 
that were present, but were in themselves not single reasons for Rosenlew to use of  
recycled material.
The examples so far are characterised by using extruding technology and LDPE as 
the main polymer. A greater potential for recycling is, however, found in moulding 
technology where polymers like HDPE and PP to a larger extent are employed. There 
are some examples in Norway on this. First, the ofﬁce chair producer HÅG employs a 
combination of  recycled ketchup bottles and car bumpers to produce a component in 
one of  their models. The supply of  recycled material is from Sweden while the moulding 
process is done in Norway. The key challenge was to establish deliveries of  stable quality 
and quantity (Kviseth 2002). The driving force for this was the wish to use ecological 
arguments in the marketing, as an active environmental strategy differentiate them from 
their competitors. The covenant seems not to have contributed in this development. 
Two other examples conﬁrm this. First the reverse vending machine company Tomra 
employs recycled HDPE and PP as part of  their environmental proﬁle, in order to 
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close the product loop (Saugen 2004) while Malthus, making utilities for construction 
sites, employs PP in their form elements (Hatlestad 2002). Common for these examples 
are, besides the environmental motivation and potential cost reductions, that they have 
experienced difﬁculties in ﬁnding proper supply of  plastic packaging from Norway, 
and that they have to get abroad to ﬁnd proper quantity and quality, at stable deliveries 
(Hatlestad 2002) This is to some extent conﬁrmed by Figure 7.7, which indicates 
that the recycling ratio for rigid plastics are low. The role of  Plastretur is mainly to 
be a coordinator in the market, with excellent overview of  the actors and a source of  
information for those interesting in employed recycled material. That said, the secondary 
producer project outlined in Chapter 7.3, indicates a more active role of  Plastretur, that 
eventually might contribute to a similar signal effect to other potential user of  recycled 
plastic packaging as intended with the waste generator projects.
(Endnotes)
1 Upstream companies are ‘Norwegian producer of  plastics or plastic packaging’, ‘packer & ﬁller’, ‘importer 
of  plastic packaging’ and ‘wholesaler or retailer in Norwegian tertiary sector. Downstream companies are ‘waste 
management company’, ‘sorting or waste treatment company’ and ‘recycling company’. ‘Industrial organisation 
or PRO’ is deﬁned as ‘other’.
2 At the annual general meeting in April 2002, it was decided, after more than three years of  preparations, 
to merge Tine Meieriene and Tine Norske Meierier into one company based on a traditional industrial group 
organisation structure where the group management has decision-making authority over the dairies and Tine. 
3 In 2004, the diversion of  sales income was grocery retailers (51.1 %), wholesalers (26.1 %), institutional 
households (9.4 %), industry (7.0 %), export (5.1 %) and others (1.3 %) (Tine 2005a, note 1 page 21).
4 This is exclusive the cost of  the raw milk. The costs of  raw milk are around 5.5 billion NOK. This cost 
is calculated based on the sales income per year and the corresponding costs. The difference, in ‘normal’ 
companies being the net proﬁt, is paid back to the farmers, who also are the owners of  TM. 
5 Their role as market regulator meant that they have to receive all raw milk produced in Norway (Norwegian 
Competition Authority 2004, p 15).
6 The ongoing WTO negotiations may alter this, which indeed might inﬂuence Norwegian farmers and 
Norwegian food processing industries.
7 Methodologically spoken, these packaging improvements constitute the overall development displayed 
above, but explaining the actual development, not only from a technical packaging point of  view, but to a greater 
extent ‘independent variables’ contributing to the development. We can assume some contributing factors; the 
total amount of  throughput in TINE and the total amount of  end-products, the composition of  products, for 
instance smaller or bigger units of  the main product (for instance small boxes of  butter versus bigger boxes), 
speciﬁc packaging improvements causing potential dematerialisation in existing packaging solutions, and, ﬁnally, 
changed processes in processing/reﬁning raw milk into various products. In this part we will focus on actual 
packaging improvements and leave the other explanatory factors for the analysis in the next chapter.
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8 As mentioned in Chapter 6, “Packaging minimisation” (NMoE 1995a) and “packaging optimisation” 
(NMoE 2003c) are employed as terms for the second target area in the covenants.
9 This was at the same time as the White Paper on waste management and indicated a turn in the 
governmental attitude to waste giving more responsibility to industry, creating an incentive for Tine to be 
proactive. In 1993 Tine contacted the Norwegian Ministry of  Environment (NMoE), with the intention of  
starting a working group elaborating on the issue of  establishing a producer responsibility on beverage cartons. 
This was also because NMoE were talking more loudly of  a packaging tax of  1 NOK pr unit. If  such a tax 
would pass through, this would mean an increase in Tine’s costs of  hundreds of  millions of  NOK. This was the 
starting point and ended up with the establishment of  Norsk Returkartong in May 1994 for creating a return 
system for beverage cartons.
10 Interestingly, TINE initiated a project for employing plastic cases for transporting cheese from production 
plant to the grocery stores, but this failed due to resistance among grocery stores because of  increased working 
load with return-logistics (Sylte 2002).
11 Tine owns 20 % of  Norsk Returkartong (NR), and had previously the chairman of  NR and the vice-
chairman of  Materialretur.
12 Plastretur and the other PROs have established LOOP for providing information to consumers on how 
to sort, but this is more about what kind of  collection systems that are in all Norwegian municipality, including 
type of  fractions. What is missing, however, is information on particular inner packaging and how this shall be 
sorted. Given the wide diversity of  polymers, the regular consumer cannot know what are plastics and what 
are not. Further, within plastics there are various types of  polymers that obviously cannot be recycled together 
(laminates and HDPE) and hence should not be collected together, remembering the slogan by Plastretur: 
‘Correct the ﬁrst time’. Hence, the communication between the producer of  the packaging and the developer of  
the collection and recycling system is not present although there are some weak attempts through for instance 
LOOP. Moreover, the Tur-Retur bulletin is also something that might be related to this information demand, 
but it is not yet at that path. In concluding, the situation would have been improved if  the packers and ﬁllers had 
given instructions on the packaging as to how this should be sorted and collected. For beverage carton, TINE 
has done this, but not for plastic packaging.
13 The market is responsible for the costumer side (both the ﬁnal consumer and the grocery shops), 
‘product’ is developing the actual product; packaging is dealing with various solutions for packaging and is also, 
traditionally, ensuring the environmental perspectives. Purchase is those being in contact with the actual suppliers 
of  packaging and ﬁnally, the process people is dealing with how the new product and selected packaging is ﬁtting 
into the existing process technology within the company and how to optimise this production.
14 Company presentation held by Kjetil Røine 10th December 2001 at internal meeting for entire Tine R&D, 
Kaldbakken, Oslo.
15 This reputation was strongly challenged in late 2004 and early 2005 when Tine was accused for paying high 
‘remunerations’ to one supermarket chain for holding one of  the competitors, Synnøve Finden, outside this 
supermarket chain.
16 If  certain substances are to be removed from the industrial society, then regulations/bans are required to 
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obtain goal efﬁciency. The covenants that in fact are not juridical documents, aim to instead of  authority power 
to stimulate market power and freedom under responsibility. We may ask, as seen from the individual company 
point of  view; what is gained when using voluntary approach in preference to regulation. The term voluntary 
can in this respect be defended to be used since the covenants are not juridical binding documents and it is thus 
voluntary for the companies to participate in the collective systems or not. The actual covenant is, however, a 
result of  negotiations between representatives from industry and industry associations and the environmental 
authorities. In this respect, the covenants are negotiated and not voluntary. Seen from the governmental point 
of  view, it is to a large extent regarded as a regulation, although it does not include any sanction points to be 
used towards the individual companies. One key aspect of  a regulation is that it is juridical binding for individual 
companies. In a regulation one cannot put up targets for the entire country, but it must be related to the 
individual companies/actors.
17 SfA is the abbreviation for ”The Committee for reduction of  packaging waste”, and is the former name for 
the organisation now known as “The Industrial Packaging Optimization Committee” (NOC).
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9. KEY CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL EPR 
IMPLEMENTATION
As seen from Chapter 6, the recycling ratio has improved during the period 1996 – 2004. 
What has contributed to this and what can be considered as barriers to even higher 
recycling ratios? Moreover, Figure 6.8 in Chapter 6 shows that there has been a relative 
dematerialisation in the Plastretur system, while there is no absolute dematerialisation. 
How can this be explained? 
9.1 Key conditions for successful EPR implementation downstream 
– loop closing
9.1.1 Correct sorting by waste generators
In Chapter 7 we identiﬁ ed low sorting and collection efﬁ ciencies by the waste generators 
and this phase turned out to be the place with largest loss of  quantity. In the same 
chapter we also discussed successful projects among waste generators, improving the 
efﬁ ciencies considerably (e.g. from 20% to 80 % in some cases). This indicates that 
there is a large improvement potential by the waste generators and that speciﬁ c projects 
targeting these actors might contribute to release this potential. A key condition here 
seems to be the necessity for direct information and guidance to the waste generators. 
This has been initiated and carried out by Plastretur, which through material ﬂ ow 
analysis has identiﬁ ed waste generators in general, and shopping centres, retailers and 
building sites in particular as places with obvious potential for improvements. Another 
key condition is thus to employ a material ﬂ ow approach to identify where the potential 
for improvements is highest.
Plastretur has put a lot of  efforts in educating the waste management companies 
based on the assumption that these will distribute this knowledge and offer solutions 
to the waste generators as they have more frequent and a broader contact with waste 
generators. However, in Chapter 8 we showed that the waste management companies 
only to a limited extent have entered the recycling regime, and still mainly are within 
the residual waste realm. Due to lack of  knowledge and awareness among the waste 
generators and a general limited competition on source separation solutions among 
waste management companies, Plastretur has been ‘forced’ to take a key role in educating 
waste generators.
The Plastretur slogan ‘Correct the ﬁ rst time’ is in line with an industrial ecology way 
of  thinking. Due to high investment costs for plastic packaging sorting technology, 
larger markets than the Norwegian are required if  such investment should be a reality. 
Therefore sorting correctly at the waste generators place, rather than sorting afterwards, 
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is a key condition in order to obtain high quantity and quality. The question is then who 
should in a market-based, collective EPR system, initiate and run such projects? 
As presented in Chapter 8, there are a number of  examples of  waste generators that 
have started to source separate and consequently saved money. Obviously, if  the waste 
generators save money on source separation, the waste management companies will 
reduce their income correspondingly, and although this is a business opportunity for 
the waste management companies to offer such solutions, it is mainly pressure from the 
waste generators and not initiatives from waste management companies that bring along 
source separation. As seen in the Tine case, it takes time to change behaviour on areas 
that are not at the core of  the business. The producers are knowledgeable in relation 
to their main products, less to utilities like packaging, and even less in relation to waste, 
source separation and recycling. Thus, the role of  Plastretur, and in general all PROs, as 
initiator for waste generators to demand source separation solutions is signiﬁcant.
Another argument showing the necessity of  correct sorting by waste generators is related 
to the quality input to Folldal Gjenvinning. As seen in Chapter 8, Folldal Gjenvinning has 
increased the quality of  their product considerably after Norsk Gjenvinning established 
their speciﬁc sorting plant in Larvik, Norway. Contrary to other waste management 
companies, this plant was specialised on plastics and their skills provide high quality 
input to Folldal Gjenvinning. As seen from Table 8.13, the recycling efﬁciency factor 
was improved at Folldal Gjenvinning, and high quality input was a main reason for this. 
Another reason was the inﬂow of  raw material from the supermarket chain Coop, which 
established their own sorting and compression line at their storage. This was entirely 
transport ﬁlm, without being in contact with other polymers or other waste fractions 
at waste management company plants. This is, thus, an example of  the advantages of  
correct sorting the ﬁrst time at the place of  the waste generator.
That said, the ‘Quality-project’ ﬁnanced by Plastretur and carried out by Folldal 
Gjenvinning is considered successful as they most often observed an improved quality 
of  supplies from the waste management companies that have been visited. This also 
illustrates that the networks of  actors and close cooperation between various actors, 
is a key condition for improving the results. For instance, in Norway there are limited 
recycling capacities for rigid plastics, and the attention on this fraction, both from 
Plastretur’s administration, from Plastretur’s Board and from the recyclers has been 
partial.
A third argument showing the necessity of  correct sorting by waste generators is found 
within household waste. The sorting efﬁciencies for household waste are very low and 
the quality of  the outﬂows from the household sorting plants is also generally low. The 
evident reason for this is the variety of  polymers within the household fraction, with for 
instance laminates, PP, PS, LDPE and EPS, that due to different melt index cannot enter 
194
Chapter 9
the same extrusion process. This causes shot-downs, which is expensive in itself, and a 
higher rate of  wear on the machineries. (Solem 2004, Calcott and Walls 2005)
The problem, however, is that relatively few waste generators are reached through the 
Plastretur projects and the effects on the recycling ratio are thus limited. However, 
illustrative examples will over time provide insight to those not yet converted to a source 
separation pattern of  waste management. For instance, despite the fact that Tine has 
a high environmental consciousness, a strong focus on cost reduction, is the largest 
fee payers to Plastretur and there is a strong link between the recycling system they 
contribute to ﬁnance and the waste they are generating, the company did still not start 
systematic source separation their own waste before year 2000. This illustrates that 
waste has not been a key cost reduction area for such companies, and that grasping 
this potential is better done by external inﬂuence, for instance from organisations like 
Plastretur. Making them aware of  the cost reduction potential, very often results in a 
demand for these solutions. This is something that waste management companies must 
take into account. 
As mentioned above, some supermarket chains have seen this potential, and extended 
their business areas to also include management of  their own waste. However, this 
has disturbed the market model of  Plastretur as the supermarket chains do not want 
to commit themselves to receive plastic packaging waste from other waste generators, 
or others not being qualiﬁed to sign the standard agreement for waste management 
companies with Plastretur. Thus, on the one side, these actors provide high quality 
plastic packaging waste to the recyclers, but on the other side, they disturb the market 
model, making it potentially very expensive for Plastretur if  a large number of  companies 
should behave similarly. Thus, a key condition is that those producers paying licence fee 
also contribute to the EPR system downstream through careful source separation at the 
point of  waste generation.
A ﬁnal argument for paying attention to the waste generator, is related to the fact that the 
unit costs for Plastretur has increased the latest years due to the fact that the remaining 
tonnages and fractions are more demanding to collect than those already being recycled. 
Giving higher attention to waste generators, either directly or indirectly through the 
waste management companies or through examples on webpage and publicity in the 
media, might help to reduce the unit costs.
9.1.2 Broad scope of system cause cost-efﬁciency
An important key condition is that the Plastretur system has the broadest scope among 
all European plastic packaging systems (EPRO 2005). By including nearly all the plastic 
packaging in the market, Plastretur has been in the position to choose from a wide 
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range of  products and sectors in order to meet the targets. The strategy of  selecting 
the cheapest fractions ﬁrst is clearly seen in Figure 7.24 and 7.25. The unit costs for 
commerce and industry have been considerably lower than the unit costs for the other 
fractions, and for households in particular. By following this strategy, Plastretur obtained 
rather quickly growth in the recycling ratio. Moreover, improved knowledge and more 
efﬁcient solutions cause a drop in the unit cost. The unit cost has risen considerably the 
latest years, due to the fact that it is now more difﬁcult to collect the remaining tons 
than the ﬁrst ton. As mentioned above, it is critical to approach the waste generators in 
order to reduce the unit costs.
9.1.3 The balancing role of PRO – internally and externally
Evidently, the role of  Plastretur is critical to the recycling results that are obtained. The 
Plastretur system is marked-based, and relies on the cooperation with direct actors in 
the recycling system in order to reach its targets. There is, however, a thin line between 
just inﬂuencing the market through various measures and interfering the market to the 
extent that it disturbs market mechanisms. As shown in Chapter 8, a number of  direct 
actors have based their activities on predictable long-term conditions, and altering these 
will necessarily affect the direct actors. For instance, the subsidising principle of  ‘net cost 
coverage’ indicates that Plastretur does not reward high quality and good performance 
beyond the basic quality criteria in the contracts, but rather lift the revenues to a level 
that makes it interesting to deal with source separation and recycling activities. This is 
similar to public subsidising policy, but has generated some dissatisfaction among the 
direct actors, arguing that Plastretur does not reward quality, only quantity. 
The logic behind ‘net cost coverage’ is that the competition between the market actors 
shall reward quality, for instance so that Folldal Gjenvinning pays more for high quality 
from Norsk Gjenvinning than from other waste management companies without 
speciﬁc sorting lines. Norsk Gjenvinning argues that they should be free to send the 
sorted plastic packaging wherever they want. Plastretur then counter argues that Norsk 
Gjenvinning can do so, but then without any ﬁnancial support from Plastretur. Hence, 
this is about who is in command regarding the material and material ﬂows.
Thus, a key condition is that Plastretur balances the various interests of  the direct 
actors with Plastretur’s own objectives of  reaching the target. In this sense the PRO is 
similar to the role of  central authorities, except from the important fact that Plastretur 
does not have any legislation supporting its actions, but just a voluntary agreement. 
For instance, the waste management companies have been critical to the fact that key 
waste generators like the supermarket chains are part of  the Board of  Plastretur and 
make important decisions concerning for instance the structure of  the subsidies that 
necessarily affect the waste management companies as well. The fact that competitor 
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have another inﬂuence on the market rules is critical for the legitimacy of  the EPR 
scheme, and establishing and keeping credibility in towards these actors is imperative.
Plastretur has almost entirely focused on the actual waste management system. Combining 
various instruments, both ﬁnancial and informational, seems to be a fruitful mix, as 
discussed above. However, there are tendencies that the ﬁnancial support from Plastretur 
to direct actors are taken for granted as a regular income to the operating budget. This is 
critical as this does not provide any learning effect, according to Giddens, neither related 
to technology and organisational aspect nor to the basic values and norms. Therefore, 
in the long run, the efforts should to a greater extent be directed towards information, 
awareness rising and knowledge creation among the actors along the entire value chain, 
in order to stimulate the market forces to change accordingly. This role of  the PRO 
being created through an institutional innovation is signiﬁcant for educating end-of-
life actors and for getting ﬁnancial mechanisms for increased recycling. As for plastic 
packaging, the margins are incremental and key players in the market do not consider 
recycling to be economically beneﬁcial for corporates without the ﬁnancial support 
from Plastretur, at least within the broad scope of  the current covenant. However, this 
is a discussion of  whether the targets in the covenant represent a correct level, but this 
is beyond the scope of  this thesis to debate. 
Plastretur has primarily been targeting actors within the waste management system. 
However, within an industrial ecology perspective, improving the recycling ratio might be 
obtained through strategies both upstream among the producers and among secondary 
producers. As for the relation to upstream companies, the Board of  Plastretur has 
decided that Plastretur shall not concentrate on stimulating these companies, unless it 
contributes directly to increase the recycling ratio and making the target easier achievable. 
Hence, the signals from downstream actors, both Plastretur and direct actors are weak 
and counteracts a basic intention of  EPR. Interestingly, the seminar held by Plastretur 
for upstream companies was very welcomed, but was later on not prioritised as the tasks 
downstream were several and demanding. 
NOC and Materialretur are those institutions that mainly interact with upstream 
companies. The former is primarily focused on design changes up to consumers, but 
omits the EoL phase and consequently have no effect on the loop closing performance. 
As for Materialretur, they are not in contact with product designers, but with ﬁnancial 
managers and controllers and does, thus, not have any inﬂuence on the design process. 
In sum, there are few, if  any, signals from Plastretur towards upstream actors in order to 
prepare the ground for improved recycling. 
On the other side of  the waste management system, we ﬁnd the efforts to inﬂuence 
the demand for recycled material. Except from some early projects on this in 1996, this 
area has been entirely left out from Plastretur’s priority list. During development of  the 
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long term strategy for the period 2005 – 2008, carried out in 2003, there was a tangible 
suggestion that Plastretur should actively contribute to projects with participants from 
the material recycler all along the value chain towards the consumer of  the product that 
contained recycled plastic packaging. 
Although this is something that a company should be able to do, such assistance appears 
to be helpful. Experiences from Germany, where DKR has a speciﬁc role in developing 
such markets, indicate that this is an important part of  the recycling system (Quoden 
2004). This includes looking for new markets, also non-packaging, where polymers 
might substitute materials like glass and metals, as well as virgin polymers. Working 
actively towards designers to encourage them to include recycled materials is successful. 
This also creates lots of  publicity, which is excellent feedback to those initially sorting 
and collecting the plastic packaging waste.
This role as a coordinator for actors that previously have not been within the same 
network is entirely new, and important as seen from an industrial ecology perspective. 
The argument for doing this is to reduce the risk of  having lack of  receivers of  the 
recycled material, as the European market is heavily supplied with subsidised recovered 
plastic packaging. This is considered as a critical part of  developing a viable recycling 
system as it makes the system more demand driven, and not only supply driven as it so 
far has been. Providing stimuli for the material recyclers within the Plastretur system in 
order to focus on high quality and stable deliveries, seems to be important, as these issues 
makes potential customers somewhat hesitant to employ recycled material, particularly 
in extrusion processes.
The empirical material also points to some organisational issues that are critical for the 
outcome of  the system. First, the relation to local authorities illustrates that the policy 
framework is not entirely clear as to who is responsible for what. When local authorities 
demand full cost coverage, this is dramatic for the Plastretur system as such, as it is based 
on the assumption to collect the tonnage where this is least expensive. The stand point 
of  local authorities is principal, but might have practical consequences since Plastretur 
depends on collaborative local authorities as they are deciding how the collection system 
shall look like. Hence, a clear policy framework which deﬁnes responsibilities is a key 
condition.
As for the internal organisational issues, the empirical evidence clearly illustrates that 
there has been a development over time where the supermarket chains to a larger extent 
have taken control over the EPR schemes, reducing the roles of  the packaging producers 
and the packers and ﬁllers. One positive aspect of  this development is that the market, 
through the supermarket chains, will put pressure on their suppliers to improve their 
packaging solutions. This, however, is not necessarily positive for the recycling ratio as 
optimisation efforts primarily are taken up to the consumer phase and not further down 
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to the waste management system. Another positive aspect of  this is that it might increase 
the supply of  high quality plastic packaging waste from retailers and wholesalers. The 
drawback is that the decisions concerning for instance ﬁnancial mechanisms to a larger 
extent will go in the favour of  the supermarket chains. They sit on both sides of  the 
table, ﬁrst by deciding where the licence fees should be spent and then as one great 
waste generator having expenses when getting rid of  their waste. In this sense, they 
get paid by others to manage their own waste. This might reduce the legitimacy of  the 
EPR system with respect to the waste management companies. Hence, Plastretur has 
become a mean for corporates to improve their business positions, and not to reach the 
targets stated in the covenant. This might induce higher costs as decisions are not based 
on reaching the targets, but to optimise the business opportunities for key actors in the 
system. The same situation is seen abroad as well, for instance in Germany, where the 
introduction of  external owners to DSD reduced the above-mentioned problem, but at 
the same time also reduced the ownership of  the producers and consequently one key 
characteristic of  EPR.
The trend, however, seems to be that the recycling activities are to a larger extent dealt 
with by a free market, while the main focus for the PROs is at collection and sorting. For 
Plastretur as PRO within a relatively small market, the problem to address is whether 
to sort at home or abroad and whether to recycle at home or abroad. As was evident 
from Chapter 8, there are particular interests within the Board of  Plastretur that mix 
the upstream and downstream activities. Norfolier, being a member of  the Board of  
Plastretur, owns the largest recycling plant in Scandinavia. Folldal Gjenvinning is a 
substantial supplier of  cheap regranulated material for Norfolier’s production in Norway. 
Thus, the Plastretur system is both a guarantee for the supply of  recycled material 
(although this could be bought abroad) and, most importantly, that their processing 
plant gets subsidised for carrying out these recycling operations. It can therefore be said 
that the ‘packers and ﬁllers’ are ﬁnancing the operations of  Folldal Gjenvinning and 
Norfolier sits on both sides of  the table in this game. This is obviously not an optimal 
situation. As can be read from the cost estimates in Chapter 8, it would have been much 
cheaper if  the collected plastic packaging was exported and recycled abroad.
If  the waste management companies are left to themselves as of  how to treat the 
material, experiences say that a number of  companies would ﬁnd traders in the market 
that subsequently ﬁnd actual recyclers. There is then, however, no guarantee that the 
material is recycled in a proper way. 
There are, however, some potential pitfalls related to this analysis. First, if  the collected 
plastic packaging to a greater extent was exported, that might have had negative 
consequences on the households’ interests in doing a good job in sorting and bringing it 
properly to the container. Second, in the long run this might be far more costly. Thirdly, 
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these particular interests are not necessarily in line with what is best for Plastretur as 
a company. Plastretur’s objectives and targets might therefore be secondary to the 
Board.
9.1.4 Stronger threat concerning sanctioning
The data shows that several key actors do not consider the targets in the new covenant 
to be absolute. Interpreting the absoluteness of  the target in such a manner, face at 
least two explanations. First, they put emphasis on the paragraph in the covenant 
saying that the targets should be socio-economic optimal, and this optimum is subject 
to alteration depending on development in factors like technology development and 
general economic growth in the society. This reluctance with respect to the target might 
cause more modest strategies where the key point is to keep the level of  the licence fee 
rather than to do what is needed in order to reach 30 % material recycling. 
The other argument for this position is the lack of  consequences if  the targets are not 
reached. First, The Ministry of  Environment is generally satisﬁed with the performance 
(NMoE 2000, SFT 2004), and the political prestige on this issue is very high. Moreover, 
the EPR schemes have been running for a decade and have reduced the working load 
for NMoE considerably (Hambro 2003) and doing changes to the type of  policy for 
achieving certain environmental goals might not be appropriate. In addition, during 
these years a number of  institutions have been established and companies have made 
investments based on a long-term basis. We might therefore expect that NMoE will be 
reluctant to terminate the covenant and implement a tax instead. This shows a type of  
‘policy lock-in’ that the plastic packaging chain is able to take into their considerations 
when deciding strategies for the further development of  Plastretur. In sum, the threat 
from NMoE is in fact not present, which according to experiences from other countries 
(Clement 1998) and policy literature reduce the effectiveness of  the policy.
Another deﬁciency in the current covenant is the lack of  third party veriﬁcation. This 
is included in other EPR policies, for instance the WEEE directive. The lack of  third 
party veriﬁcation leaves the industrial players all by themselves to deﬁne the amount 
of  generated waste (which constitute the denominator), as well as the actual recycling 
data. SFT, the receiver of  the annual reports from Plastretur, admits on a general level 
that they do neither have the capacity nor the knowledge to quality control the numbers 
given by the PROs. That said, Plastretur has shown a trustworthiness and transparency 
on this issue so it should be relatively easy to check the numbers. We would nevertheless 
argue that lack of  third party veriﬁcation is a weakness in the system.
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9.2 Key conditions for successful EPR implementation upstream 
– dematerialisation and design for recycling
9.2.1 Incentives for producers to focus on downstream issues
Another key condition is to create motivation for designing environmentally friendly 
products. The data shows however that there is a critical lack of  such incentives, both 
from the covenant itself  and from Plastretur or other organisations being part of  the 
industrial implementation of  EPR. 
It is commonly accepted that EPR has the ability to provide incentives for companies 
to design environmentally friendly products and packages (Lindhqvist and Lifset, 1998). 
This study ﬁnds evidence that for the Norwegian EPR system on plastic packaging 
there are few, if  any, incentives for producers to redesign products and enhance EoL 
management. We might in fact conclude the other way around. By ‘outsourcing’ the 
responsibilities to Plastretur and just pay the licence fee, the upstream companies are 
stating that they take responsibility without actually changing their behaviours and way 
of  thinking for managing end-of-life issues. Plastretur takes care of  that, and appear 
more as a sleeping pillow for the environmental consciousness. Consequently, the 
covenant has not created “the tools and power relationships that in turn reinforce and 
further embed those visions and values in the cultural underpinnings of  routine actions” 
(Ehrenfeld 2000b, p 198) 
It conﬁrms that the “[R]esponsibility in the policy world of  EPR is understood some 
form of  legal duty, authorised by a legitimate government and enforced by the power of  
that authority”, and “turn out to be merely an elaborate case of  business-as-usual – with 
business doing basically what laws and regulations mandate” (Ehrenfeld 2000b, p 200). 
If  motivation for designing more environmentally friendly products does not emerge 
from the values and belief  (the ethical type of  responsibility) external motivation is 
needed. Looking at the point of  governmental intervention, we suggest primary three 
categories of  EPR policies that might contribute to motivate this.
Our data shows that if  the targets and commitments are downstream, the signals to 
upstream producers are weak and should rather be complemented with additional 
policy instruments that stimulate producers accordingly. This point is supported by 
for instance van Beukering and Hess (2002) saying that “rather than promoting one 
particular instrument it is concluded that none of  the policy categories is sufﬁcient to 
‘do the job’ alone. It is recognised that an appropriate balance needs to be struck between 
regulatory, economic and communicative instruments” (p51). This also provides signal 
to the policy makers (e.g. NMoE) that speciﬁc instruments should be implemented 
targeting upstream actors. This is, however, another argument than Veerman who states 
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that “EPR is not suited for prevention of  waste” (Veerman 2001), since, based on our 
understanding of  EPR (ref  Figure 3.3), it is just a matter of  designing (EPR) policy 
instruments to make this effective.
Moreover, the line of  argument saying that the covenant provides incentives for the 
producers to innovate products which are better prepared to be recycled1, does not take 
into account that the authorities will most probably not induce sanctions because they 
have put political prestige in this, and because it is impossible to prove that companies 
are not changing into a design-for-recycling behaviour, and consequently do not reach 
the targets. Independent of  what the producers actually do related to downstream issues 
they run no risk of  being punished, either by the market or by the authorities. Thus, the 
incentives to focus downstream are non-existing.
Through the case studies in Tine and Plastretur as well as the activities in NOC, we 
clearly see that the main focus for ‘the producers’ is related to the upstream phases. NOC 
deﬁnes packaging optimisation as the value chain onwards to the consumer. The case 
study of  Tine obviously indicates that the when designing new products and packaging, 
the incentives from neither the covenant nor Plastretur is as strong as design aspects like 
attractiveness, costs, product durability and safety, as well as functionality. 
Another argument along this line is that the ﬁnancial mechanisms set up by Plastretur 
are not making any difference on the easiness of  recycling. Contrary to individual EPR 
systems where the licence fee usually differentiated (see Tojo 2004, Lindhqvuist and 
Lifset 2003), a fee based on weight, and not on recyclability, prevents price signals to 
reach the producers. Cost reductions are one major reason for carrying out design 
changes, but these do only reduce the costs to licence fee if  using less material, and 
as shown in Figure 8.7 from Tine the cost of  licence fee is just 0.4 % of  the total 
packaging costs. Recalling Figure 3.2, the strength of  feedback from end-of-life phase 
back to the producers is too long and too weak, and thus neglectable. Hence, there are 
weak incentives for “producers to minimise the quantity of  materials introduced into 
commerce and to design for recyclability, re-usability, durability and related objectives 
in order to minimise their costs.” (Lifset 1999, page 2). The incentives for minimising 
the quantity lie primarily in the purchase of  the material and not in the licence fee. 
Moreover, the incentives for design for EoL is absent as there are no ﬁnancial risk 
connected to omitting doing this. A key condition is therefore to add EPR-based policy 
instruments to address such issues.
Materialretur has a broad interface with upstream companies while Plastretur has 
their main contacting surface with downstream companies. A consequence of  this is 
that information that Plastretur ideally should have brought to upstream companies 
related to product optimisation, packaging optimisation and design for recycling has a 
long way to go. Due to this long feedback loop, the signals from downstream phase to 
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upstream companies are rather weak. Obviously, when Plastretur explains the system 
for companies and fee payers they better understand it than if  just Materialretur does 
it. In fact, it seems that companies just pay the licence fee and do nothing except from 
that.
The key condition in this aspect is that there are incentives neither from the covenant nor 
from Plastretur to the producers to design for recycling. As for the covenant, targets and 
consequently commitments for the producers on design for recycling could have been 
posed, but this would probably be difﬁcult to carry out due to ambiguity concerning 
what and how to measure. 
Another option is to alter the ﬁnancial mechanisms so that there is linearity between 
licence fee and costs of  recycling. In a collective system like the one organised by 
Plastretur, this would have caused insurmountable administrative costs and resources 
as the number of  various plastic packaging products are in practice unlimited. For 
instance, in Germany with full cost coverage, the licence fee is ten times higher than in 
Norway. Another option might have been to differentiate between various groups of  
plastic packaging, for instance household waste (sales packaging) and industrial waste 
(transport packaging), but this would not have caused any incentive for the producers to 
act differently, only that the licence fee for sales packaging would have been higher.
In concluding, the present covenant contribute to an increased recycling ratio, that might 
be even higher if  the PRO focuses more on educating waste generator and creating 
stronger competition among waste management companies, but it has not contributed 
signiﬁcantly to design for recycling activities among upstream producers. This is contrary 
to existing assumption in the ﬁeld of  EPR.
9.2.2 Incentives to focus on upstream issues 
The empirical evidence clearly shows an atmosphere with a mixture of  factors and 
incentives that inﬂuence decisions made by the actors. In order to avoid free-riders, a 
successful action has been to stimulate the wholesalers and retailers to demand that their 
suppliers are members of  Materialretur. This shows that pressure along the value chain 
is a key condition. 
The retailers are also signiﬁcant in deﬁning how the packaging should be in order to 
reduce costs. However, as found in the Tine case and supported by Maldum (2003), 
the role of  the covenant in this is of  minor importance. That said, developing meeting 
places, for instance through NOC is increasing the awareness on this. 
The increased awareness is, though, just the starting point for actually making changes, 
because it is ﬁrst when the real decisions are to be made that the tangible incentives are 
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present. As found in the survey and in the Tine-case, costs, functionality, market pressure, 
attractiveness and other market-related factors are the most inﬂuential ones. The relative 
cost of  the licence fee is marginal compared to the overall packaging costs.
The power of  the covenant for design for recycling and dematerialisation is considered 
to be relatively weak. In Chapter 6 we found a relative dematerialisation connected 
to consumption and material input, but no absolute dematerialisation. Several argued 
that the demand for waste reduction counteracts the growth objective of  other non-
environmental policies. This is a real challenge as the increasing demand for packaging 
is due to more general development trends in society that involves larger and slower 
mechanisms that single companies are not able to inﬂuence. For instance, the new 
patterns of  living which to a larger extent involve one-person households and people 
getting older before founding families necessarily provide both higher packaging 
volumes and packaging intensities (conf. Figure 8.6). Thus, EPR policies are, isolated 
speaking, not able to reduce the absolute numbers of  packaging volume, and measuring 
this should be based on relative numbers. In order to obtain a larger degree of  relative 
waste reduction, there is a need for combining the core EPR policy with other policies, 
entering into an integrated product policy.
Our data shows that there is a weak causality between dematerialisation efforts and the 
covenant. This runs contrary to the existing literature. This usually shows the correlation 
between these two parameters, but not the causality. For instance, Lindhqvist employs 
Clement (1998) for arguing that “an effect of  the Dutch Packaging covenant of  1991 
was a drastic improvement of  the overall environmental impact of  packaging and a lot 
of  innovations” (Lindhqvist 2000, p 107). However, Clement (1998) does not show the 
causality between the covenant and innovations. Based on our data, we will draw the 
conclusion that there are other far more inﬂuencing factors that have contributed to 
the observed changes in packaging design, for instance cost reduction due to increased 
competition. That said, it is the way the policy instrument is designed and not EPR as 
a policy principle that is our key message. We consequently propose an IPP approach 
based on the EPR policy principle.
As mentioned above, NOC’s program for improved competence focuses on practical, 
economical and environmental improvements throughout the value chain from producer 
to consumer [author’s italic]. This statement shows that the focus is not on the entire life 
cycle. The covenant aims at certain recycling targets and packaging optimisation. These 
targets are in one way or another said to be fulﬁlled since the recovery ratio increases and 
there are many examples of  packaging optimisation (NOC 2002, 2003, 2004) However, 
the link between this optimisation and the recycling activities are missing. No actions are 
taken to make it easier for the recycling chain to increase recycling ratios, and no actions 
are taken to link the recycling activities with innovation upstream in order to increase 
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the market pull for recycled material. We might ask who should be responsible for 
establishing this missing link; Plastretur, NOC or other parts of  the society, for instance 
Ministry of  Trade and Industry. It is nevertheless a need for an integrated product 
policy based on an EPR policy principle in order to obtain this. Waste minimisation and 
packaging optimisation must be commenced through outer, stronger policy instruments 
than covenants.
9.3 Conclusion
As we have seen there are several key conditions to be identiﬁed. The overall key condition 
seems however to be to strengthen the link between the upstream and downstream 
activities. The main problem seems to be lack of  incentives for the producers to design 
for recycling. This is conﬁrmed by the survey and by the Tine-case. In order to obtain 
this, there is a need for harmonising the policy instruments throughout the life cycle, 
so that the producers also get into design for recycling. As shown by Tojo (2004), the 
incentives for this are stronger in individual systems. As for packaging it is virtually 
impossible to establish individual systems as the plastic packaging entering the market 
is subject to diffusion throughout the country and mix up with plastic packaging from 
other producers, as well as with other packaging materials. 
Those arguing that EPR is radical because it can stimulate and force actors to behave 
responsibly apparently overestimate the power of  EPR policies to induce changes. It 
is the instruments, not the concept itself  that induce changes, if  considering that the 
understanding of  responsibility has penetrated into the values and beliefs department. 
Our empirical evidence shows that it has not. Interestingly, however, is that within 
organisations it seems to be common understanding of  how well they are doing in the 
environmental realm. But when it comes to what they actually do, they are far behind 
what could be expected.
(Endnotes)
1 ‘EPR challenges not only a ﬁrm’s tools and authorities, but also its values and beliefs. They force designers 
and planners to consider issues left out if  the customary focus on cost and performance. And they open the 
ﬁrm up to new relationships with its suppliers, distributors, customers and waste managers.’ (Ehrenfeld in 
Fishbein, p224). 
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10. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of  this thesis was to identify key conditions for successful industrial 
implementation of  collective EPR programmes in the Norwegian plastic packaging 
system, according to an industrial ecology perspective. Key condition was deﬁned as 
those factors, both drivers and barriers, which are critical for the outcome of  industrial 
implementation of  EPR. As we have seen there are several key conditions to be identiﬁed. 
We have studied this by ﬁrst developing a theoretical framework based on the industrial 
ecology perspective and combined with a modiﬁed understanding on categories for 
EPR policy instruments we have developed an analytical framework which combines 
a material ﬂow approach and an actor approach. Based on this we have carried out a 
case study of  the Norwegian EPR system for plastic packaging, organised by Plastretur. 
We have shown the complexity of  this system by doing analysis on various levels, both 
with respect to material ﬂows and to actors. Our conclusions are primarily valid for this 
system only, but we have shown how our results correspond to existing literature, both 
theoretically and in practice. Below we will ﬁrst sum up the key conditions. Then we will 
clarify our scientiﬁc contributions as well as suggestions for further work on this topic.
10.1 Key conditions
The overall conclusion from this case study is that the Plastretur EPR scheme has proven 
to be successful with respect to recycling ratios and costs, while it has been less successful 
concerning dematerialisation and design for recycling. This conclusion is contrary to 
what is considered to be the strength of  EPR policies, but it provides empirical evidence 
for the arguments put forth by Veerman (2004) on the Dutch system, claiming that EPR 
has mainly effects downstream. We argue that one of  the reasons to this controversial 
result is that previous studies have not to a sufﬁcient extent taken into account the need 
for identifying the causality between EPR policy instruments and the observed effects. 
We have provided this through a detailed case study on various analytical levels.
10.1.1 Successful implementation downstream – loop closing
The key condition concerning loop closing was identiﬁed to be the need for correct sorting 
by waste generators. This is valid particular in small countries like Norway where the 
volumes are limited which do not invite to substantial technological innovations and 
investments. Being preventive by sorting correctly at the point of  waste generation is 
in line with an industrial ecology way of  thinking. In order to sort correctly, the waste 
generators need direct information and guidance both from the PROs and from the waste 
management companies. Identifying the highest improvement potentials is preferably 
done by employing a material ﬂow approach.
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Another key condition is to have a broad scope of  the system in order to obtain cost efﬁciency. 
If  so, the cheapest fractions can be selected ﬁrst and through this gaining experience on 
how to deal with the more expensive parts.
The role of  the PRO is obviously of  key importance. Our main ﬁnding is that the PRO 
executes a balancing role in order to inﬂuence the direct actors so that they contribute to 
the objectives of  the PRO. This includes for instance that the PRO interacts with the 
market in a way that the interests of  the various direct actors are taken into account 
when developing strategies and measures. Moreover, it implies that measures should 
be taken towards both primary and secondary upstream companies in order to create a 
pressure throughout the life cycle. Lack of  life cycle orientation is identiﬁed as a barrier to 
establishing sufﬁcient feedback mechanisms between downstream and upstream actors. 
This includes coordination of  actors that are not within the same network, for instance 
potential users of  recycled material.
As seen from the Ministry of  Environment point of  view, there is a need for a clear 
policy framework with deﬁned responsibilities, for instance the relationship between local 
authorities and the EPR schemes. For instance, lack of  technological investments in 
the recycling systems might be counteracted by central authorities providing additional 
policy instruments to stimulate this. That said, another part of  the role of  the central 
authorities is the sanctioning mechanism if  targets are not met. A barrier to successful 
implementation is lack of  sanctions.
10.1.2 Successful implementation upstream – dematerialisation and 
design for recycling
Our empirical data shows that the covenant does not seem to contribute the way it was 
meant. Among the main barriers is that it does not provide signiﬁcant incentives for producers 
to take aspects of  design for recycling or dematerialisation into account. The main 
explanation to this is that other factors are more signiﬁcant to the companies in general 
and the product designers in particular. EPR for a majority of  the upstream companies 
remains basically a matter of  licence fee payment. In order to increase the awareness of  the 
producer responsibility, wider group of  interests and shareholders in PRO might be 
appropriate. In the current Plastretur EPR system, most of  the 1800 licence fee payers 
are not involved in the system except from paying the fee.
In order to strengthen the link between downstream actors and upstream actors, the PROs should 
play a larger role through communication and guidance to upstream actors. Then the 
signals and requirements from actors in the recovery system might come through. As 
for the Plastretur, they have become a sleeping pillow for the upstream companies, which 
argue that the waste management is taken care of  by the PRO and consequently that 
208
Chapter 10
they do not have to think about it.
Overall, in order to achieve the objectives stated theoretically within EPR literature, 
there is a need for combining core EPR-policies with other types of  policies so that it 
becomes an integrated product policy with incentives and pressures throughout the life cycle. This 
should be carried out both from the central authorities’ point of  view and from the 
PRO’s point of  view.
10.2  Scientiﬁc contributions
10.2.1 Theoretical contributions
This thesis contributes theoretically primarily in two directions. First, we have suggested 
a theoretical framework for industrial ecology consisting of  three perspectives: i) 
the resource perspective, ii) the networks of  actors’ perspective and iii) the systems 
perspective. This framework contributes to develop the analytical frame work employed 
in this thesis. The theoretical framework is developed in order to take into account 
the roles and interests of  actors when studying industrial economic systems. The case 
study in this thesis shows that this is signiﬁcant for understanding the system and the 
mechanisms causing changes. The distinction between direct and indirect actors provides 
useful insight to distinguish between how various actors inﬂuence the system. However, 
this is just a staring point and empirical studies must be conducted in order to discover 
the actual inﬂuence.
The second major theoretical contribution is considered to be the categorisation 
of  EPR policy instruments for understanding how the incentives inherent in these 
instruments inﬂuence the producers. It is argued that if  the producers’ commitments 
are not within their core domain, the feedback mechanisms to product design (design 
for environment) are weak. Thus, in order to provide incentives for design changes 
that will reduce the environmental impact other places in the life cycle, EPR policy 
instruments should be targeted within their core domain. An example of  this is the 
RoHS directive. Phrased differently, the assumption that EPR stimulate actors to behave 
responsibly, apparently overestimates the power of  EPR to induce changes. That said, 
it is the policy instruments, and not the concept itself, that induce changes, and careful 
attention should be given to the design of  these EPR policy instruments in an integrated 
product policy framework.
10.2.2 Methodological contributions
This thesis contributes methodologically by providing an analytical framework for 
studying industrial economic systems. Combining the material ﬂow approach and actor 
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analysis represents two important aspect of  industrial ecology: the resource perspective 
and the network of  actors’ perspective with its actors with various interests. By doing 
this, we are able to better understand the development of  material ﬂows and the reasons 
for why they have become the way they have. This thesis has shown how this analytical 
framework can be applied. Basic to this analytical approach is that understanding a 
system demands knowledge on mechanisms, not only output indicators, although 
this is a very good starting point for the analysis. However, if  time and resources are 
scares, the proposed analytical framework suggest to start with an overall picture of  
the system and move into ‘the black box’ as the need for further explanations on the 
observed developments arise. Also, by combining material ﬂows and monetary ﬂows, 
the mechanisms within the system become more evident. 
10.3  Further work
The most obvious suggestion to further studies in this area is to carry out comparative 
studies, preferably by using the same analytical framework, on other EPR systems. 
First, the Dutch covenant system could be investigated as it seems to face some of  the 
same development trends. Second, other plastic packaging systems in the EU might be 
studied, preferable with as many parameters as possible similar to the Plastretur EPR 
system, in order to be able to control for these variables. Moreover, comparative studies 
can be done on more differentiating systems as well, for instance comparing individual 
EPR schemes with collective EPR schemes.
On the methodological side, studies are encouraged to be carried out by employing 
the matrix calculations, in order to more easy identify the losses from waste generators 
towards the recyclers.
Moreover, this thesis does only to a limited extent discuss the material qualities within 
the recycling systems. Hence, combining the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of  
the material ﬂows within recycling systems like this would provide an even better insight 
to the performance of  the recycling systems. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CFC –  Chloroﬂuorocarbon
CfSD – Centre for Sustainable Development
DfE –  Design for Environment
DKR –  Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kunststoff-Recycling mbH
DMF -  Norwegian industrial environmental association for wholesalers and   
  retailers
DMI – Direct material input
DNE –  Norwegian Packaging Association
DSD –  Duales System Deutschland
EE –   Electrical and electronic 
EEE –  Electrical and electronic equipment
EoL –  End-of-life
EPP –  Environmental Product Policy
EPR –  Extended Producer Responsibility
EPRO –  European Association of  Plastics Recycling and Recovery Organisation
EPS –  Expanded polystyrene
ERA –  Environmental risk assessment 
GATT –  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP –  Gross domestic product
HDPE –  High density poly-ethylene
HSH –  Handelens og Servicenæringens Hovedorganisasjon [Association for 
trade and service industry]
IOA –  Input/ output analysis
IPP –   Integrated product policy
LCA –  Life cycle assessments
LCC –  Life cycle costs 
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LDPE –  Low density poly-ethylene
LLDPE – Linear low density poly-ethylene
MFA –  Material Flow Accounting
MIPS –  Material Input pr Service
MMI –  Markeds- og Mediainstituttet [The Norwegian Institute for Market and 
Media]
NACE –  Classiﬁcation of  Economic Activities in the European Community
NGO –   Non Governmental Organisations
NHO  Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon [Confederation of  Norwegian 
Enterprises]
NOC –  The Industrial Packaging Optimization Committee
NOK –  Norwegian kroner (currency)
NMoE –  Norwegian Ministry of  Environment
NR –   Norsk Returkartong
NTNU –  Norwegian University of   Science and Technology
PBB –  Poly-brominated biphenyls
PBDE –  Poly-brominated diphenyl ethers
PET –  Poly-ethylene terephthalate
PP –   Poly-propylene
PP –   Plastic packaging
PPP –  Polluter Pays Principle
PRN –  Packaging waste recovery notes
PRO –  Producer Responsibility Organisations
PS –   Polystyrene
PVC –  Polyvinylchloride
R & D –  Research and Development
RoHS – Restrictions of  the Use of  Certain Hazardous Substances
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SFA –   Substance Flow Analysis
SFT –   Norwegian Pollution Control Authority
SSB –   Statistics Norway
STØ –  Stiftelsen Østfoldforskning
TCI –   Technological change and innovation 
TMR –  Total Material Requirement
TM –   Tine Meierier
TNM –  Tine Norske Meierier 
TNM FoU – Tine Norske Meierier Research and Development
UN –   United Nations
WBCSD – World Business Council for Sustainable Development
WEEE –  Waste electrical and electronic equipment
WMC –  Waste Management Company
WTO –  World Trade Organisation
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APPENDIX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
This list of  interviewees includes those interviewed in the two main organisations that 
have been subject to investigation in this thesis; Tine and Plastretur. Some persons 
in Plastretur have been interviewed several times, particularly during the periods of  
participating observation in June 2002, June – August 2003 and August 2004, and this 
is noted accordingly. 
In addition to those mentioned below, a number of  interviews (>20) have been conducted 
with single companies along the life cycle, and those directly employed in the thesis, is 
referred in the reference list, under the heading ‘personal communication’.
Interviewees in the Tine case
Ove Johansen  market director   Tine R&D 27 September 2001
         3 October 2001
         20 September 2002
Marit Sverdrup  Leader of  Tine Market Dept. Tine Market 2 October 2001
Edel Nagle  Packaging responsible  Tine Market 2 October 2001
Aage Kvande  sales and marketing manager Tine Midt-Norge 23 April 2002
Stein Aasgaard  managing director  Tine Midt-Norge 26 April 2002
Per-Odd Lyngås  quality manager   Tine Midt-Norge 26 april 2002
Ola Mogstad  communication manager  Tine Midt-Norge 23 april 2002
Inger Lise Sætra  advisor    Tine R&D 19 September 2002
Merete Høraas Eide environmental advisor  Tine R & D  1 October 2001
Janne Iren Dalberg product developer  Tine R & D 1 October 2001
Eirik Selmer-Olsen researcher ingredients  Tine R & D 4 October 2001
         19 September 2002
Hanne Refsholt  director R & D   Tine R & D 3 October 2001
         15 October 2002
Sonja Iversen  leader    Tine Personnel & Competence 14 October 2002
Ragnar T. Solgaard leader of  packaging dept. Tine R & D 28 September 2001
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          2 October 2001
Iver Sylte  manager   Tine Midt-Norge 22 April 2002
Bjørn Tho  purchasing manager  Tine Øst/Tine  5 October 2001
Aage Jacobsen  leader labour union  Tine   3 October 2001
Interviewees in the Plastretur organisation
Peter Sundt  managing director  Plastretur several dates in 2002-05
Geir Schefte  technical director  Plastretur several dates in 2002-05
Per Gjester  sales director   Plastretur several dates in 2002-05
Edgar Skjervold  ﬁnancial director  Plastretur several dates in 2002-05
Eirik Oland  information director  Plastretur 13 June 2002
Gerd-Oddveig Braaten region manager   Plastretur 14 June 2002
Asbjørn Bratterud region manager   Pøastretur 13 June 2002
Dag Aursland  region manager   Plastretur 12 June 2002
Kjell Olav Maldum board member   Plastretur 1 and 12 December 2003
Steinar Skilhagen chairman of  the board  Plastretur 5 August 2002
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APPENDIX C1: DENOMINATOR FOR THE PLASTRETUR SYSTEM 1995 - 2004
DENOMINATOR Commerce and industry
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Film 25 125    25 150    25 800   27 100   28 050   29 250        30 750   31 450   32 100 32 500
PP-bags 1 700      1 700      1 700     1 830     1 700     1 700          1 600     1 600     1 600 1 600
Rigid packaging 8 900      8 900      9 200     9 800     10 250   10 800        11 500   11 800   12 100 12 300
Feedstock recycling
Reuse 3 900      3 900      3 800     3 745     3 700     3 200          2 700     2 200     1 700 1 200
SUM DENOMINATOR 39 625 39 650   40 500   42 475 43 700  44 950      46 550  47 050   47 500    47 600  
DENOMINATOR Agriculture
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Film 5 000      5 100      5 200     5 564     5 750     6 000          6 300     6 600     6 950 7 200
PP-bags 1 250      1 200      1 200     1 156     1 100     1 050          1 000     970         930 900
Rigid packaging 650          630          600         578         520         480             440         400         350 300
Feedstock recycling
Reuse
SUM DENOMINATOR 6 900      6 930     7 000     7 298    7 370    7 530        7 740    7 970     8 230 8 400
DENOMINATOR Aquaculture
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Film 1 450      1 450      1 400     1 391     1 200     900             600         300         0 0
PP-bags 1 700      1 730      1 750     1 782     1 800     1 840          1 880     1 920     1 960 2 000
Rigid packaging
Feedstock recycling
Reuse
SUM DENOMINATOR 3 150      3 180      3 150     3 173     3 000     2 740          2 480     2 220     1 960      2 000     
DENOMINATOR Households
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Film 25 100    25 200    26 400   29 000   30 800   33 150        36 150   37 500   38 750 39 550
PP-bags -          -          -         48           -          -              -         -         0 0
Rigid packaging 15 730    15 750    16 350   17 550   18 450   19 550        20 950   20 600   21 200 21 550
Feedstock recycling -         
Reuse 0
SUM DENOMINATOR 40 830    40 950    42 750   46 598   49 250   52 700        57 100   58 100   59 950 61 100
DENOMINATOR TOTAL SUM
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Film 56 675 56 900 58 800 63 055 65 800 69 300 73 800 75 850 77 800 79 250
PP-bags 4 650 4 630 4 650 4 816 4 600 4 590 4 480 4 490 4 490 4 500
Rigid packaging 25 280 25 280 26 150 27 928 29 220 30 830 32 890 32 800 33 650 34 150
Feedstock recycling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reuse 3 900 3 900 3 800 3 745 3 700 3 200 2 700 2 200 1 700 1 200
SUM DENOMINATOR 90 505 90 710 93 400 99 544 103 320 107 920 113 870 115 340 117 640 119 100
APPENDIX C: DATA FROM THE PLASTRETUR CASE
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Question 1: Your organisation is
15 16,1
26 28,0
8 8,6
2 2,2
26 28,0
5 5,4
4 4,3
7 7,5
93 100,0
A Norwegian producer og plastics or plastic packaging
A Norwegian user of plastic packaging (packer&filler)
A wholesaler or retailer in Norwegian tertiary sector
A industrial organisation or PRO
A waste management company
A sorting or waste treatment company
A recycler company
An importer of plastic packaging
Total
Frequency Percent
Type of organisation
56 60,2
35 37,6
2 2,2
93 100,0
upstream
downstream
other
Total
Frequency Percent
Question 2: What type of plastic packaging are you involved in?
11 9 36 56
19,6% 16,1% 64,3% 100,0%
11 9 15 35
31,4% 25,7% 42,9% 100,0%
0 0 2 2
,0% ,0% 100,0% 100,0%
22 18 53 93
23,7% 19,4% 57,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
Sales/inner
packaging
Transport or
industrial
packaging Both types
Type of plastic packaging
Total
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Question 3: What are the most important environmental problems caused by 'your' plastic 
packaging/process the latest 10 years?
Typeorg * Increased amount of waste Crosstabulation
24 32 56
42,9% 57,1% 100,0%
13 22 35
37,1% 62,9% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
39 54 93
41,9% 58,1% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased amount of
waste
Total
Typeorg * Emissions of GHGs from waste treatment plants Crosstabulation
52 4 56
92,9% 7,1% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
83 10 93
89,2% 10,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Emissions of GHGs
from waste treatment
plants
Total
Typeorg * Emissions of toxic substance from waste treatment plants Crosstabulation
53 3 56
94,6% 5,4% 100,0%
30 5 35
85,7% 14,3% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
85 8 93
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Emissions of toxic
substance from waste
treatment plants
Total
Typeorg * Consumption of limited non-renewable resources Crosstabulation
34 22 56
60,7% 39,3% 100,0%
27 8 35
77,1% 22,9% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
62 31 93
66,7% 33,3% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Consumption of limited
non-renewable
resources
Total
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Typeorg * Emissions of GHGs from production and transport Crosstabulation
49 7 56
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
83 10 93
89,2% 10,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Emissions of GHGs
from production and
transport
Total
Typeorg * My plastic packaging cause neglectable environmental problems Crosstabulation
38 18 56
67,9% 32,1% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
72 21 93
77,4% 22,6% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
My plastic packaging
cause neglectable
environmental problems
Total
Typeorg * Other environmental problems Crosstabulation
53 3 56
94,6% 5,4% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
83 10 93
89,2% 10,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other environmental
problems
Total
38,1% 54,8% 7,1%
64,7% 35,3% ,0%
46,7% 48,3% 5,0%
upstream
downstream
Total
Yes, very
important
Somewhat important, not among
the most important ones
No, not
important
Have environmental issues been important when carrying out
t h l i l h
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Question 5: Have environmental issues been important when doing technological changes?
33,9% 53,6% 12,5%
51,4% 34,3% 8,6%
40,9% 45,2% 10,8%
upstream
downstream
Total
Yes, very
important
Somewhat important, not among
the most important ones
No, not
important
Have environmental issues been important when carrying out
technological changes
Question 6: Have you conducted changes in plastic packaging or related processes the latest 10 years?
,0% 75,0% 25,0%
5,7% 48,6% 45,7%
2,2% 64,5% 33,3%
upstream
downstream
Total
Not answered Yes No
Have you conducted changes in plastic
packaging or related processes last 10
years
Question 7: What changes have been carried out?
62,5%
2,9%
38,7%
upstream
downstream
Total
Reduced
consumption
of materials
Typeorg * Reduced consumption of materials Crosstabulation
21 35 56
37,5% 62,5% 100,0%
34 1 35
97,1% 2,9% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
57 36 93
61,3% 38,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Reduced consumption
of materials
Total
Typeorg * Eliminationn of potentially toxic substances Crosstabulation
34 22 56
60,7% 39,3% 100,0%
35 0 35
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
71 22 93
76,3% 23,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Eliminationn of
potentially toxic
substances
Total
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Typeorg * Substitution of substances/materials (e.g. recycled material) Crosstabulation
44 12 56
78,6% 21,4% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
78 15 93
83,9% 16,1% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Substutution of
substances/materials (e.
g. recycled material)
Total
Typeorg * Reduced energy consumption in production phase Crosstabulation
46 10 56
82,1% 17,9% 100,0%
34 1 35
97,1% 2,9% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
82 11 93
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Reduced energy
consumption in
production phase
Total
Typeorg * Reduced waste generation in production phase Crosstabulation
34 22 56
60,7% 39,3% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
65 28 93
69,9% 30,1% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Reduced waste
generation in production
phase
Total
Typeorg * Changed functionality in the plastic packaging Crosstabulation
46 10 56
82,1% 17,9% 100,0%
34 1 35
97,1% 2,9% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
82 11 93
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Changed functionality in
the plastic packaging
Total
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Typeorg * Increased suitability for material recycling Crosstabulation
41 15 56
73,2% 26,8% 100,0%
25 10 35
71,4% 28,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
68 25 93
73,1% 26,9% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased suitability for
material recycling
Total
Typeorg * Generally increased efficiency of the processes Crosstabulation
40 16 56
71,4% 28,6% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
73 20 93
78,5% 21,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Generally increased
efficiency of the
processes
Total
Typeorg * Other changes Crosstabulation
52 4 56
92,9% 7,1% 100,0%
31 4 35
88,6% 11,4% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
85 8 93
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other changes
Total
248
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Question 9: What is the frequence of the changes?
5,4% 8,9% 60,7% 3,6%
14,3% ,0% 20,0% 2,9%
8,6% 5,4% 45,2% 3,2%
upstream
downstream
Total
Once on several
types of plastic
packaging
Once on one
type of plastic
packaging
Continuous changes
on several types of
plastic packaging
Continuous changes
on one type of plastic
packaging
What is the frequency of the changes
Question 10: When were these changes in general carried out?
3,6% 17,9% 7,1% 46,4% 5,4%
,0% 14,3% 17,1% 11,4% 5,7%
2,2% 16,1% 10,8% 33,3% 5,4%
upstream
downstream
Total
1995 - 1997 1998 - 2000 2001 - 2003 All the time Not able to specifiy
When were these changes in general carried out
Question 11: Which environmental problems did the changes reduce?
Typeorg * Increasing amount of waste Crosstabulation
16 40 56
28,6% 71,4% 100,0%
18 17 35
51,4% 48,6% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
35 58 93
37,6% 62,4% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increasing amount of
waste
Total
Typeorg * The content of toxic substances Crosstabulation
38 18 56
67,9% 32,1% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
71 22 93
76,3% 23,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
The content of toxic
substances
Total
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Typeorg * Consumption of natural resources Crosstabulation
33 23 56
58,9% 41,1% 100,0%
24 11 35
68,6% 31,4% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
59 34 93
63,4% 36,6% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Consumption of natural
resources
Total
Typeorg * Emissions of GreenHouseGases Crosstabulation
49 7 56
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
80 13 93
86,0% 14,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Emissions of
GreenHouseGases
Total
Typeorg * Other environmental problems reduced Crosstabulation
49 7 56
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
33 2 35
94,3% 5,7% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
84 9 93
90,3% 9,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other environmental
problems reduced
Total
250
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Question 13: What were the most important drivers for the changes carried out?
Typeorg * The covenant on plastic packaging  Crosstabulation
38 18 56
67,9% 32,1% 100,0%
28 7 35
80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
67 26 93
72,0% 28,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
The covenant on plastic
packaging
Total
Typeorg * Other Norwegian environmental regualtions Crosstabulation
51 5 56
91,1% 8,9% 100,0%
33 2 35
94,3% 5,7% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
86 7 93
92,5% 7,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other Norwegian
environmental
regualtions
Total
Typeorg * Environmental regulations in EU Crosstabulation
50 6 56
89,3% 10,7% 100,0%
33 2 35
94,3% 5,7% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
84 9 93
90,3% 9,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Environmental
regulations in EU
Total
Typeorg * Other Norwegian 'non-environmental' regualtions Crosstabulation
50 6 56
89,3% 10,7% 100,0%
35 0 35
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
87 6 93
93,5% 6,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other Norwegian
'non-environmental'
regualtions
Total
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Typeorg * Cost Reductions Crosstabulation
22 34 56
39,3% 60,7% 100,0%
23 12 35
65,7% 34,3% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
47 46 93
50,5% 49,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Cost Reductions
Total
Typeorg * Pressure from the market Crosstabulation
35 21 56
62,5% 37,5% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
69 24 93
74,2% 25,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Pressure from the
market
Total
Typeorg * Pressure from competitors and suppliers Crosstabulation
43 13 56
76,8% 23,2% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
74 19 93
79,6% 20,4% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Pressure from
competitors and
suppliers
Total
Typeorg * Environmental consciouseness in the company Crosstabulation
31 25 56
55,4% 44,6% 100,0%
21 14 35
60,0% 40,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
54 39 93
58,1% 41,9% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Environmental
consciouseness in the
company
Total
252
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Typeorg * Pressure from media, environmental and other NGOs Crosstabulation
52 4 56
92,9% 7,1% 100,0%
32 3 35
91,4% 8,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
86 7 93
92,5% 7,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Pressure from media,
environmental and other
NGOs
Total
Typeorg * Other contributing factors Crosstabulation
54 2 56
96,4% 3,6% 100,0%
34 1 35
97,1% 2,9% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
90 3 93
96,8% 3,2% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other contributing
factors
Total
Question 15: What are the main reasons why changes were NOT carried out?
Typeorg * Too high development costs Crosstabulation
48 8 56
85,7% 14,3% 100,0%
34 1 35
97,1% 2,9% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
84 9 93
90,3% 9,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Too high development
costs
Total
Typeorg * Too low cost savings Crosstabulation
44 12 56
78,6% 21,4% 100,0%
28 7 35
80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
74 19 93
79,6% 20,4% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Too low cost savings
Total
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Typeorg * Lack of incentives from the covenant between NMoE and the industry Crosstabulation
54 2 56
96,4% 3,6% 100,0%
31 4 35
88,6% 11,4% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
87 6 93
93,5% 6,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Lack of incentives from
the covenant between
NMoE and the industry
Total
Typeorg * Lack of incentives from other EU and Norwegian regulations Crosstabulation
53 3 56
94,6% 5,4% 100,0%
33 2 35
94,3% 5,7% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
88 5 93
94,6% 5,4% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Lack of incentives from
other EU and Norwegian
regulations
Total
Typeorg * Lack of demand on environmentally friendly plastic packaging products in the market Crosstabulation
40 16 56
71,4% 28,6% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
70 23 93
75,3% 24,7% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Lack of demand on
environmentally friendly
plastic packaging
products in the market
Total
Typeorg * All others in the sector produce the same and we do not need to be different Crosstabulation
49 7 56
87,5% 12,5% 100,0%
33 2 35
94,3% 5,7% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
83 10 93
89,2% 10,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
All others in the sector
produce the same and
we do not need to be
different
Total
254
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Typeorg * Other factors preventing changes Crosstabulation
44 12 56
78,6% 21,4% 100,0%
28 7 35
80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
74 19 93
79,6% 20,4% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other factors preventing
changes
Total
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Question 17: What will be decisive factors for your company to do environmentally friendly changes in 
future?
Typeorg * Changes in the covenant Crosstabulation
45 11 56
80,4% 19,6% 100,0%
26 9 35
74,3% 25,7% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
73 20 93
78,5% 21,5% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Changes in the
covenant
Total
Typeorg * Stricter Norwegian environmental regulations Crosstabulation
35 21 56
62,5% 37,5% 100,0%
26 9 35
74,3% 25,7% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
63 30 93
67,7% 32,3% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Stricter Norwegian
environmental
regulations
Total
Typeorg * Stricter EU environmental regulations Crosstabulation
37 19 56
66,1% 33,9% 100,0%
28 7 35
80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
67 26 93
72,0% 28,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Stricter EU
environmental
regulations
Total
256
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Typeorg * Stricter non-environmental regulations in EU or Norway Crosstabulation
54 2 56
96,4% 3,6% 100,0%
33 2 35
94,3% 5,7% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
89 4 93
95,7% 4,3% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Stricter
non-environmental
regulations in EU or
Norway
Total
Typeorg * Increased pressure from costumers Crosstabulation
11 45 56
19,6% 80,4% 100,0%
24 11 35
68,6% 31,4% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
37 56 93
39,8% 60,2% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased pressure from
costumers
Total
Typeorg * Increased demand on cost reductions Crosstabulation
36 20 56
64,3% 35,7% 100,0%
18 17 35
51,4% 48,6% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
56 37 93
60,2% 39,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased demand on
cost reductions
Total
Typeorg * Increased pressure from competitor and/or suppliers Crosstabulation
41 15 56
73,2% 26,8% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
72 21 93
77,4% 22,6% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased pressure from
competitor and/or
suppliers
Total
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Typeorg * Increased environmental consciuousness within the company Crosstabulation
36 20 56
64,3% 35,7% 100,0%
28 7 35
80,0% 20,0% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
66 27 93
71,0% 29,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased
environmental
consciuousness within
the company
Total
Typeorg * Increased pressure from NGOs and media Crosstabulation
47 9 56
83,9% 16,1% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
78 15 93
83,9% 16,1% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased pressure from
NGOs and media
Total
Typeorg * Increased knowledge on environmental impacts and on how to improve
environmental performance Crosstabulation
36 20 56
64,3% 35,7% 100,0%
29 6 35
82,9% 17,1% 100,0%
2 0 2
100,0% ,0% 100,0%
67 26 93
72,0% 28,0% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Increased knowledge on
environmental impacts
and on how to improve
environmental
performance
Total
Typeorg * Other factors Crosstabulation
50 6 56
89,3% 10,7% 100,0%
31 4 35
88,6% 11,4% 100,0%
1 1 2
50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
82 11 93
88,2% 11,8% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
No Yes
Other factors
Total
258
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Question 19: Has EPR contributed to increased cooperation between actors for developing environmentally 
friendlier packaging solutions?
Typeorg * Has EPR contributed to increased cooperation between actors for developing environmentally
friendlier packaging solutions Crosstabulation
1 14 23 18 56
1,8% 25,0% 41,1% 32,1% 100,0%
7 11 6 11 35
20,0% 31,4% 17,1% 31,4% 100,0%
0 0 1 1 2
,0% ,0% 50,0% 50,0% 100,0%
8 25 30 30 93
8,6% 26,9% 32,3% 32,3% 100,0%
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
Count
% within Typeorg
upstream
downstream
other
Typeorg
Total
Not
answered Yes
More
cooperation,
but not due to
the covenant
No, covenant
without
significance
Has EPR contributed to increased cooperation between
actors for developing environmentally friendlier
packaging solutions
Total
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